


JPRS-UMA-89-013
26 MAY 1989



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-89-013

CONTENTS

26 May 1989

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Soldier's Drug Use Discussed [S. Brish; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 3, Mar 89]	1
Roundtable Discussion on Interethnic Relations in Military [O. A. Belkov et al; SOVETSKIY VOIN No 4, Feb 89]	2
Military Jurist Interviewed on Rule of Law [P. Panov; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 6, Mar 89]	7
Editorial on Final Stage of Military Electoral Campaign [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Mar 89]	8
Lizichev Meets With Candidates in GSFG [A. Vasilets; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Mar 89]	10
Armed Forces Election Day Coverage [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 89]	10
GLAVPU Examines State of Anti-Alcohol Campaign [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Mar 89]	12

ARMED FORCES

Officer Education's Role in Decline of Professional Prestige [N. Saratov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Mar 89]	14
Cut Forces by Raising Draftee Standards [T. Ivanova; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 12, 25-31 Mar 89] ...	15
Proposal to Raise Draft Age to 19 [V. Sivtsov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 26 Mar 89]	15
Military Equipment Transfer to Patriotic Associations [V. Bogdanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 89]	16
Cooperation Between Defense, MVD Motor Vehicle Inspectorates [V. Ryzhkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 89]	16
Cooperative to Provide Job Placement Aid to Retired Servicemen [L. Yalkitman; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 89]	17
Trial Reveals Malfeasance in Military Commissariat in Vilnius [G. Konchyus and N. Nadezhdina; TRUD, 4 Apr 89]	18
Col Gen Krivosheyev Responds to Readers' Concerns on Draft [R. Makushin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Apr 89]	21

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Mar Avn Yefimov: Improving Qualitative Parameters of Aviation Operations [A. Yefimov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Mar 89]	23
Moscow PVO Problems Clearing Winter Runways [A. Voynov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Mar 89]	25
Journalists Visit Far Eastern Air Defense, Note Threat from U.S. Military, Intelligence Presence [A. Gorokhov; PRAVDA, 9 Apr 89]	27

NAVAL FORCES

Night ASW Operation Described [V. Pasyakin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Mar 89]	31
--	----

CIVIL DEFENSE

Training Program Plans 'Significant Reduction' of Training [A. Ryakhov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 11, 1988]	33
--	----

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

MRL-1 Weather Radar Station [V. Knyazkov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 3, Mar 89]	36
Light Industry Unresponsive to AF Concerns on Flight Uniforms [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Mar 89] ...	37

DOSA AF

- 'Restructuring' DOSAAF to Fit Lithuania [G. Taurinskas; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 15 Mar 89] 39

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

- Role, Problems of 'Vystrel' Courses in Training [L. Generalov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Mar 89] 43
New Rules for Acceptance into Military Schools [V. Arapov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Mar 89] 45
New 'Language' to Facilitate Technology Assimilation [V. Surnin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Apr 89] 48

MILITARY HISTORY

- Reasons for Early Losses in WWII Discussed [SOVETSKIY VOIN No 2, Feb 89] 51
Soviet Program to Design ICBM Reviewed [G. Tyulin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Apr 89] 55

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

- Tenets of, Debate on U.S. 'Strategy of Competition'
[Yu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Mar 89] 62
Norwegian Military Committee Chairman on Purpose of Visit
[K.M. Fredheim; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Mar 89] 63

AFGHANISTAN

- Gromov's Experiences in Afghanistan Considered
[V. Roschupkin and A. Oliynik; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 1, Feb 89] 65

Soldier's Drug Use Discussed

18010488 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in
Russian No 3, Mar 89 pp 18-19

[Article by S. Brish: "A Difficult Return"]

[Text] "And did you begin taking drugs long ago?" I ask Private Viktor Shuvaev who is seated opposite me.

"I do not remember, I was still in school," he answers softly.

I feel how unpleasant and painful this conversation is for him. Nearly a year has passed and once again all of his still short life has been reflected upon. Each of its days has been rethought and enmeshed in thought and each action and movement of this soul has been given a strict and brutally honest evaluation. Otherwise this whole journey of his from non-existence to a life completely different and completely new could not occur.

"The guys and I were sniffing something or other then," continues Shuvaev, "either some sort of paint or glue, I do not remember."

"And just what did you experience after that?"

"Well, nothing, later I had a headache, spots before my eyes, and I was nauseous."

"You knew then how dangerous these "[toxic] sniffing substances" were and understood what they would lead to?"

"No, I was simply interested in them."

"And did you often...get high?"

"No, what are you saying? It was seldom. Very seldom," he added after a pause.

He did not even know this word then—"toksinomaniya" [toxic substance abuse]. He did not understand that sniffing and taking any toxic substances leads to that terrible line beyond which is the organism's unhealthy attachment to poisons which destroy the brain, health, and beyond which is rapid, irreversible emotional and physical degradation, and afterwards, death. A year ago, he was within a hairbreadth of death.

"He's regained consciousness, doctor..." a nurse's voice carried to Private Shuvaev as if from afar. He half-opened his eyes, his eyelids began to tremble, and he did not want to sleep anymore. Shuvaev was looking at the ceiling and trying to remember what happened to him yesterday. But his brain [acted] as if it was this smooth white hospital ward ceiling.

"He pulled through," a slightly tired voice pronounce this word calmly from the rear [of the room]. Someone carefully raised his head from the pillow and raised a

glass of water to his chapped lips. Shuvaev painfully swallowed once and then again down his parched throat and, as if he had expended all of his strength on these spasmodic swallows, he fell back on the pillow. His spirit shrunk with horror and he wanted to howl in despair, fear, and pain, but only a weak squeal escaped from his throat—he remembered, he remembered everything...

There were few patients on that day. In the evening, Medical Attendant Private Viktor Shuvaev carried out all of his duties, made notes, chatted for a few minutes with the Floor Nurse and went to his office, the duty medical attendant's small room. It was getting dark outside the window. A calm, long evening lie ahead but Viktor was tormented by a state of restlessness. He picked up a book, leafed through a few pages from the end, set the book aside and with an unseeing stare gazed at the window pane. There was absolutely nothing to do. Afterwards, having torn his fixed gaze from the window, he stood up and walked about the room.

At times, he was glad when such quiet evenings and duty periods occurred, he read and dreamt, but today... A kind of torture interfered with getting involved with anything. He sat down again and again picked up the book left on the last page, and... his gaze rested on the glass medicine cabinet. Shuvaev walked up to it and began to look at its contents. He came across an already unsealed plastic bottle containing tiny white pills...

Viktor did well in school and arrived in Orel to continue his studies. And here he met people who loved to attain a drug-induced stupor [pribaldet] from chemical poisons. Sometimes, having gathered at someone's house or in an empty apartment, they destroyed themselves in the search for a "high."

Observing Viktor Shuvaev, I attempted to sort out what pushed him, a good, unassuming lad in general, into this crowd.

"I was stupid, really stupid," he suddenly broke the silence as if he had guessed my thoughts. "I was not thinking about anything and I was not striving toward any [goal]."

Here at least he is honest and forthcoming. Alas, how many examples are there of thoughtlessness and internal emptiness leading to tragedy, a broken future, and failing health.

It will not do to describe all of the details of this conversation which was difficult for both of us. It became clear that cases of pill use are already here in the Army—an investigation [has revealed] that from time to time there are episodic and repeated ingestions of toxic substances. And was it worth it only to create a "pleasant" situation...

Shuvaev was mistaken then in thinking that, having taken the pills, he would sleep through the night. In fact, he only regained consciousness three days later. For three days, doctors fought for his life. And afterwards, there was all of this: his shame before his associates, a confession, curses, bitter tears, doubts, and hope. But the main thing was fear. A horror-stricken fear, to his very soul, of death. He is a young man who has not succeeded in living and suddenly the end, nothing.

The process of moral recovery was difficult. The collective of the company where Shuvaev was transferred understandably did not greet him with open arms. But there was no alienation either. They observed him, watched him closely, and evaluated him. The soldier conducted himself well, although who knows what value Shuvaev gave this [since] everything he had lived through was still too recent. At night, waking unexpectedly, he relived his short life, day by day, year by year, weighing and evaluating each step.

Shuvaev himself talks sparingly and says very little about this period. Yes and perhaps it is impossible to retell in words what happened to his spirit and what he rethought during those sleepless nights, remembering, at times tearfully, the vexing thoughtlessness of his past.

Viktor acknowledged to me that he considers a happy moment to be when Sergeant Vasyukin and Corporal Baranov turned up alongside him in the company. They had managed to understand how Shuvaev's inner confusion felt, maintained their confidence in him, that the black period in [his] life [would not last] forever, and that it must and should be left behind. The company's best specialists helped him to master the plotter's duties.

Shuvaev studied eagerly and grasped it all in a summer and strove to convince himself that he was still not quite a "lost man." Now, running ahead, I will say that the soldier became a first-class specialist. Training and combat work were the saving grace by which he could prove to his acquaintances and to himself (and he could not immediately determine to whom, first of all) that everything was within his power and strength.

During the summer, the company went to the training area. Shuvaev remained at the subunit. The work load on him and his comrades was considerable—they had to stand combat duty with a reduced staff. Viktor saw the tensions operators worked under, saw how tired they were after duty, and felt guilt toward them. Guilt because he had it easier than the rest. He handled his duties as a plotter rather easily and could not permit this "inequality of efforts." He cannot now. Yet a year ago, he was happiest of all because of his "easy life" but today... Today this was not the same Private Shuvaev.

And then he requested that the acting company commander allow him to master the related specialty of RLS [radar] operator. The next day, during an off-duty period, he sat in front of a radar scope. (I would like to point out that Shuvaev also mastered the RLS operator specialty.)

Having already said good-by to the soldier, I asked him a final question anyway, the very one he expected from me. I immediately understood that he was waiting for precisely this question.

"Tell me, Viktor, are you no longer attracted....well, does the desire to take something ever arise again?"

"No," he answered, "Believe me, no."

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo DOSAAF SSSR, "Voyennyye znaniya", 1989

Roundtable Discussion on Interethnic Relations in Military

18010531 Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 4, Feb 89 pp 2-3, 26-27

[Roundtable discussion by Colonel O. A. Belkov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor; A. A. Timorin, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor; Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Baymanov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences; Colonel V. A. Aleshchenkov, Candidate of Historical Sciences; Major S. D. Yemets; and Major V. A. Alekseyenko, bearer of the Orders of Lenin and the Red Star, under the rubric "SOVETSKIY VOIN Discussion Club": "Countrymen and the Countrymen's Association"; the first two paragraphs are SOVETSKIY VOIN introduction]

[Text] Lately there has been an aggravation of ethnic relations in a number of regions of the country. The interethnic unity of society, with which Soviet citizens rightly link the present and future of the socialist Motherland, is being put to a serious test. Under these conditions it is the duty of every USSR citizen to safeguard and augment everything that serves to unite our multinational Union as being the foundations of free development and prosperity of all its component peoples.

The Army and Navy are entrusted with great tasks in this connection. "Service in the USSR Armed Forces must become a genuine school of internationalism," states the 19th All-Union Party Conference resolution "On Interethnic Relations." The conversation at the latest "Discussion Club" session was about what is being done to unite multinational military collectives, about existing problems and contradictions, and about possible ways to resolve them. Taking part in it were Colonel O. A. Belkov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor; A. A. Timorin, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor; Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Baymanov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences; Colonel V. A. Aleshchenkov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Major S. D. Yemets; and Major V. A. Alekseyenko, bearer of the Orders of Lenin and the Red Star.

[Belkov] The problem of ethnic relations, or rather the problem's aggravation, did not arise overnight. A large number of issues which accumulated in the years of stagnation but were not resolved assumed an unhealthy character and developed into conflict situations, as M. S. Gorbachev noted.

The earthquake in Armenia is our nationwide disaster; it muffled these conflicts, as it were, but did not remove them.

At times one hears that the aggravation of ethnic relations is an episodic phenomenon, the result of glasnost, and that perestroika is to blame for everything.

This is of course a superficial understanding of the issue. I believe it is obvious to us that perestroika did not generate a single ethnic problem; it merely uncovered them. To accuse perestroika because of the difficulties that have arisen is the very same as accusing a physician who made a proper diagnosis because of the appearance of a disease.

However that may be, the growth of national self-awareness everywhere and the rise in the role of the ethnic factor in public life remains a fact. The problems connected with this are interesting to us both in themselves and because they are directly reproduced and reflected in the Armed Forces.

[Timorin] It must be borne in mind, however, that this is not a mirror image. The Armed Forces are a specific organization which has its own features influencing this process. In any case the negative features existing in society show up in the Army, but to a lesser extent, although it would be naive to assume, for example, that young men who have been participating in nationalist rallies leave previous views and sentiments outside the barracks together with civilian clothing on joining the Army formation.

For example, last fall young replacements from Armenia and Azerbaijan arrived in the company where Senior Lieutenant I. Arekhin is deputy commander for political affairs. They immediately began verbally "clarifying relations," but then Sergeants V. Asatryan and A. Mamedov went up to them in friendly conversation. "We have been friends for one and a half years now," they began. And they started telling how they had helped and were helping each other in service and in training. "There is nothing to divide us. Even after the Army our friendship will be just as strong," they said, trying to persuade their countrymen. "And you too will become friends."

At first the young soldiers looked mistrustfully, but then their looks warmed up and questions poured out.

This example shows how important it is for commanders and political officers to take account of the situation and know about ethnic relations in regions from which replacements arrive.

But it should be noted that social processes are reflected inadequately in the Army. For example, following the familiar events in Alma-Ata, young lads who witnessed them or even participated were called into the Army. On coming into the Army, however, they quickly gained a sense of responsibility for the performance of military duty, which was a deterrent. The Army's daily routine, the overall atmosphere, and the preventive and educational work of commanders and political officers have played and are playing a role of no small importance, although I cannot help but agree that one must be ready for various situations.

[Yemets] Shaping a multinational military collective and making it cohesive is a task that is not simply complex, but one that is of increasing complexity. The fact is that representatives of over 100 peoples serve in our Armed Forces. Today a platoon or company in which soldiers of 7-10 or even 15 nationalities stand in common formation is no rarity.

[Timorin] And there is a clear-cut trend toward an expansion in the number of nationalities and their proportion in the collective. The Institute of Military History began working on problems of ethnic relations in true earnest in 1979. We registered the following picture (data are for two military districts): soldiers representing 10-15 nationalities were serving in companies and equivalent subunits in 1980, while soldiers of up to 18 nationalities were serving there in 1988; there were 30 and 35 nationalities respectively in units. The proportion of representatives from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia is growing.

[Yemets] The complexity is also determined by the fact that we do not have simply multinational Armed Forces. It is important to note that people often come into the Army who have no personal experience of interethnic contact. There are entire rayons and regions where people of the same nationality make up the bulk of the population. For example, Russians make up 90 percent of Moscow's population of many millions. In Armenia Armenians make up 90 percent of the population.

[Alekseyenko] In this situation the commander's role increases; his own experience of interethnic contact is very important. I judge this from my own experience. I was born in the Lithuanian SSR, completed the Ryazan Airborne School, and was sent to an airborne regiment in the Baltic for further service. I grew up in Klaypeda and lived among people of different nationalities. I remember that when I was a boy we conversed not only in Russian, but also in other languages. This occurred of itself. Subsequently this intercourse and these habits came in handy for me. When you address a person who is experiencing some kind of difficulties in service in his own native language, you sense how he changes and opens up.

[Aleshchenkov] Of course, it is good when the commander can address a subordinate in his native language, but it is not a question of an officer's fluency in various national languages. This is an excessive task, but one can and must create conditions prompting him and helping him to master, at least at the level of everyday intercourse, the language, let us say, of the nationality which has given the name to the republic or oblast where he serves.

[Alekseyenko] I had occasion to perform international duty in Afghanistan from 1983 through 1985, and there I repeatedly saw the importance of knowing a language. Private First Class Mansur Sadykov was an interpreter, as it were, attached to our reconnaissance company. He had respect among the local populace, who called him "our Sadyk." Through him we became close with soldiers of Afghan subunits and found a common language and mutual understanding.

Sadyk was an indisputable authority for his colleagues, but Russians, Kazakhs and Turkmens were drawn to him for more than just his knowledge of languages.

He was twice decorated for courage and was wounded in action.

[Baymanov] We know from experience that many commanders and political officers in the Army and Navy attempt to learn the language either of the indigenous nationality of their duty assignment location or of the nationality whose representatives make up a significant group in their subunit. But how difficult this is to do! There are no textbooks or necessary aids. Everything rests on the enthusiasm of the officers themselves. It is no surprise that this has not yet become a mass phenomenon.

[Aleshchenkov] And it is a pity. Even a knowledge of two or three dozen everyday words and a few simple everyday phrases help create "bridges of trust" and closeness between officers and privates.

This is especially important when we consider that the proportion of people who do not know Russian or who have a poor knowledge of Russian has increased noticeably among draftees from the national republics. In some units they make up from 40 to 70 percent of the soldiers of Central Asian and Transcaucasian nationalities. By the way, the organization of work with them for studying Russian requires decisive improvement. There is a shortage of time, trained personnel, and well thought out methodologies among the troops for now. Decisions, including those made at a high level, often remain on paper since they are not backed up by practical measures.

I know that a number of district and fleet newspapers have begun to write more about the history, culture and customs of the nations and nationalities and that a

so-called "friendship dictionary" is being published, but I consider this to be little. It would be well to have the central military press and Voenizdat join in, and as promptly as possible.

[Belkov] In my view, it is an important issue also because a poor knowledge (or ignorance) of Russian on the part of soldiers from the national republics is becoming one of the principal reasons for the formation of closed national groups in the troop collective.

In my view, an association of countrymen, forming on a regional or more often a national basis in the Armed Forces, is a problem equal to if not more acute than the hazing of new conscripts. Experience and studies by scientists show that so-called nonregulation relationships often have an ethnic tint or even spring up on ethnic soil. In addition, as the soldiers themselves say, they suffer from dedovshchina (naturally, where it still remains) in the initial period of service.

But the pressure of a countrymen's association, where one has formed, must be experienced throughout one's service. The fact that groups form on a national basis not only at the subunit level, but also at the level of a unit and sometimes a military post, also cannot be ignored.

[Timorin] The data of sociological studies speak of the widespread nature of national groups. Forty-five percent of servicemen surveyed state that they maintain countrymen's ties throughout all service, but it is far from always that they have a negative manifestation.

[Belkov] National microgroups hamper us when an open and sometimes also a concealed rivalry arises among them for some kind of privileges or preferential position.

[Timorin] I cannot help but agree with this. Nevertheless, conflict situations arise more often in everyday life. I will cite just the following example from the life of one military construction detachment. Servicemen who were multinational in make-up arrived in the messhall and took their seats. One soldier stood up and shouted: "Hey, Chernyy [Black]! Bring some bread." (He was addressing his comrade named Chernyy.) Fellow soldiers from the Transcaucasus sitting two tables away thought it was addressed to them. A conflict could have broken out in a matter of seconds. It was well that an officer was in the messhall. This example confirms that the presence of national microgroups in a collective demands officers' fixed attention to the culture of interethnic intercourse both in the theoretical comprehension of this phenomenon and in practice, although the very indoctrination of the culture of interethnic intercourse must begin with kindergarten, with the family and with the school.

[Aleshchenkov] And it seems to me that it is time to seriously ponder this problem in drawing up training curricula for military schools. The deeper an officer

knows the history, culture, psychology and traditions of peoples of the USSR today, the easier it will be for him to perform his assigned mission of training and indoctrinating subordinates.

[Belkov] A very correct thought, especially when we consider that the majority of officers of our Armed Forces belong to one ethnic community, Slavic, and in working with subordinates they far from always see themselves as a carrier of something ethnic. They sometimes forget that all their actions and deeds were shaped in a specific ethnic medium and frequently they are uncustomary or even incomprehensible to people whose development took place in another culture.

Here is one example. The right side is considered honorable for peoples of traditional Islam. This is not a religious, not even an ethnic, but an everyday custom. A person adhering to it never will enter a home—his own or another's—from the left leg and never will take anything with the left hand, and everything is passed on with the right hand. Meanwhile, remember how we, for example, honor the winner of socialist competition and how the award is presented to him. The right hand is extended for a handshake and the left for handing over the award. And so bewilderment, albeit fleeting, appears for no reason. There are a great many everyday features in people's behavior which serve as the reason for national psychological barriers, create familiar difficulties in intercourse, and generate a certain alienation between officer and privates. We have begun to look for a solution to this situation, but mostly on paper for now.

[Timorin] Some positive experience already has been accumulated where an approach was taken to solving this problem without formalism. For example, in one unit of the Central Asian Military District Deputy Unit Commander Major A. Turanov, an Uzbek by nationality; Chemical Service Chief Major R. Abdullayev, an Azerbaijani; and motorized rifle battalion commander Capt V. Gazaryan, an Armenian, were widely included in upbringing work. Soldiers representing non-Russian nationalities were very willing to come into contact with these officers, chat with them in their native language, turn to them for help in various difficult situations, give them letters from home to read, and share impressions about what they had seen in their home places after short leaves. All this facilitated and accelerated their entry into formation and their development as soldiers.

In addition, Turanov, Abdullayev and Gazaryan repeatedly spoke to unit officers and told about features of working with soldiers from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

[Baymanov] Here is what I would like to emphasize. Multinationality of personnel is growing in units and fleets, but the proportion of officers of non-Russian nationality in the Armed Forces remains stable at an extremely low level.

[Yemets] Apparently the question also must be raised about some kind of benefits on entering schools, but not just this. It is common knowledge that in 1986 300 Kirghiz boys were forced to part with their dream of becoming officers because of a poor knowledge of Russian. The propaganda worked, but the selection system and training system did not. The blame here also rests with the examining boards, and above all with the schools and military commissariats.

If a company has at least one officer of non-Russian nationality, the possibility of microgroups forming in this subunit is reduced. Interests become balanced as it were, both because there is an official leader, the commander, and because upbringing work here is conducted differently.

Files of newspapers of all 15 republics are kept up in the reading room in the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant G. Arutyunyan. The same now is being done in many subunits, but Arutyunyan went further. He began to assign soldiers to make summaries of the successes of their own republic and about its contribution to the country's economy.

This united the collective, because each reviewer, in gradually becoming imbued with a sense of responsibility for his own affairs and acts, became aware of the commonality of interests and tasks being accomplished at the level of the country and the Armed Forces.

[Aleshchenkov] Generally you were telling about the ideal variant. Unfortunately, it is far from every company that has officers who are representatives of the national republics. In any case, however, commanders and political officers are obliged to keep microgroups of countrymen from appearing or at least to neutralize the informal leaders of these groups, who are infected with negative, nationalistic sentiments. The authority of such leaders can be debunked in the only way: by personal example, i.e., by high professional training and high culture.

If an officer or NCO demonstrates the felge using his fingers and his word differs from his actions, if he uses various nicknames and obscene words out of carelessness or as a joke, or if he is crude and tactless, he will not overcome the informal leader. In relations with soldiers of non-Slavic nationalities it is necessary to criticize them cautiously. It happens where deficiencies of an individual soldier of a particular nationality are thoughtlessly transferred to the entire nationality. A negative stereotype forms that is incorrect in principle.

[Belkov] But it also happens the other way around, when a soldier is admonished for omissions in his duties and he takes this as attacks on his nationality. Therefore it is very important that a commander be able not only to display firm exactingness toward everyone, but also the ability to reveal that socially and officially it depends exclusively on the interests of the matter.

[Yemets] Speaking of the leaders of microgroups, we omitted the question of forming an elective and appointed aktiv. There must be no mechanical distribution here. Obviously we must ensure that all groups of nationalities are represented in the aktiv.

[Belkov] It is no secret that it is easier for a Russian-speaking officer to work and assign a mission to a Russian-speaking aktiv, but the real question is which of two activists will get the commander's idea across better and more understandably to an audience who has a poor knowledge of Russian. It is the one who is able to address the audience in their native language. By the way, during the Great Patriotic War agitators were especially chosen specifically on this principle for working among soldiers of non-Russian nationality.

Today frontline experience is assuming a new life. I have already seen how political officers in more than one unit solicitously choose subunit agitators from among soldiers of different nationalities. The motive is that the soldier perhaps will be more difficult to train for the work, but he will get across everything he learns better to his comrades and tribesmen.

[Baymanov] For many years it was believed that we had resolved the question of interethnic education, and then formalism made its presence known. Where do representatives of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus primarily serve? In construction troops. There are objective reasons for this: the sometimes insufficiently high level of general education and a poor knowledge of Russian.

And the young men themselves are not always at fault for this. For example, there is a shortage of genuinely qualified instructors, especially Russian language instructors, in republics of Central Asia.

The most competent young men are chosen for technically outfitted troops—they too are necessary.

But sometimes a subjective factor also operates. Commanders do not wish to examine every individual and so they take an oversimplified path. Therefore in some units the cooks, breadcutters, shoemakers and tailors are soldiers of non-Russian nationalities. To the shame of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Armenians, Georgians and Tajiks, they willingly occupy cushy jobs, forgetting about male honor and dignity. Later at home they concoct stories about their nonexistent exploits.

[Aleshchenkov] Here is where I would also like to direct your attention. Lately we have begun to speak somehow so very timidly about Soviet patriotism, but this is a very capacious concept. It takes in love for one's home, one's republic and the entire multinational country with its grain fields, construction sites, cities and villages.

The sense of the Motherland must be developed in every soldier. A realization of the purpose of one's military labor will definitely affect the results of this work, i.e., the combat readiness of the subunit or unit.

[Yemets] Soviet patriotism has been tested more than once. It was during the last war and in Afghanistan, and Russians, Belorussians, Georgians, Kazakhs and Tajiks stood shoulder to shoulder at Chernobyl against the raging atom.

And the earthquake in Armenia echoed with pain in the heart of every Soviet citizen. Help came and is coming from all ends of the country.

Now we know that soldiers were first to join the struggle to save human lives. They took the most difficult things on their own shoulders: they took apart the rubble, restored the railroad bed, set up a water line. Those who had lost their own families also were among the officers and warrant officers. A good word also should be said about officers' wives. They bandaged the wounded and helped people overcome grief, having hardened their hearts to their own misfortune: the children of one and the husband of another perished.

[Aleshchenkov] And what blasphemy it seems to us even today that there were people with no mercy in their hearts, no sympathy, not even human understanding of what happened.

In his speech M. S. Gorbachev called them "political adventurers" who, cloaked in "concerns for the people and for the nation," thought not about how to help the people, but only about power. Nationalism thereby showed its true face.

[Belkov] We have only touched in our conversation on problems of national relations and interethnic education. As we see, they are complex.

Certain contradictions in views and in the attitude toward events and socioeconomic problems will not disappear tomorrow or in a month in our Army environment between soldiers of different nationalities.

But our Motherland is one, and there is a single task—to reliably defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. It is from this that we should proceed in the matter of educating soldiers and in the matter of elevating the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

COPYRIGHT: "Sovetskiy voyn", 1989

Military Jurist Interviewed on Rule of Law
18010556 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in
Russian No 6, Mar 89 pp 2-4

[Interview with Col of Justice V. P. Panov, candidate of legal sciences, docent, by Maj V. Donskoy: "For a Legal State"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

[Donskoy] Vladimir Petrovich, why have problems associated with the formation of a socialist legal state become so acute today?

[Panov] Chiefly for the reason that restructuring requires dependable legal support. And even its content—a return to Lenin's principles of the development of socialism—is inseparable from the reinforcement of socialist legality.

V. I. Lenin taught us to hold the laws and all prescriptions of the Soviet government sacred and inviolable, and to monitor their strict execution. He demanded that we reckon not only with the letter but also the spirit of our legislation. That we deviate from it not a single step. But as life has shown, the level of socialist legality in the country does not satisfy the requirements of the times. We still encounter cases where laws are violated not only by ordinary citizens and officials, but even by state and public organizations. And all of this happens despite efforts to maintain surveillance, to check execution and to employ measures of persuasion and, when necessary, compulsion.

These negative factors and the new requirements of restructuring are what led to the need for creating a socialist legal state and conducting a legal reform. The law is obligated to become a strong foundation and a dependable guarantee for the changes planned by the party in the political, economic and social spheres of society. As M. S. Gorbachev noted, it is our principle that respect for the legal state must be accompanied by fundamental renewal of all basic branches of legislation. The law as an act of supreme state power must become the basis for the rule of law, and it must exert pressure against illegal acts, especially excessive bureaucratic standard-setting.

We can hear various opinions today on whether or not we formerly lived in a legal state. Here is one of them. A legal state evolved in our country in the course of the October Revolution, and then it was eliminated by the cult of personality. I feel that such a premise is incorrect. Socialist law and legality only began to evolve in the period of dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, the state of those days could hardly have been called legal even according to Lenin's definition. Only its transformation into a state of the whole people created the objective conditions for its transformation into a legal state. However, the cult of personality and the period of stagnation halted this process. Distortions appeared in

the legal system that were the consequences of authoritarian, dictatorial and bureaucratic methods of administration. Deviation from Lenin's principles of state life led to a situation where organized crime appeared, and corruption, bribery and other negative phenomena flourished in the country. Such a state cannot be called a legal state.

[Donskoy] How is a socialist legal state defined?

[Panov] In such a state, all affairs are controlled by laws, and not by chiefs. Executives of all ranks issue instructions directly foreseen by standards and legislation. If they begin to administer arbitrarily, in avoidance of the law, then all of this becomes nothing more than tyranny. So it was in the recent past, when what was almost a special caste formed in the upper levels of the party, soviet and administrative apparatus. This caste was free of all control, including legal. And yet the law is written for all, and it must serve the people and the state.

A legal state is the invariable goal of all social revolutions. Recall the uprising of the Decembrists. Colonel Pestel, who wrote the draft constitution "Russian Truth," was one of its leaders. The principles of democratic reorganization of the Russian state were spelled out in this document. And when the uprising was defeated, and its organizers were arrested, the Tsar asked this question of Pestel during his interrogation: "Why do you need laws? You are a landowner, a Colonel, one of the best regiment commanders, a recipient of a golden weapon...."

"I do not wish to serve the will of Nicholas," the Decembrist replied. "There might be times when he is in a bad mood.... I wish to serve the law, which would express the will of society, the people, and not the will of Nicholas. Only administration by the state with the assistance of the law is just...."

The main objective in forming a socialist legal state is to practically ensure supremacy of the law, expressing the will of the people. In this case no one state organ, official, collective, party or other social organization, no one person is released from responsibility before the law. In the same way that citizens bear responsibility to their whole people's state, state government bears responsibility before the citizens. Their rights must be reliably protected against all tyranny of the government and its representatives.

[Donskoy] What place will the armed forces occupy in a legal state? How will the legal reform reflect upon military service?

[Panov] Our armed forces can be interpreted as being legal right now. Why? Chiefly because all of the life and activities of the army are regulated down to the finest details by Soviet laws and other legal acts. Take for example the procedures of military service. The time of its initiation and the procedures for awarding ranks,

appointing personnel to positions and discharging them into the reserves are indicated in detail. But we must remember that an abundance of military legal acts does not automatically lead to strict compliance with the law, and the maintenance of a high level of discipline. Experience persuades us that it is not enough to have good laws and manuals. The main thing is to achieve their unflinching observance.

What has been referred to as legal nihilism has developed in some subunits and units. It is defined as a negligent attitude toward rules of law established by the state. All servicemen know, for example, that improper relations are impermissible between them. But these requirements are violated.

I am aware that this journal receives many letters relating infringements of the rights of soldiers. Last year, as I recall, AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA was compelled to return several times to the "problem" of mustaches, which soldiers are not allowed to have in some places. One would think that the issue is clear: No legislative act foresees such a prohibition. And yet.... "What would happen if they permitted us to have mustaches, but not to grow them?" Private I. Buyvol from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany writes to the editor. "Our commanders make the excuse that you can't grow a mustache in a single day, and that the manual does not permit one to go unshaven for a week. Meaning that if you grow a mustache overnight, wear it in good health, but if you don't have such 'phenomenal capabilities,' don't look for forgiveness...." Citing an explanation published in AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA and in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that commanders are not empowered to make notations on the military service card that would compromise soldiers, Private A. Fedul and "all of the unit's soldiers undergoing compulsory military service" (Southern Group of Forces) report with alarm that in their unit, "this issue would now be resolved not by the commander but by a specially created commission." A year ago a warrant officer permanently took away a camera from Private I. Slyuta (Donets Oblast), even though, as the soldier writes, the photographs he took in the stadium "were of no threat to combat readiness...."

It is painful and distressing to read such lines. How could it be that we still have people who literally excel in evading the rules of law, and in defending their ambitious positions through every kind of truth and untruth! But he who feels that such all-permissiveness will continue is deeply mistaken. We must approach each such incident as a deviation from our socialist legality. This pertains to commanders, the public and law enforcement organs. Restructuring is creating a huge democratic barrier to the road of legal nihilism. And it will force all officials and servicemen to continually measure their actions up to the Law. Many have not yet become accustomed to doing so, but they will have to.

[Donskoy] Yes, the party requires that we firmly pursue the line of reinforcing legality and the rule of law, and of expanding democracy. The principle that "everything which is not prohibited by law is permitted," introduced in decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, applies to the armed forces as well. How should we understand it?

[Panov] Army service is governed by general military regulations. Their purpose is to guarantee the rights and freedoms granted to each soldier as a citizen while concurrently ensuring that he fulfills the responsibilities of military service and respects the worth of the individual. Favorable prerequisites for revealing the creative possibilities and capabilities of soldiers are provided in this way.

Whatever is not prohibited in the laws and regulations is permitted to all servicemen. No constraints should be introduced in this area. The legal reform is eliminating the former imbalances, and it is having a most positive influence on all aspects of the life of the armed forces.

Many different proposals for improving Soviet military legislation are now being suggested. The first steps toward implementing them have been made. Thus, draft legislative acts directed at improving legal regulation of certain relations between servicemen and at strengthening legal protection of the individual have appeared. New general military regulations are being prepared. The role of the public in reinforcing order and military discipline is rising. A statute on comrade's courts is being written with this purpose. Such courts are to be created in the companies, as had been done prior to 1946. The new statute on the officer meeting is called upon to raise educational work with this category of servicemen to a higher qualitative level.

Thus all of the changes and innovations will ensure supremacy of the law in our life and activity, and will become dependable legal guarantees of deeper restructuring in the country and in the armed forces.

COPYRIGHT: "Agitator armii i flota", 1989

Editorial on Final Stage of Military Electoral Campaign

18010427a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed editorial, entitled: "Our Candidates".]

[Text] The Armed Forces are putting up 121 of the candidates for People's Deputies of the USSR who are continuing in the final stage of the election campaign to fight for mandates to the nation's highest organ of state authority, and 35 of them are registered from public organizations. Among the candidates for deputies are 64 prominent Soviet military leaders—marshals, generals and admirals—48 senior and 8 junior officers, 1 warrant officer, 1 senior sergeant and 4 Soviet Army employees. Of

the total number of registered candidates recommended by the army and navy 118 are Communists and 3 are Komsomol members, 15 are Heroes of the Soviet Union, and 19 candidates are presently Deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Just 3 months ago, when the date was announced for the forthcoming elections of People's Deputies of the USSR, few could have imagined that the election campaign would become a preelection battle and an outpouring of public activeness such as we had never seen before. The accomplishment of the aims set forth at the 19th All-Union party conference with respect to further democratizing the Soviet society, reforming the political system and implementing the Law on Elections have sent truly all segments of the society into action. Only confidence in the reality of the changes and the possibility for every Soviet individual effectively to influence the resolution of important problems brought out by life and the restructuring could evoke the great enthusiasm with which the people entered into the selection of the deputy corps. Who will receive the mandate of trust, and what will our elected officials be like? These questions concern everyone today.

There is no need to mention how important it is for the highest agency of state authority to consist of the most prestigious and principled people, profoundly convinced of the need for a revolutionary renewal of our society. People who can advance the restructuring not with appeals and slogans but with concrete action. It is only natural that the electors can be heard saying to the candidates at many preelection gatherings and meetings: "We need a deputy who can handle the load of urgent problems, particularly social problems...."

And whoever the future deputy is, one thing is certain: that he must be politically active and a fighter capable of protecting the people's interests (this is why he is now referred to as a "people's deputy") and accomplishing the large state tasks, and be intolerant of everything retarding the society's renewal.

The party's preelection platform approved at the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is the basis for the programs of candidates for deputies from the army and navy. Social activeness and responsibility on the part of the people's deputy-elects, active participation and initiative in the Soviet society's renewal and the restructuring in the Armed Forces, and a striving to provide a better life for our people in the years immediately ahead constitute their overall, pivotal concept. Most of the preelection programs of our candidates also include an orientation toward enhancing the country's defense capability and the combat readiness of the army and navy based on the qualitative parameters, ensuring a peaceful life for ours and future generations of Soviet people and further strengthening the unity of the army and the people. The future deputies are also concerned with problems of ecology, morality and inter-ethnic relations. Nothing is isolated or omitted; everything is

interrelated and interdependent. And the support of the masses goes to those candidates whose social stance, political and professional qualities and performance convince the electors that they represent the electors' interests and are capable of defending them. This is precisely what brought victory at the district preelection meetings for Generals of the Army K. Kochetov and V. Lobov, Admiral F. Gromov, Lieutenant Colonels R. Aushev and V. Zadorozhnykh and many other candidates. Their preelection campaigns were distinguished by realistic aims and attention to the needs and concerns of the people. The electors rapidly sense it when a candidate plays games with them in order to gain votes and lavishes promises right and left, which, with the greatest desire, he cannot fulfill.

At the present stage of the electoral campaign candidates for Deputies are meeting with their electors. The law extends to each of them an equal right to promulgate and promote his program and his social and political stand, not avoiding polemics and debate with his rivals. All citizens and organizations have the right freely and thoroughly to discuss the political and personal qualities and performance of claimants for the Deputy's mandate and to campaign for or against. In this situation a candidate cannot rely on the assistance of proxies alone. He must make himself known and defend his own political credo and his stand. All of this takes place within the framework of democracy and glasnost. And it is inevitable to want the preelection struggle to be conducted specifically and in a worthy manner, with absolute observance of the principle of equal opportunity and with the rivalry kept in good taste.

The previous stages of the election campaign produced many examples of real honor and nobleness on the part of the candidates for people's deputies. For example, Lieutenant Colonel P. Kovtun withdrew his candidacy at a district meeting and called upon his supporters to vote for his recent rival, since he was convinced that the latter's preelection platform was more constructive and more realistic and that his political qualities and performance made him completely worthy of the deputy's mandate. Lieutenant General V. Novozhilov, Commander of the Far East Military District, did not want to remain the only candidate, with no alternative, and insisted during a district meeting that a second round of voting be conducted. Another candidate was registered as a result.

We have to talk about nobleness because some of the preelection polemics did not escape manifestations of group egotism, tendentiousness and bias in the personal evaluations of "enemies," pressure on the vocal cords, outpourings of rumors and conjectures in the halls, and unsubstantiated accusations against opponents. It is the worst thing of all when democracy is sacrificed to demagoguery and political avarice, when the dignity of candidates is publicly degraded and other unbecoming means

are used. The pre-election campaign should be conducted within the framework of socialist morals and be based on respect for the honor and dignity of each Soviet individual.

The results of the election campaign are predetermined in great part by the substance, the depth and activeness of the ideological and mass agitation activity. As we defend our candidates, we cannot tolerate placidity and complacency or lose initiative. It is the task of party organizations and ideological workers persistently to direct the growing political activeness of the fightingmen into the channel of practical action. We must revive in the people an awareness that the pre-election campaign is important political work requiring active participation by every individual and every Communist, and ideological solidarity of the party organizations and military collectives.

Only a few days remain until the elections. The electors still have time, however, and a real opportunity to take a close look at their candidates for deputies, to think about and ponder their programs in order to make the correct selection. The selection can truly determine the fate of each of us and must guarantee success in the restructuring.

Lizichev Meets With Candidates in GSFG

18010427h Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel A. Vasilets: "Meetings With Electors"]

[Text] General of the Army A. Lizichev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and Yu. Sokolova, Member of the Presidium of the Soviet Women's Committee, candidates for People's Deputies of the USSR, have met with electors in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

General Army A. Lizichev spoke at meetings of the party aktiv of the Group of Forces and the Air Force of the GSFG, addressed the collectives of a repair enterprise and a motorized rifle unit, shared his views on problems pertaining to the restructuring in the nation and in the army, military organizational development and the reduction of the Armed Forces, and answered numerous questions. Yu. Sokolova met with the aktiv of the women's committee at the Wuhnsdorf Garrison and with the workers at one of the military hospitals.

Armed Forces Election Day Coverage

18010475 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "On Land, at Sea, and in Space"]

[Text] And the day arrived, 26 March, election day for USSR Peoples Deputies. How did it pass? The editorial teletypes have been "chattering" since morning. The first tape was a communique from Vladivostok. The local time there was already 1600 hours.

Captain First Rank V. Shirokov sent [this report]: "I visited several polling districts. Voting is actively going on. Here is what I saw. Mainly older people voted in the morning. They did what they were accustomed to doing: The earlier you vote, the quicker the election commission will report [the results]. But nevertheless, a sign of the times is more visible, I would call it striving for a pluralism of opinions.

This is a polling district in the Pervorechenskiy area of town. Admiral G. Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet, is casting his ballot here.

I talked with P. Mironov, a war veteran:

"I am for the platform proposed by the commander. Competent people must raise military issues at the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies."

Col N. Mulyar, our permanent correspondent in the Transcaucasus Military District, sent in this report: "At 1400 hours local time, I communicated via radio with the "point," the radar company which is located in the mountains at an elevation of more than 3,000 meters. There is frosty weather there, it is snowing again, and it is reaching a depth of 3 to 4 meters. Knowing the whims of weather, they had prepared for the elections a little earlier at the "point." Already on the 23rd of March, having selected a "window" they delivered ballots and ballot boxes from the "Soviet Heartland." Captain A. Skvortsov, company commander, told me that voting was conducted in "an organized manner."

After a short time, Col Mulyar sent a supplemental [report]. He had spoken with Lt Col M. Poluzerov, a political worker. Voting was completed at all Alpine "points." It is true that sealed ballot boxes and ballots had to be delivered to some "points" by helicopter.

Military personnel far from the homeland are also voting. In contact [with us] is the Admiral Spiridonov, a large anti-submarine warfare ship [BPK] carrying out its military mission in the Indian Ocean. Sr Lt A. Ivanov, a correspondent for the Pacific Fleet newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA on board the BPK, transmitted the following: "The ballot boxes are set up in the officers' wardroom. In accordance with the law, there is a cabin for secret balloting. I conducted an interview with Warrant Officer N. Veringin, a member of the polling district voting commission:

"I do not want to be a prophet," he says, "but I think that the majority of votes will be for Rear Admiral Oleynik, the candidate whose nomination we supported."

One more report [was received] from the BPK Krasnyy Kavkaz in the Mediterranean Sea. Voting has already ended here. The crew is elated. It is pleasant after many thousands of miles to feel that someone cares about you. On election eve, packages arrived from shore with sound-recorded letters from the sailors' families. Having

arrived in the Mediterranean Squadron, the task force political section chief conducted visiting hours on personal problems wherever he went on the Krasny Kavkaz.

And how are the elections going in the Groups of Soviet Forces abroad? We have a telegram in front of us from Lt Col A. Manushkin, our permanent correspondent to the Northern Group of Forces (SGV): "I talked with Lt Col V. Marchenko, a member of the operational group on elections under the SGV political administration. He reported that the distinguishing peculiarity of the current elections is the fact that there is no 'competition' normally organized to see who votes fastest. In spite of this, several hours after voting began, up to 60-70 percent of the voters have already voted in many polling districts."

Reserve Colonel F. Semyanovskiy, a free-lance KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, visited several areas of the Moscow military district. Here is his record of conversations with voters.

First Sergeant N. Khovrin, secretary of the Battalion Komsomol organization:

A meeting of communists took place with M. Moyiseyev, CPSU candidate for USSR Peoples Deputies, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, during the election campaign in our Kantemirovka Guards Tank Division imeni Yu. V. Andropov. I was also among those who took part in that meeting. He talked about issues that troubled me as a young voter. In particular, [he talked] about the need for creating those conditions under which the young generation could participate in various ways in the solution of important issues of our lives in the nation, the republic, and the unit where we serve, train, and work.

Corporal A. Tatarinov:

"At the subunit general meeting, I was selected as a delegate to the [military] district election meeting. I became convinced with my own eyes of how much more democratically, openly, honestly, exactly, and objectively the candidates' platforms were being discussed there. I personally preferred the positions of those among them who advocate approval of social justice, urge [us] not to wait for manna from heaven, and who honestly and productively labor in their work place and approach changes with deeds and not with tempting appeals.

Servicemen participating in the elimination of the after-effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant] are not deviating even a single hour from the decontamination operations schedule on election day, reported Col A. Polyakov, our permanent correspondent to the Kiev Military District. The company's special [decontamination] mission personnel commanded by Officer A. Kovalenko left immediately after voting to carry out the mission at the plant.

"At Chernobyl, we realized the high responsibility that each of us, worker, scientist, and soldier, has to our descendants for preserving life on Earth," said A. Kovalenko. "That is why the ecological program of N. Primachenko, candidate for Peoples Deputy and secretary of the party raykom, found the proper response in the hearts of my co-workers. Many of us also voted for him."

Six polling districts were created among the subunits carrying out work on eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. And voting was conducted in a business-like manner everywhere.

And here is a communique from the Moscow area. Our correspondent Maj V. Kazakov visited the unit commanded by Lt Col M. Kotash and posed a question to the commander as he was returning from voting: "What would you wish for the future deputies?"

"Today's elections," answered Mikhail Ivanovich, "are not a step, but genuine progress toward democratization of society and a real confirmation and guarantee of the irreversibility of the process of perestroika. I can wish only one thing for the future deputies, [that they] maintain the will power, persistence, and uncompromising attitude demonstrated during the course of the election campaign. In my view, the main thing for the peoples parliament is not to lose contact with the people and not be tempted by bureaucratic benefits and privileges.

Toward the middle of the day there were ever increasing calls. The stenographer did not have time to write down all of the information. And naturally we cannot use all of it in this commentary. And it is becoming more difficult to select reports. But what we decided to "compress" into a newspaper column is the result. Soldier-internationalists were the first to vote among those voters undergoing medical treatment at the Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N.N. Burdenko. Electoral commission members came right into the wards to them. We will also point out that all "afghantsy" [Afghan vets] were given the opportunity to meet the Baumanskiy electoral district candidates for USSR Peoples Deputy, to become intimately familiar with their platforms, and to express their mandates and desires during the election campaign.

Many of our newspaper's readers were interested in how cosmonauts Aleksandr Volkov, Sergey Krikalev, and Valeriy Polyakov, who are on the Mir orbital complex, would be able to vote. As reported to our correspondent Lt Col V. Baberdin at the Central Electoral Commission, the cosmonauts transmitted their decisions to Mission Control [Center] during one of their communications sessions and they will be included when vote totals are tallied.

And now this day also ended. We did not task ourselves with the goal of making any predictions about the results of the voting. We still need to return to that. Meanwhile

we will point out: the current elections became a major event in the nation's life. Political reform began from them and people supported it.

GLAVPU Examines State of Anti-Alcohol Campaign

18010469a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article, published under the heading "At the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy," "Assess More Acutely, Act More Decisively"]

[Text] At a session of the Buro of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy [GLAVPU], an analysis was made of the activities of the political directorate, the political bodies and party organizations in the Volga Military District in carrying out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on overcoming drunkenness and alcoholism. Lt Gen V. Filippov gave the report.

It was pointed out that the organizational and political indoctrination work which has been done has contributed to improving the moral situation in the troop and labor collectives and in the families of the servicemen. In a number of units and military schools, the number of infractions committed by servicemen in an inebriated state has declined. In exercises, in various forms of political training, in the district newspaper as well as in the oral and visual agitation, more attention has been given to propagandizing a sober way of life and to instituting new rites and traditions. The questions were posed in a more acute and principled manner of ensuring the personal example set by the communists and Komsomol members in service and discipline as well as their involvement in the struggle to implement the course set of overcoming drunkenness and alcoholism.

At the same time, the GLAVPU Buro pointed out that the district political directorate has lowered its demands on the political bodies and party organizations for their consistent implementation of party policy to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism as a component part in the fight to strengthen discipline, order and organization. Shortcomings and oversights have been one of the reasons that the district continues to have infractions committed by servicemen under the influence of alcohol. In a number of instances they have not achieved proper effectiveness in supervising and providing aid to the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in the area of strengthening discipline. The real reasons for the survival of drunkenness among various categories of servicemen are not always disclosed, and the ways for further affirming soberness in the district troops are determined timidly.

Many measures in antialcohol propaganda are carried out formally and do not have the necessary indoctrinational and scientific-educational impact. The leading command and political personnel of the district staff and

directorates, the military schools, the troop units, the military lawyers and medics as well as scientific workers do not take a sufficient part in this. The Komsomol and trade union organizations, the women's councils and the other public institutions have not risen properly to the struggle against drunkenness as well as for organizing the beneficial leisure of the servicemen and the members of their families.

The solving of these questions has not become a matter of principled review at certain party conferences and party report-election meetings.

The GLAVPU Buro has pointed to a lessening of work in carrying out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 7 May 1985 "On Measures to Overcome Drunkenness and Alcoholism" as well as other decisions on these questions. The political directorate, the political bodies, the party organizations, the staffs, the crime prevention and medical bodies as well as military trade institutions are obliged to take specific measures to eliminate the designated shortcomings. The struggle for establishing a sober way of life in the district troops, it was emphasized at the session, must be considered a matter of great political importance having a substantial impact on the level of vigilance and combat readiness of the troops, the strengthening of prescribed order and discipline.

It is essential to improve the leadership over the activities of the primary political bodies, the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations in instituting a healthy way of life and closely link the work being done with the practical realization of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on strengthening military discipline in the Army and Navy. At present, the political bodies and party organizations should not permit deviations from the course set of intensifying the struggle for sobriety and establishing a new moral atmosphere in the troop and labor collectives. It is essential to broaden and coordinate more actively the involvement of the leading cadres of the district staff and directorates, the units, military schools and institutions in this.

We must not permit a lack of control and lenience in carrying out measures to systematize the sale of alcoholic beverages.

All levels of political bodies must outline fundamental ways for strengthening the effectiveness of the party organizations and their contribution to the question of strengthening military discipline and ensuring the personal example of each communist in service and conduct and work for true closeness with the men. One must deal strictly with the communists and primarily with the leadership for the failure to take decisive measures to eradicate drunkenness among the servicemen and crime based on this.

In the course of certifying the officer personnel, in the graduating of officer candidates from the military schools and in providing party recommendations there

must be glasnost and an objective and principled assessment of the political, moral and professional qualities as well as personal involvement in eradicating any deviations from the standards of socialist morality and which are the main causes of severe accidents and crimes. For these purposes it is essential to employ the officer meetings, the cutback being carried out in the size of the Armed Forces as well as improve the quality of the diverse work done with officer personnel.

The commanders, the political bodies, the political workers, the faculty, the party and Komsomol organizations of the military schools, it was emphasized at the session, must develop in the officer candidates a profound understanding of the inadmissibility of using alcoholic beverages. They must be enriched with the skills and learn to organize and conduct antialcohol propaganda as well as indoctrinate them in a spirit of high discipline and efficiency.

The political directorate, the corresponding political bodies and party organizations must constantly carry out a range of measures to establish the new political and moral state and healthy service morale situation in the subunits, units, military schools and labor collectives.

The party organizations must act as the initiators of an extensive dialogue concerning the level of intercourse and reciprocal relations. We must ensure a respectful attitude toward the personality of each serviceman, worker and employee, family member, and the observance by all communists of the requirements of the Soviet laws, troop regulations and moral standards of conduct. All forms of political instruction and the work of the agitation-propaganda collectives and groups must be used for extensively explaining the urgency of the measures being carried out by the party to improve the situation, to strengthen law and order and legality as well as overcome drunkenness and alcoholism. The district and central newspapers, the clubs, libraries, the Lenin rooms and radio centers should take an active part in this.

The GLAVPU Buro has recommended that all the political directorates and political bodies of the military districts, troop groups and fleets thoroughly analyze the course of carrying out the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the demands of the minister of defense and chief of the GLAVPU in overcoming drunkenness and alcoholism as well as setting specific ways for further activating this work.

Officer Education's Role in Decline of Professional Prestige

18010468a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Article, published under the heading "What Concerns Us," by Capt 3d Rank N. Saratov from the Northern Fleet: "Questions, Questions..."]

[Text] We have heard several times now that the prestige of the officer profession has noticeably declined. For example, even such a school as the submarine school, where there was always strong competition, is presently concerned by the reduced quantity and quality of the applicants. As a result, they are ready to accept not the finest of the finest but those who merely evidence a desire. And this leads to a decline in the quality of training for the future officers.

In talking with young lieutenants who had graduated from this school, one discovers that many of them completed the school with satisfactory grades. And what is particularly noteworthy, not one of them showed embarrassment in completing the school with threes. One is simply amazed from whence derived and when the expression took root among us that "it is better to have a red face than a red diploma"? Why has it become somehow awkward to have an excellent academic record?

Of course, not everyone feels this way. Clearly such persons are still a minority. But frequently we judge precisely from this minority. And the conclusion inevitably arises that we must exclude all unworthy persons from our ranks. In addition, everyone who has average grades, who does not show a bent for learning, anyone who has been involved in unworthy deeds—all of them in the future must be prevented from becoming officers. Certainly nothing will come of them. I am certain of this.

Let me give the following example. Lt D. Belozarov arrived on a submarine to serve as the commander of a department. In his last year at school he was held liable for drunkenness. At that time they felt sorry for him, they left him in school and gave him an opportunity to mend his ways. And what happened? In 6 months of service, Belozarov committed several major infractions. Now seemingly everyone realizes that he should have been immediately kicked out of the Navy. But here a justification was found: the lieutenant had only served 6 months.... Possibly he should be given an opportunity to mend his ways? But I do not feel that in the given instance all-forgiveness will be of any benefit.

Or the following example. I myself studied by correspondence in the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. There were around 30 persons in our class. But did they all study uniformly? No. And this certainly does not depend upon training or intellect. Simply certain were admitted (and not only here) because this was

supposedly essential for their further advance in service. And without making much of an effort they wait until they can exchange admission to the academy with...a diploma.

Possibly it would be better to admit a smaller number of persons but work with them so that as a result the Navy receives trained officers and not dilettantes with a higher military education? It is high time in the system of higher education to focus on the more capable, the stronger, the more enterprising and not on the "mediocre."

Now let us take a look how an officer grows in the process of service. Practice shows that in an appointment to a superior position, they consider least of all his ability and desire to work with others. For example, the commander of a headquarters group serves on a submarine. He does not have subordinates, he has completely mastered a specialty and has been declared an outstanding man in military and political training. Then he is suddenly appointed as a divisional [ship unit] commander and this happens frequently. All of a sudden the officer has under him three-score men. But he has no experience in working with the personnel. And so begins a bitter lesson.

Would it not be better immediately after appointment or even before the appointment to send him to retraining courses, where he would master a specialty on the level of the commander of a ship division or department and assimilate at least the theory of working with others? You might say this would be expensive. But is it more expensive than teaching something by mere practice?

Aside from all else, it is time certainly for the sociologists to find their place in working with the officers. Where are their proposals on the selection of candidates for superior positions? Where are the parameters worked out by them and to which particular attention must be paid in an appointment to a position involving work with others? Unfortunately, we do nothing of the sort. And this is a pity. I feel that expert evaluation cards would aid greatly in avoiding subjectivism in an appointment.

I do not know, I cannot judge how certification is presently being carried out on the scale of at least the Navy. But if it is as it is in our formation, then this is the usual overly formalized campaign. Judge for yourselves. In January we learned about the forthcoming certification. At the end of January, we made a detailed study of the certification plans, we received blanks and so forth. And we were to complete officer certification by 15 March. But certainly, as I saw it, we had to talk three times with each of them, point to shortcomings and provide time for eliminating them.

Or the following question. The deputy commander for political affairs and the party organization secretary were to participate in the certification. But to what degree

should the commander consider their recommendations? And let us not forget that these persons are also dependent upon the commander, as he also certifies them. Will they thus always be principled and objective? A difficult question. In addition, the certification commission of the formation simply physically does not have time to delve in detail into each arising conflict.

At present, each officer is expecting major changes in the life of the Armed Forces. The need for these has long arisen. We know that a law on defense is being prepared, but where and by whom? Why isn't the draft of this being brought up for extensive discussion and will it be? Will there be a draft of a new provision for the service of officer personnel with guarantees incorporated in it for the social protection of the officer? There is no information about the new regulations which we have long been hearing about. And there are various rumors and idle talk about.... The essential glasnost should remove them.

One other question. Why is officer service spoken and written about in such a poor, wretched and often biased manner in individual publications and TV and radio broadcasts? Why have we been turned into persons who must justify themselves to others who do not know the army but accuse us of laxness, mediocrity and impotence? Can these claims be made merely against us? For example, on our ship 80 percent of the seamen and petty officers were called up after completing the first year of the institute. It is shameful to say but a majority of them write with elementary grammatical errors, they do not know how to use punctuation marks and so forth. And how easy it is to state that it was the army that made them this way! Let us sample the public opinion of those discharged into the reserves. Let people have a say who know service and let us publish this research so that everything is objective. For now most often persons who have not even the slightest involvement in the army write and speak about it.

Certainly service itself should become democratic. What does this mean? Above all, the possibility of each officer to participate in the determining of his fate really and not nominally. The principle of "filling a place at any price" would cost significantly more for us and the state.

I agree that possibly it is not worth calling up students for active service but rather training reserve officers from them. And in such a manner their training level should not differ sharply from the training level of regular officers. This is not easy but it is possible.

Presently we frequently say and hear that we must work in the new manner. That is, face all those problems which are actually pertinent. It is time, as they say, to escape from the fetters and begin to act. This is above all a purposeful, all-round improvement in the quality of our personnel. We must set to this decisively and not stand there wringing our hands, regretting: "Why does everyone condemn us?..."

I realize that my letter has more questions than it does answers, but it is useful to ask questions. Certainly I feel that they concern more than me.

Cut Forces by Raising Draftee Standards
18010468b Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 12, 25-31 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by T. Ivanova from Moscow: "Let Us Regret the Youth"]

[Text] A 500,000-man reduction in the USSR Armed Forces has been announced. Might this not be started by removing from the Army primarily the persons of "limited military fitness"? It is a question of fellows with serious physical shortcomings such as bad vision (up to -4 or -5), a major loss of hearing, spinal injuries and so forth. Some 6 years ago such fellows were not called up for the army. Now they are, although they cannot carry out soldier duties completely on the proper level. Moreover, the increased danger involved with service (the lifting of weights, concussions and contusions to the head) can aggravate the illnesses of persons who are just beginning their lives and make them invalids. Presently such fellows usually serve in construction battalions. Much has been said about the specific nature of service in these troops....

Proposal to Raise Draft Age to 19
18010482 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Sivtsov under the rubric "From an Officer in the Capital": "Economizing on Weapons"]

[Text] I wear the insignia of a lieutenant colonel. I have devoted thirty years to service in the Armed Forces. If one takes into account that prior to taking the oath of allegiance I spent an additional six years studying at the Suvorov Military School, for me the army is my whole conscious life and, therefore, I act not only because of duty and orders, but also according to conscience.

The army is a part of the people and the public interest, which is displayed towards the army and its status, especially recently during the years of perestroika, is understandable. During meetings, one has occasion to listen to different opinions, including those that are pointed and at times annoying. Some people attempt to "attach" [podkalyvat]: they say an edict concerning the reduction of the Armed Forces and defense expenditures has been promulgated, are you left without anything to do? Those, who ask such questions, have apparently forgotten that we are not just soldiers. We also are citizens of our country and the interests of the army and the country have not drifted apart.

Arguments are also raging in our military environment. It is possible that there are those who are dissatisfied with this decision: you see, someone could even lose his

"lucrative" cushy job. But the decision is wise and timely because it meets the vital interests of our people. The decision concerning a unilateral reduction in the armed forces shows the peace loving aspirations of our country.

Furthermore, this orientation is emphasized in the pre-electoral programs of the candidates for national people's deputies, who were nominated by military units. Meetings with voters have shown that the labor collectives also approve of this orientation. We all understand that the reduction of the armed forces and defense expenditures increases the number of workers in the fields, at machines, at construction sites, in the mines, and at all other peaceful construction projects. In our instructions there is a concern for creating the type of army, in which during peacetime, one person would be able to do the work of three.

In my opinion, an improvement in the system of selection, conscription, training, and military service would meet this objective. I feel that by this time we ought to give draft age youth, not just in the colleges and technical secondary schools but in the professional technical schools as well, an opportunity to complete their studies. Maybe it would be worthwhile to change the draft age: not make it upon reaching the age of 18 years, as is currently practiced, but a year later. I expressed this personal opinion at a meeting with the candidates for people's deputies of the USSR.

Moscow Military District.

Military Equipment Transfer to Patriotic Associations

18010477a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Bogdanov by Lieutenant Colonel G. Lisenkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Tanks, Aircraft, and Combat Vehicles"]

[text] The USSR Ministry of Defense is transferring tanks, aircraft, combat vehicles, and other combat equipment to military patriotic associations and clubs. Colonel V. Bogdanov describes how this is occurring:

[Bogdanov] First of all, the legal status of the military patriotic association (VPO). It is considered such only after approval of the VPO identity card by a joint decision of the appropriate committee of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League or Komsomol], the DOSAAF, the military commissariats, and the organizer-founder.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Military equipment will not be issued without this identity card?

[Bogdanov] That is exactly it. Provision of training equipment is carried out in accordance with the VPO identity cards by USSR Armed Forces branch supply organizations, military districts, fleets, and the USSR Ministry of Defense main and central directorates.

The issuance of training equipment provided for by approved identity cards is carried out in accordance with the territorial principle and orders of republic, kray, and oblast Komsomol committees.

The Komsomol committee presenting orders must confirm in writing that conditions exist which ensure safeguarding of training equipment.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How is equipment delivered to its destination?

[Bogdanov] By the personnel and equipment of the organizer-founder. The transport of aircraft, helicopters, and outsized ground equipment on a wheeled or tracked base can be carried out at the recipient's request by appropriate supply organizations by rail, ocean, or river transport to the facility nearest the final destination.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Have many associations and clubs obtained combat equipment and weapons?

[Bogdanov] No, not many. The reason is the absence of conditions which ensure safeguarding of training equipment.

Cooperation Between Defense, MVD Motor Vehicle Inspectorates

18010477b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Ryzhkov, Chief of the VAI [Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] Main Motor Vehicle Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense by S. Ostanin, entitled: "One Road for All".]

[text] A USSR Ministry of Defense and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs order has defined cooperation of the Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate [VAI] of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the USSR MVD State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate [GAI].

Our correspondent S. Ostanin talked with V. Ryzhkov, chief of the VAI Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Ivanovich, how does this new order work in practice?

[Ryzhkov] I recently observed a military convoy's movement through the city. GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] traffic-controllers met and directed it at intersections. It was precisely they who on one of the route's segments took it upon themselves to be concerned about military drivers.

What is the matter here? It is no secret that in a number of instances military convoys follow traditionally established routes. Before it resulted in two automobile inspection posts, military and civilian, being in the same area and therefore to duplication of traffic-control activities.

And really military vehicles travel in the general transport flow along those same GAI posts. And who else ensures movement of traffic in their sectors. Well, this situation is also discussed in the new order: Do not place military traffic-controllers on routes where GAI subunits control traffic.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Well, let us imagine a "non-technical order" situation: Transport of particularly dangerous and outsized cargoes...

[Ryzhkov] This is how the system works. The route and transport times are coordinated with the internal affairs agencies and traffic is controlled by joint forces and assets. In a word, GAI employees will also be, as they say, hot at intersections. In such situations, they can count on our assistance. Life itself has prompted all of these situations. For example, VAI and GAI did not divide their obligations but worked together while eliminating the after-effects of the earthquake in Armenia.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And how is this cooperation being worked out in a changeable road situation, will conflicts not arise here?

[Ryzhkov] A timely exchange of information about the situation is important here. The order clearly states in this regard: GAI posts will take the necessary steps for priority passage of military vehicles.

These new requirements are being implemented now. Of course, road traffic problems will not be smoothly resolved everywhere. Both VAI and GAI think that they need to teach joint operations. And, in my opinion, this is the guarantee of our common success.

Cooperative to Provide Job Placement Aid to Retired Servicemen

18010477c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with L. Yalkitman, chairman of the "Vstrecha" cooperative, by A. Ivanov: "A Meeting"]

[text] A cooperative with the name "Vstrecha" is ready to help those being transferred into the reserve from the ranks of the Armed Forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is hidden behind the cooperative's name and how can it help former servicemen? Judging by the sign, to find a helpmate?

[Yalkitman] The essence of the matter is rendering intermediary services mainly to construction organizations from any region of the country in recruiting specialists.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In other words, if someone needed, let us say, a welder or stone mason, then they would turn to you and the cooperative would conduct a search based on that order, if I understand you correctly?

[Yalkitman] That is absolutely correct. But at the same time, the builders themselves are coming to us. People want to be placed in a job of their choice: For example, someone would like to make more money and would like to work in the North and someone else much prefers the South. Both of them learn of the other's existence through us. And there you have a meeting!

Now imagine, how many young lads, now fulfilling service in the Soviet Army especially in construction units could determine their future with our help. To do this, they need to send a letter to the cooperative and indicate the skill they possess and the desired work location. Then, towards the end of their enlistment, we will be able to select an interested organization for the man and propose his candidacy there.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In your opinion, would it be more complicated for those who are being transferred to the reserve to do this themselves?

[Yalkitman] I do not think any particular problems would arise if a professional builder was looking for a job in his home town. But if he suddenly wants to "migrate" or wants to work in another area for a time, problems crop up here as a rule. The volume of mail we receive is evidence of this. In my opinion, inertia and inflexible information ties impede State job placement services. Incidentally, this fact compelled us to start our own personnel service.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You stated that you are ready to help former servicemen "to determine their own future." Obviously, many will want to use your services. I imagine there are even those who, not wanting to part after service, are organizing whole teams and will ask you to find enterprises where they could all work together. But you are not performing these services free of charge?

[Yalkitman] For servicemen, it is precisely free of charge. As for our expenses, I can say that we mainly cover them at the expense of organizations which select the specialist. And at prices significantly below those of the government. This is a needed step because otherwise we would lose our competitiveness.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And the last question. To what address does one send a letter in order to become a subscriber to the cooperative's personnel service?

[Yalkitman] Here it is: The "Vstrecha" Cooperative, Subscriber Box No 669, Moscow, 117602. And one more thing. I foresee that people could come to us who are not only soon finishing their enlistments, but even those who got out of the service 2 or more years ago. I have a request for them—send a copy of your service record.

Trial Reveals Malfesance in Military Commissariat in Vilnius

18010606 Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Apr 89 p 4

[Article by G. Konchyus and N. Nadezhkina, special correspondents: "A Present for the Major: What Was Concealed in the Military Commissariat by a Curtain of Secrecy"]

[Text] For a long time, the life of military commissariats was a zone closed to criticism. The cover of "military secrecy" protected them from public control. But in recently held open trial a military tribunal of the Kaunas garrison convicted Major B. Plotkin, a former division chief of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in Vilnius, of systematically abusing his official position out of self-interested motivations, and sentenced him to 3 years confinement (suspended) and mandatory labor. The trial raised the curtain over the life of the military commissariat, and helped us see the flaws in its work.

The Witnesses

"Ishoro!"

Vanda Mikhaylovna's voice was quiet and tired. Why did she call Plotkin? She was worried, there was a persistent rumor in the city that all of the boys of this call-up would be sent to Afghanistan. Where did she get the name and the telephone number? She could no longer remember: Someone at work told her, or maybe the neighbors—many in Vilnius knew this number. All Ishoro did was say that she was concerned for her son, she introduced herself, and said that she taught mathematics in school, whereupon Plotkin asked her whether she could tutor the son of an acquaintance of his. She agreed, of course, and took this to mean that something would be done, since he did ask her to tutor the boy.

"Witness Sarulene!"

A woman rose with difficulty. She was in bad health, she said, diabetes and heart trouble. She wanted her son to serve closer to home, so that he could visit her. He was a student in Kaunas, at the technical school. And he was registered in Kaunas. Why did she come to Plotkin, in Vilnius? Well, they said that only he could help. She came after her son had already received his traveling notice. She placed an envelope containing 200 rubles on the desk. And then she thought, perhaps that's not enough. A few days later she came in again and left an envelope with 300 rubles. Plotkin promised to help,

though he did not say anything specifically. But it seemed to her that he was displeased with her somehow, and so she came a third time, laying another 300 rubles down.

A Japanese television set, a Zhiguli, a video tape recorder, a lump sum of 4,000 rubles paid in advance to his former wife for child support were listed off during the trial. A name removed from a register, an envelope laid on the desk. In 4 years, 42,000! And not just money! He could do anything.... Organize a banquet at the best restaurant in Vilnius in 10 minutes. Come up with a leather jacket. Arrange for a cooperatively owned garage. Even "push through" a cooperative apartment for Shilko, an acquaintance of his—a three-room place for two and their son. (The file contains a letter to the city soviet executive committee with a request "to find a possibility for allocating a three-room apartment to Shilko," signed by A. Norkunas, assistant chairman of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee, who was also incidentally a member of the draft board of the rayon military commissariat). He was a frequenter of theater premieres, and a fancier of elegant oratory. Nothing, by the way, was too small to be turned down.

Arlauskas, chairman of the trade union of the sanitary engineering trust, came to Plotkin for advice when his son began experiencing trouble at the institute: Either he stopped going to lectures and took on a part-time job, or he was dropped for poor academic performance. The boy could be called up into the army at any moment, and his father was concerned. Plotkin was blunt: Don't you have vacation passes there, in the trade union? Yes, they were available, only there were more than enough desiring to receive them, and they were paid for out of the material incentive fund. But Arlauskas had the power, he wrote "military commissariat" in the "to whom issued" column, and took four over to Plotkin. And a year later, another four. Then there was the time that Plotkin telephoned: He needed a toilet installed in his apartment. Arlauskas, who was a sanitary engineer by occupation, dared not refuse. He came over and did all of the work. At least this time he had to pay for "attention to his son" with his own hands, and not with trade union vacation passes.

In court, the trade union worker did not raise his eyes, he offered excuses, and he mumbled something incomprehensible. On the other hand Graybuvene, a younger, pretty woman employed as an assistant department chief of the Vilnius City Food Trade Organization No 2, felt very confident. Yes, she did go to the military commissariat, she did ask that her son be stationed "closer to home," that he be kept out of Afghanistan. Whether it was Plotkin's help, or it just happened, she didn't know, but her son was stationed in Kaliningrad. The division chief was attentive to her, and didn't she have the right to thank him? She arranged with the store to set aside some Bulgarian cucumbers and tomatoes, she telephoned Boris Ilich, he came by car, and took away two

boxes. Can't you understand, it was just a way of saying thank you, like giving someone a bouquet of flowers? And after that he came for meat, and for other food products.

Each person brought Plotkin what he could. Actress Babilene brought him a pass to a variety show, another some boots for a friend, and another some brandy. Korzunovas, a worker of the republic State Fuel Committee, helped him exchange the standard gasoline coupons for ones that could be used to get AI-95—very high quality fuel supplied only to the vehicles of executives.

Medicine

Doctor Strazdene had been a member of the draft board of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Military Commissariat for many years. She knew her work well, but many doubts and questions had accumulated. For example, the doctor told us, a young man is summoned toward the end of a call-up, he complains of poor health, and he is sent to the clinic for examination. He is confined to bedrest for about a month, and when he returns, the draft board is no longer in session. When it comes to the conclusion the physicians at the hospital arrive at, as to whether the young man will be summoned at the next call-up or not, we know absolutely nothing. When the young man is sent to the medical board of the republic military commissariat for consultation, it is not felt to be necessary to communicate the results to physicians of the draft board. The responsibility is ours, but the decision is made by someone else.

Here is an example. Conscript A. Petukhauskas complained of poor health. He was naturally subjected to additional examination. The young man was given a urological operation in the clinic. When he was released, the summer was already in full swing. He did not appear before the draft board until fall. The doctors looked him over and made their decision—grant him a postponement so that he could complete his treatment. Everything seems clear. But for some reason the conscript's file was sent for examination to the medical division of the republic induction center, and its director, Doctor Drobayalis, wrote "Unfit for peacetime service" on the basis of the paperwork, without ever examining the young man. And after that, Plotkin, who communicated nothing to the draft board, made a correction on the young man's draft card, and Petukhauskas was freed completely from the draft.

This is, so to speak, the visible tip of the iceberg. There is also the submerged part. Back in spring, conscript A. Petukhauskas's father visited Plotkin in the military commissariat. He was concerned about the health of his son, who was close to being called up into the army. When he came back later, Plotkin told him that his son was recognized to be unfit for duty, and he intimated that this "cost a great deal." What was there left to do? Petukhauskas laid an envelope containing 2,000 on Boris Ilich's desk.

The conclusion of this story is simple. A year later, during an inspection of the military commissariat, 25 conscripts "unfit for peacetime service" were sent to the district hospital in Riga for a spot check. Seventeen of them, including A. Petukhauskas, were recognized to be fit for duty, and joined the army. Who is to say—did Plotkin have a hand in freeing the conscript, or does the medical certification system create opportunities for its abuse?

Moreover, can the medical board do its work in a qualified manner? Judge for yourselves. Fifty conscripts must be examined in half a day. Faster, faster. Every doctor hurries to his hospital or polyclinic (theoretically they are released from their principal job, but this does not happen in fact). No one is insured against mistakes. Recall the teacher Ishoro, the one who gave lessons in mathematics at Plotkin's request. As it turned out, her son went to serve in a flying unit in Tyumen Oblast. It was revealed later on that he was seriously ill, and he was released due to rheumocarditis. The doctors overlooked that! And this is no joke—physical loads are categorically contraindicated in the presence of rheumocarditis. And if such cases are possible, something is not working in the system for medical certification of future soldiers.

The Draft Board

Doctors are not the only ones that participate in the work of the military commissariat. There is the draft board, which is created by decision of the executive committee, and these, we were told, are authoritative, trusted representatives of the public. Members of the draft board of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Military Commissariat testified as witnesses in the trial. But it seemed important to us to interview them a little more deeply. What do they believe to be their role, how do they participate in the decision making, and finally, what are they responsible for?

Let's listen:

A. Norkanus, deputy chairman, Oktyabrskiy Rayon Executive Committee: "We know nothing about the conscripts, we do not look at their files beforehand. The commissar knows, and we put our trust in him. And to be honest, we do not feel ourselves to be part of the process."

A. Volgin, an instructor of the rayon Komsomol committee at that time: "If the truth is to be known, I did not delve deeply into the work, my participation was—how can I put it?—secondary.... We do not talk with the young men about which unit they are to join, and where they are to serve—these things are decided by workers of the military commissariat."

Z. Vareyka, deputy chief of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Organ: "What do I do personally? I preselect those who could be called up into troops of the

Ministry of Internal Affairs. And otherwise? To intervene, we have to have the grounds, we have to arrive at our own opinion. But we don't know anything. By its signatures, the board essentially only gives its blessing to the good or bad work of the military commissariat."

Now there's a term that fits: blessing the work. Even the new military commissar of Oktyabrskiy Rayon S. Ubovich, said: "The board members are as remote from the draft as I am from ballet." But just try to object. They would say that it was a collective decision, that the board knows what it is doing. But the fact that this authoritative board itself feels to be not a part of what is going on in the military commissariat is unimportant. In some branches of troops the preconscripents present their applications beforehand, and those who are to serve abroad are tentatively chosen. Are the members of the board informed of this? No, of course not. Are the preconscripents referred to the board for questioning? Are the board members informed? No. When the conscript is finally summoned, the board members do not ask him a single question. Because both the young man and the authoritative representatives of the public know that everything is predetermined. "Congratulations, my son," the military commissar says, "you're going into the navy." And that's all.

It is felt for some reason that it is improper for the future soldier to know where he will be serving. They even try to persuade us that the military commissariats have no idea where the conscripts will go—the commands are given number codes. Perhaps that is the way it should be according to the instructions, but in practice it is otherwise. Experienced workers know very well what is concealed behind a particular number. And this provides them the possibility to skillfully manipulate and—let's not be afraid to use the term—utilize the curtain of secrecy, which is "translucent" to them, for their own benefit.

Think about it: Would parents be running to Plotkin if everything were done openly? Would Sarulene have come? Her son already had his draft notice, after all. Would she have brought those envelopes if she knew that the decision was made collectively, and that nothing could be changed? Or what about Graybuvene and her cucumbers? Moreover, the medical indications may be that one person cannot serve in a hot climate, while another cannot serve in the Far North. But if orders could be changed arbitrarily, who is to be responsible for seeing that these recommendations are observed? Consider that the health of the future soldier and the quality of army training depend on such recommendations.

A Round-Table Discussion by Correspondence

The trial and discussions with people involved in the work of military commissariats persuaded us that something needs to be changed in the draft system. We spoke about this with executives and workers of rayon military commissariats, with members of the military tribunal of

the Kaunas garrison, with members of draft and medical boards, and with the parents of future soldiers. Various proposals were suggested, debates flared up, and opinions collided in this unique round-table discussion by correspondence.

Conscripts should be examined in polyclinics at their place of residence, and they could be examined by all of the physicians and consult with specialists ahead of time. A call-up is a legal act. And so there should be legal specialists on the board, as well as military doctors and veterans of the armed forces—they won't be just incidental observers. And it would also be reasonable to make the draft board permanent; we shouldn't break people away from their principal job. Let them come, let us say, once a week, but let's not allow any decision to be made without their participation. And why shouldn't representatives of military subunits not participate in the work of the draft board? Why shouldn't they take a look at the future soldiers beforehand, visit the secondary schools and the vocational-technical schools to talk with the young people, and finally, simply lobby for their own units?

But most importantly, everything should be done openly, since only this will eliminate the possibility of abuses. Every conscript should know beforehand which branch of troops and, to the extent possible, which region he will be serving in. And there will be no conflicts if the question is decided not on the basis of "appeals from parents" but by direct, open competition taking account of health, general education and presence of a military specialty.

These are of course only the basic outlines. Other proposals are possible as well. And all of them deserve examination. Except for one—not changing anything.

Our last interview was conducted in Vilnius. Colonel A. Visotskis, the republic's military commissar, retorted angrily when we shared what we learned about the problems: "Writing about abuses in the army means doing harm to the army's prestige." With this we cannot agree. The Plotkin story is not unique, after all. In connection with the amnesty a few years ago, a criminal case was dropped against Major General V. Mitskyavichus, former military commissar of the Lithuanian SSR, who was accused of abusing his official position. Later on, once again in connection with an amnesty, a similar case was dropped against Colonel P. Lyaskovskiy, former military commissar of Oktyabrskiy Rayon in Vilnius. An amnesty is not a pardon; the facts gathered by the enquiry were rather serious. And it must be clearly said that harm is being done to the authority of the army, and consequently to the entire society, not by glasnost but by all of these lovers of vacation passes, cucumbers and envelopes, who have cunningly concealed themselves behind the curtain of secrecy and authority of the military commissariat, discredited military service and infused mistrust into young souls.

Col Gen Krivosheyev Responds to Readers' Concerns on Draft

18010619 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with USSR Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General G. Krivosheyev by Colonel R. Makushin: "How the Draft Will Go"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

[Makushin] Comrade Colonel General, it is generally known that for many years now, the USSR Armed Forces have been conducting a draft twice a year—in spring and fall. Nonetheless each time after the press publishes the USSR minister of defense's order on the draft and on discharge of servicemen who had served out their term into the reserve, the editor's telephone begins ringing, and he begins receiving letters asking for explanations of particular issues associated with active duty.

[Krivosheyev] Letters are sent not only to the editors of periodical publications; we in the General Staff receive great numbers of them. I suppose the problem here is that many citizens simply don't know the laws. Each question can be responded to briefly as follows: The order of military service is regulated by the USSR Law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service," by the general military regulations of the USSR Armed Forces approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, and by orders of the USSR Minister of Defense.

[Makushin] Nonetheless questions do exist. One of the most frequently asked ones that trouble the readers of our newspaper concerns the induction of students for active military service and the active duty of VUZ [higher educational institution] graduates.

[Krivosheyev] Answers to the larger part of these questions have already been given, particularly in issues of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and IZVESTIYA, and in television broadcasts. Here is what I can add to this: The statute granting students a deferment from induction for active compulsory military service does not apply to those students who were called up into the army or navy prior to 1 January 1989 and are now on active duty. That is, they are not subject to early discharge into the reserves, and they will continue to serve in the generally prescribed manner.

[Makushin] This is clear in regard to students. But what about VUZ graduates?

[Krivosheyev] Well, things have also been said about who of them will be inducted, and what percent of the total number of graduates will be inducted. But there is news in this regard as well. A decision was made this year to discharge VUZ graduates called up from the reserve

for 2-3 years and serving active duty as officers in the Soviet Army and Navy, and in border troops, irrespective of their time of service.

[Makushin] Do you mean that it doesn't matter whether they have served a month or a year?

[Krivosheyev] Absolutely. All will be discharged. But I must make a qualification on this account: This does not pertain to those in specialties experiencing a shortage of personnel. They will serve as before.

[Makushin] All right. But when it comes to people who have these specialties, will they continue to be called up?

[Krivosheyev] Without a doubt. This statute is to remain in force for the moment.

[Makushin] But might this not lead to a situation where in view of a shortage of officers, specialties for which there is no shortage of personnel will be recognized as ones experiencing such a shortage?

[Krivosheyev] Well, no. Why call up a graduate of an agricultural VUZ to serve as a platoon commander? This would be funny. Moreover given the reduction of the armed forces, they will be all the more capable of getting by with the personnel they have in cases where the officer specialty is not experiencing a personnel shortage.

[Makushin] All right, then. I can assume that our readers are now clear on students and VUZ graduates. As far as compulsory service is concerned, are there any innovations here?

[Krivosheyev] No. However, I would like to turn attention to one minor but important detail. The term of active duty is calculated as follows. For those inducted in the first half of the year—from 1 July of the year of induction, and in the second half of the year—from 1 January of the year following the year of induction. But there are letters stating that persons who had served two full years were being detained in the service. Comrades who complain of this should know that when necessary, the USSR Minister of Defense has the right to detain servicemen on active duty for a time of up to 2 months above the established term.

[Makushin] Grigoriy Fedotovitch, let's return once again to students, though not to the order of serving active duty or, more accurately, not serving, but rather to the problems of preparing them for service. Whatever the case, this question is still pertinent, is it not? That is, I'm talking about the military training of students.

[Krivosheyev] The draft of a new statute on the military training of students (cadets) of institutions of higher education in the reserve officer program has now been written. It foresees in particular that the lists of VUZes [higher educational institutions] in which military training is conducted and the manner in which students

undergo this training and in which they are certified as reserve officers are determined jointly by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR State Committee for Public Education.

The training of students in military departments is set at a term of 2 or 3 years depending on the particular groups of students undergoing this training.

Students who had served compulsory active duty will undergo 2 years of military training, in connection with which the time allocated to military training is decreased from 450 to 350 hours. This category of persons is released completely from individual training. Students who have not served compulsory active duty are to undergo 450 hours of military training. Upon completion of the theoretical training course, students undergo a training course (apprenticeship) in the troops and in the navy lasting 80 days.

In secondary special educational institutions in which military courses may be organized, only students (cadets) with a secondary education will be required to undergo military training.

Special courses are conducted for graduates of higher and secondary special educational institutions who had undergone training in military departments and courses in the reserve officer training program prior to completion of their studies. After completing their military courses and passing the required examinations, they are awarded the rank of officer without having to serve active duty: VUZ graduates are awarded the rank of

reserve lieutenant, and graduates of secondary special educational institutions are awarded the rank of reserve junior lieutenant. Later on they may be called up in peacetime—voluntarily—for active duty as officers by decision of the USSR Minister of Defense, and they may be inducted for 2-3 years at age up to 30 years in a quantity and in military specialties determined by a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers.

After completing their studies, graduates of institutions of higher education who have not undergone training in VUZ military departments, who are not certified as reserve officers for any reason, and who have not completed their term of active duty prior to entering the VUZ, are inducted for active duty as privates, NCOs, seamen and petty officers for a term of 1 year.

I would like to lay special emphasis here on the fact that considering their training and the interests of the country's national economy, and in order to distract specialists from the productive sphere as little as possible, the government has deemed it possible to limit their term of duty to just 1 year.

Graduates are called up upon completion of their studies, but not later than at an age of 27 years.

Privates, seamen, NCOs and warrant officers who have completed their year term on active duty may be required to attend special courses. After completing these courses and passing the tests, they are awarded the rank of officer upon being discharged into the reserves. The testing deadlines and procedures are established by the USSR Minister of Defense.

Mar Avn Yefimov: Improving Qualitative Parameters of Aviation Operations

18010464 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Mar 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Mar Avn A. Yefimov, commander-in-chief of the Air Forces: "Flights—Precise and Strict Work"]

[Text] Modern combat aviation—the complexity of the processes, and the acuteness of the problems accompanying the development of the Air Forces; combat readiness under conditions of defensive military doctrine; psychological adaptation of the personnel to fourth generation equipment; renewal of the moral atmosphere in the military collectives—all of these are very difficult tasks. Nevertheless, our most disturbing thoughts are about flight safety.

December 1988. The whole world is shook by the tragedy in Armenia. Dozens of mighty military transport aviation planes are in the air. The victims need help. Immediate help. Il-76 are bound for Leninakan. Onboard are specialists and equipment. Each machine and each person is greatly needed. Liquidation of the consequence of the earthquake, and the battle for the lives of the people who have fallen into calamity, have begun.

But the plane did not land in Leninakan; it crashed during its landing approach. The catastrophe occurred because the crew inaccurately determined the atmospheric pressure in the area of the airfield.

Study of all the circumstances of this flying accident leads to the simple conclusion that it was crew error. In those days military transport aviation pilots were working at colossal intensity. It was physical and psychological burdens (and simply extreme tiredness) that led to the fatal error.

But here is another case. The crew of Maj S. Klenin knew that for a long time the servicing and maintenance without which they must not take off had not been carried out. But, despite this, not merely an erroneous, but a senseless decision was made: never mind, they said, it does not matter if we fly out on our mission without checking the quality of the fuel. The flight ended in catastrophe.

Two aviation tragedies. And the reasons, it would seem, were similar: mistakes by the aviators. But this is a formal similarity. In the first case it was the extremely severe conditions and the flight crew working at the limit of human strength. It was going beyond this limit. In the second it was criminal irresponsibility.

Every flying accident, in the final analysis, results from a confluence of specific circumstances and quite definite causes. Therefore, the program of preventive measures to improve flight safety, implemented after an incident, in a certain sense is also particular in nature.

However, at the basis of ensuring safety there are also strategic, constantly operating factors: laws of flight duty. That is what we call these fundamental principles, tested by all the many years of experience of military aviation practice, of planning, organizing, supporting, controlling, and accomplishing flights.

These laws are precise and categorical. They do not allow any ambiguity of interpretation. They are not recommendations and they are not desires, but are an entire code of simple requirements incumbent upon everyone associated with aviation. Here a single type of attitude makes sense: thorough knowledge of the content, and deep understanding of the essence of the regulations, and strict, mandatory fulfillment of everything established by them. The laws are set forth in the appropriate directives, but they are not the result of abstract reflections "on the given topic" by those specialists who develop manuals, courses, guidance documents and instructions. The specific nature of aviation activity itself dictates them.

This is the development and combination of laws to which equipment, psychology, the "pilot—airplane—medium" system, and the aerial environment are subordinated. This is the establishment of the optimum connection between the attributes of the material components of the aviation branch and the qualities of man in aviation—the pilot, operating complex machines, organizing flights and controlling them.

No, it is not we who regulate aviation life. Life regulates us: our relations, the process of our professional activity, our behavior, deeds, psyches and morals.

Seemingly I am talking about the obvious. Is it useful to repeat everything again?

Yes, it is doubtful that any aviator will openly and directly doubt the very laws of flight duty. But, unique, camouflaged, or perhaps even speculative doubt in their truth is manifested now and then, and sometimes in highly original form. For example, it accompanies the most contemporary slogans. They say that the laws of flight duty today retard creative inquiry, limit innovativeness, restrain independence and initiative. And, of course, references are made to restructuring.

It is, I recognize, a strange view on restructuring, which at once (and first of all!) presumes knowledge of the objective laws of development of any social and professional field, and rejects all approximateness and voluntarism. It rejects noble desires, if they are unjustified by practical capabilities.

The secret of the distortion of the idea of renewal is simple. True work is precision, maximum intensity, responsibility, and self-output. It is persistent labor. Not everyone is capable of this way of life. Not anyone is ready for this attitude toward service. Serious work, as a rule, is not gaudy, and is not always showy and noticed.

It is always difficult. Conversations about unlimited improvement are another matter. "The cock has crowed but it is not yet dawn there."

So, do the strict and uncompromising laws hold back the all-round development of combat aviation? First, I will remind you that continuous improvement of professional skill is also a law of flight duty, one of the chief and defining ones. It is a law which transforms the activity of aviators from the realm of unclear dreams to the sphere of precise, specific, planned and monitored work. The law prevents chaos and disorganization. It establishes the real boundaries of the possible.

Or take another law of flight work: the continuous movement from the simple to the complex. Any distortion of this law is impermissible. Let us suppose that someone decided one day: I want no more complications. Seemingly this guarantees the aviator wellbeing. The pilot accomplishes tasks at the level of complexity he has mastered, or perhaps even simply repeats well worked out, usual tasks. He does this from flight to flight, from month to month. From the operational standpoint it is simpler and simpler, and easier and easier for the man to fly. And he does not notice that, in parallel with the polishing of his actions, there takes place a disarming of his psyche, and destruction of his capabilities for flying activity. Such a paradox: the skills of elementary operations are perfected, and the structure of a higher level, creative activity, is gradually eroded. And, if suddenly there arises an unanticipated flight complication, the formalistically very experienced pilot may not find a way out of the critical situation.

I must recall here the valuable experience in organizing flying work of such commanders as Col V. Maskayev. For three decades the unit that he now commands has had no flying accidents. This means that the people are able, based on the laws of flying, to combine wise words with careful deeds. They do not turn the eternal truths into copy-book maxims by primitive, dogmatic repetitions.

So, do the laws of flying work interfere with its improvement? I think that the examples cited above give a clear answer. Those who find in the laws methods of improving the effectiveness of service, and advance the cause, do not complain about regulations. He who does not understand the positive meaning of generalized experience has nothing left to do besides grumble about "conservatism" and the strictness of the regulations. Of course, even the laws require extension, clarification, and improvement. They record the understanding of aviation processes that we have achieved for today. In this well-founded renewal is also found the meaning of progress.

However, the highest responsiveness and discipline will never lose their paramount instructive importance. These are, in my deepest conviction, eternal attributes of any complex branch of human activity. Seemingly this postulate is clear to all.

But, a special conference on flight safety is taking place. Much that is valuable has been expressed and proposed. Serious problems have been disclosed. Possible ways of overcoming certain negatives have been discussed. But complete satisfaction from this thorough, and at times sharp exchange of opinions is lacking. Why? Because, somehow the problems of unconditional and strictest fulfillment of the documents regulating flying work have remained in the shade. It is as though this was implied in and of itself.

But, real practice convinces me that it is not enough merely to imply, it is necessary to begin with individual self-discipline. But, how many years is it necessary to serve for discipline to become an internal requirement? What positions and military ranks is it necessary to reach, in order for precise and strict fulfillment of such a basic law as the absolute following of the flight plan (an order, essentially) to become the primary stimulus in any situation?

Col N. Chava, commander of an aviation large unit, committed aerial hooliganism such that his aircraft was damaged. A division commander—a hooligan. How? Of course, now he is already a former division commander.

Unfortunately, this extreme case is not unique. There are still commanders who perceive each promotion as an expansion of their area in which anything is permissible. And, they can already prepare for flights without particular zeal or care. It's all right to "experiment a bit" in the air, and to amaze their subordinates with their remarkable skill and valor. Although such "experimentation" has nothing in common with mature professional skill.

And the colonel, sweeping by over the airfield at an impermissibly low altitude (and one that he had not mastered!), in no way is demonstrating his faultless handling of the aircraft. Here he is showing something entirely different: intoxication with power. Such tricks are prohibited for you, comrade subordinates, but for me they are permitted because I am the boss!

And the subordinates watch attentively. They evaluate everything, our subordinates. And the absolute majority of aviators condemn such daredevil stuff. They condemn it because the commander is being hypocritical. Publicly he calls for precision and strictness in fulfilling all the norms of flight duty, but he openly ignores them himself.

But, we will not conceal the fact that there are also those who may be taken in by the example of their unsound commander. And then await the calamity that lies in wait for every mistake of the flying man. There is no greater luck for an officer, especially when he is becoming established, than to meet a wise commander. This is the equivalent of meeting a happy fate, a reliable future. A wise commander, who has understood thoroughly and comprehended the laws of flight duty, will help open up

the secrets of desired professional skill, and teach everything. A talented aviator always consciously subordinates himself to the prescriptions of flight duty. And the laws begin to affect his skill, the reliability of his work in the most difficult situation, and his safety.

And furthermore, in our day public opinion has become unusually active. Personnel today feel responsibility for everything, since they sense their right to participate in everything. This includes the development of tactical techniques, the modernization of flying equipment, and the introduction of computers into the combat training processes. Today this is no longer theory, it is practice, which has gripped thousands of people. And here the questions of flying discipline, and unwavering fulfillment of flight service regulations, for some reason, remain virtually unaffected by the social activeness of aviation collectives. Might it be preoccupation with combat readiness and combat skill, with everything else pushed to second or third priority?

I think that involving public opinion in discussing the problems of flight safety, of improving the whole aviation structure, and of monitoring the state of affairs, is a paramount task. This is because only a collective that has diversity of thinking, but unity of actions, is capable of anything.

I recall the remarkable work by Antoine St. Exupery, "Night Flight." There are three main actors. Rivier, director of the air communications net, Inspector Robino, and Pilot Fabien. They are three entirely different types of people, who have three entirely different attitudes toward their work. Rivier is a visionary, and a daring and courageous innovator. Fabien is a man fanatically attracted by flying. Robino is a servant of paragraphs, a defender of order, for whom there is no justification if a deviation from established regulations is committed. Aviation for him is a reign of absolute order. But, here is what is amazing. It is precisely this difference in the members of the small collective of aviators, participants in most complex work, that makes its accomplishment possible at all.

This unusual, but essentially fraternal unity took shape by accident. And what if the leaders of an aviation unit are able to unite people by the idea of conscientious work, and to involve public opinion in seeking solutions for the problem? What if the command learns to extract from the discordance of opinion the rational kernels? What if it masters the art of overcoming the outward effects, and the ability to concentrate the interests of its subordinates on solving the everyday, specific (and therefore most difficult) questions? Then true successes and stable results will come—in combat readiness, professional skill, and flight safety. And the morality of strict and precise observance of the flight duty regulations will become a normal, continuously operating factor.

One day I thought: "Why for me, for many years already, has everything associated with the laws of flying work been self-evident, and caused no doubts? Why do some aviators, by their deeds, seem to polemicize that which for me is obvious?"

The answers did not come immediately. But, one day a thought flashed through my mind: "And what if flight personnel are granted absolute freedom in this matter? If you wish, follow the flight norms; if you wish, reject them. In short, do what seems right to you. What would happen as a result of such an instruction?"

There are those who, no doubt, would throw out the eternal truths just the same. This is because faith in one's success is extremely strong in man. Faith that nothing would ever happen to him.

Well, I do not have justification (and, thus, the right) to placate myself with hope and illusions that everything will work out fine in the Air Forces, without improving the established norms of flight duty, and without strictest following of the truths extracted from the harsh realism of real life. Aviation prohibits all sweet self-deception, and confirms the prose of everyday life: flights are strict and precise work.

The long distance phone rings. At this minute hundreds of Air Force planes are in the air. What news will this telephone call bring?

Moscow PVO Problems Clearing Winter Runways
18010439 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

Article by Major A. Voynov, Chief of a Section of the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU, Moscow Air Defense District, under the rubric "The Problem Demands a Solution": "A Slick Airfield"]

[Text] There was ice on the runway....

The Commander of the fighter regiment picked up the phone time and again and asked the same question:

"How is the runway"?

"We are warming it," answered Major V. Abramkin, Commander of the Separate Airfield Technical Maintenance Battalion (OBATO).

The Colonel replaced the telephone, and in the ensuing quiet it seemed to him that he could hear the distant hum of the warming machines. There was only one alarming note in it. There was no certainty that the worn-out equipment would hold up, that the "airfield machines" "would not freeze" the runway.

In the airfield maintenance company commanded by Captain V. Buryan it is felt that the critical situation arose because of a shortage of equipment designed for

combatting icing on the runway (VPP). Today, the airmen were using the TM-59 warming machines. (This is a self-propelled chassis with a VK-1 or RD-45 jet engine mounted on it.) As it moves along the airfield the machine melts and blows away the ice crust and moisture with a jet of gas from the engine. When winter began the company had had two jet engines for three warming vehicles. Later they received an engine for the third. This did not relieve the acuteness of the situation, however. The operating life of the warming machines had long since expired. The axles and running gear from vehicles taken out of production were used in them, and spare parts had become practically an insolvable problem.

The Airfield Engineering Service of the Moscow Air Defense District, headed by Colonel A. Khrenov, explained that back in October of last year they received a manual which specified the operating life and approximate annual consumption of motor life for the TM-59 warming machines. In accordance with this document the machines, manufactured in 1979, were to be written off. This would not be done, however, because there were no replacements.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kuznetsov, representative of the Airfield Engineering Service of the Air Defense Forces, had the following to say: "For years now requisitions sent to the Directorate of Airfield and Engineering Service of the Air Force's Rear Services have only been partially filled. Especially with respect to warming and vacuuming machines. For years the service has experienced major difficulties with the distribution of this acutely scarce equipment."

I contacted Colonel G. Bobrov, a representative of the aforementioned directorate, who stated the opposite, that the extent to which aviation of the Air Defense Forces is provided with warming machines today is 7/

above the level for the Air Force. In 1987, for example, 14 jet engines were renovated in Air Force Rear Service units for the warming machines.

It is not a matter of lack of coordination between departments, however. The fact is that repair possibilities have now been exhausted, since industry no longer produces the VK-1 or RK-45 jet engines.

The warming machines are doomed to gradual "extinction." It is planned to use jet engines discarded from the L-29 trainer for them, to be sure. By that time, however, chemical reagents are to be used as the main means of combatting icing. Colonel Bobrov even expressed the idea that after learning how to use them and evaluating their merits, the airfield maintenance specialists would themselves not want to return to the warming machines, which would be assigned an auxiliary role.

And just what are the prospects for switching to chemical means of combatting icing?

The Moscow Air Defense District is presently receiving the ANS deicing reagent. Unfortunately, however, only 27-36% of what is needed. Its use is limited to the temperature range of zero to minus 7-8 degrees. The reagent erodes the runway's concrete surface and must be carefully removed after use. It cannot be used on concrete surfaces "younger" than 2 years.... Industry is developing a new and more effective one, to be sure. But it is not exactly clear when the troops will begin receiving an adequate quantity of it. For the immediate future the specialists believe that the warming machines will continue to be the main means of combatting icing.

According to specialists with the Airfield Engineering Service of the Air Force Rear Services, not a single [other] state in the world burns kerosene for combatting icing on runways. We use an unjustifiably large amount of the aviation fuel for this purpose each year.

The U.S., for example, uses a chemical method—ordinary carbamide, also known as urea. In addition, methyl alcohol is extensively used for preventing icing. And we are theoretically not behind. Our country has developed the only special deicing reagent in the world today, which meets extremely strict requirements. And when we consider the fact that the main job involved in the winter maintenance of airfields is not even that of combatting icing but of preventing it, "our" method is above competition. A 50% solution of the reagent prevents the formation of an ice crust when the temperature fluctuates around the most dangerous, zero mark. One-time use of ANS prevents four or five icings with brine remaining in microscopic cracks in the concrete surface. A new reagent has also been developed, which is active within a temperature range of zero to minus 20%.

But there is even more. A method of impregnating concrete surfaces at airfields with a petroleum-polymer substance has been tested and is in use. It fills microscopic cracks in the concrete and forms an extremely thin but strong film on its surface, which reduces the traction practically none but protects the runway from adverse external factors for 2 years. After treating "young" concrete surfaces with the petroleum-polymer resin, ANS can be used on them without limitation. The production of these resins has already been set up in one of the republics, which will make it possible in the future to treat dozens of airfields each year. Not a large number, of course. The problem is being resolved too slowly.

And the problem arose back in the times of piston aircraft. Ordinary salt was used to handle it back then. But jet aircraft came into being. With the increase in landing speeds, increased demands were made of the preparation and maintenance of airfields. Some sharp fellows at one of the air garrisons converted snow loaders, of which there was a surplus, by mounting written-off but still serviceable RD-45 jet engines on the self-propelled chassis. This was in 1957. They were ordered from industry in 1958-59. They were produced as the TM-59 we have discussed.

And so, the "warming method," which came about as a temporary, forced measure, proved to be amazingly tenacious and is still going strong today, more than 30 years later. But the nation's only supplier of ANS, the Azot Chemical Production Association, which was to reach full capacity for production of the reagent back in 1986, promises to put into operation only 70 percent of the planned capacity this year. This cannot meet the needs of the nation's entire aviation.

Nor can we disregard the habits of the airfield maintenance specialists, their attachment to the tested, even though wasteful, warming method. Incidentally, the specified allocations of fuel for the warming machines are not issued in the Moscow Air Defense District. And even this, as we can see, is no barrier.

We need to admit that the Ministry of Civil Aviation has left the aviation of the Armed Forces behind in this area. B. Kozlov, Chief of the Airfield Maintenance Section of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, told me that warming vehicles are used there on a limited basis, only on certain sections. At the take-off lines and at turns, for example, where the concrete must be kept absolutely dry. The chemical method is the main one used. If not for ANS, the capital's airfields would be unable to fulfill the cargo- and passenger-hauling plan....

I informed the uneasy regimental commander about this.

"Fantastic," he said with a sigh and once again picked up the telephone....

One can understand him. Where, if not in air defense, must the combat machines be prepared to take off at any time? At any time!

Journalists Visit Far Eastern Air Defense, Note Threat from U.S. Military, Intelligence Presence
18010622 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by special correspondent A. Gorokhov: "Far from Moscow: Report from the Air Defense Forces"]

[Text] Snow-covered and fringed by blue water with pack ice beyond, little by little Iturup began growing in the portholes of our AN transporter, rising above the wind-driven clouds and recalling an upset Gzhelskaya [translation unknown] [one word illegible]. The ice of the Sea of Okhotsk virtually butted against the island, beyond which, on the backdrop of a smoking volcano called Ivan Groznyy, the Great Ocean sparkled. Beyond that there was nothing, only unbroken water. Such was the calling card the Kuril Islands first presented me with....

What sort of colors can I use to paint a group portrait of the Air Defense Forces, what words can I find to describe the radar stations, the missilemen—the masters of anti-aircraft firepower, and the interceptor pilots raising their land-based aircraft above the seas, straits and oceans?

What could I, a stranger, do for these people whom military duty summoned to the edge of the earth? At least take my hat off to them, and remind PRAVDA readers that our military compatriots do not just inhabit the Far Eastern lands to which our itinerary takes us today, but also perform combat duty there, opposing a fully realistic threat, sad though this may be.

A tangle of contradictions....both external—peace and war, good will and the readiness for immediate combat operations and internal—21st century technology and the sometimes squalid living conditions, duty and a sense of guilt before wives and children....

It was not my objective to list in chronological order all of the garrisons on Sakhalin, the Kurils, Kamchatka and on the thousand-kilometer coastline of the continent, or describe these little army settlements, some of which sleep nestled "beside the steeply rising chest of the giant," while others "breathe freely" the chilly ocean air which, whenever it stirs to life, blows so hard that all you can do is hold on for your life, and watch out for "tin-can" blizzards, which raise noisy clouds of rusty cans above the frigid earth. The question sometimes crossed my mind as to what sort of lucid minds these are that push their pencils across their maps in search of the more remote and wilder places to "plant" an anti-aircraft missile battalion or a radio company, or even an air regiment.

What's more, I was going to name the garrisons and indicate their specific geographic locations, but I was unable to—it's all classified. But who are we keeping secrets from? Not from our own people?

In our short journey, let excerpts from a recent statement by USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Army General I. Tretyak, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces, at a meeting of the Military Council of these forces with Moscow journalists, serve as our guiding star. During this meeting, incidentally, the journalists were taken out into the field, where for the first time, in the spirit of the times, they were shown a new surface-to-air missile complex in action. (It would not be a bad thing, it seems to me, for the leadership of the air force, which eagerly demonstrates its new technology to highly placed foreign visitors—from NATO even, to sometimes think about the Soviet press as well).

And so, a word from the Commander-in-Chief:

"The Air Defense Forces are purely defensive in their purpose and in their very essence. No one has ever relieved them of the mission of defending the country: They must protect the people, their homes, the economy and, of course, the army. But it is another matter that the means by which this basic mission is carried out are significantly changing, meaning that modern weapons are required. I must note that the USA, for example, has

not cut a single military program. Development of offensive airborne resources is proceeding at full steam abroad, despite all negotiations."

The situation in the "Far Eastern Theater" was explained to me at headquarters before I could even sit down.

One P-3 Orion and one RC-135—large four-engine aircraft built by Lockheed and Boeing—were conducting reconnaissance along the Chukchi and Kamchatka peninsulas. Another Orion was flying along the Kurils. There were three Orions together in the Sea of Japan—this was heightened attention to our Maritime Kray, from where in their opinion the threat to peace originates. And a U-2 was noted in the Yellow Sea (well what do you know, that "antique" is still flying; that was the airplane in which F. Powers visited us almost 30 years ago in that unfortunate incident).

There is more. Unprecedented in scope. Team Spirit-89 exercises of the armed forces of the USA and South Korea had come to an end, and the troops were being ferried back home. On the island of Hokkaido the U.S. Air Force was conducting a private exercise—F-16s were making strikes on ground targets. In Alaska, a confusion of radio traffic: B-1Bs, B-52s, F-15s and A-10s were penetrating a simulated enemy air defense system.

"What's going on here, comrades?" I dumbfoundedly asked the operators I was interviewing. "Over there, they're doing maneuvers, while over here all of the triggers are cocked, and not just in the Air Defense Forces. No one wants war, but everyone is making ready for war. Where is that mechanism of inhibition that could put an end to this devil's sabbath? Will every action always have to have a reaction? On and on, until infinity?"

To be honest I was given some figures at the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces. Take as an example the fact that in the first 3 months of this year, around 800 (!) foreign reconnaissance airplanes flew near Soviet borders. Fighters had to be launched over a thousand times. These figures seemed sort of abstract back in Moscow. But here, on the eastern edge of our country, they appear visually meaningful, they have substance to them.

"That's exactly what the problem is," noted Lieutenant General of Aviation I. Ancheyev. "You must understand that it's hard to call us hawks, but everything inside of me protests whenever I hear someone urging us to bury our arms. It's too early to take off our uniforms. The political climate is warming, but paradoxical as it may seem, tension at the borders is growing. And we are not the ones that are creating this tension."

A word from the Commander-in-Chief:

"Over 100,000 officers are serving in the Air Defense Forces. The forthcoming unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces will affect our forces as well. However, I would like to recall that the principle of defense sufficiency remains inviolable. Therefore, any haste in this issue is impermissible. I feel that we will nonetheless be able to reduce our forces within reasonable limits.

"The missile troops of the Air Defense Forces are armed with weapon systems capable of executing missions in a wide range of altitudes and speeds. Fighter aviation possesses fourth-generation MIG-31 and SU-27 interceptors. We are receiving new electronic equipment and automated control systems."

We landed at one of the airfields on an amazingly beautiful though slightly windy day.

"The kind of weather you have brought us occurs here 34 days a year," said Colonel V. Kochkin, commander of a fighter air regiment, as he watched the MIG-23s take off and land.

Yes, it is a daring thing to do—to fly over the ocean in a single-engine airplane. A pilot obviously needs something more here than what is usually referred to as courage. It is rather often that American deck-landing F-14 Tomcats appear here, in the regiment's zone of responsibility (F-14s are powerful two-engine craft similar to our MIG-29).

Last summer for example squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Korolev, who was paired up with I. Antsiferov ("We flew together back when we were in the Baltic area, and we worked well together," Korolev told me later), met up with a pair of F-14s. No shots were fired, of course, but a full set of maneuvers was played out. Korolev spoke excitedly slapping his palms against the tabletop as he told the story; I sensed that he embellished things a little, like the well-known hero in "The Celestial Sloth." Nonetheless according to his story, our pair "beat" the Americans.

Generally speaking the officers—at least those with whom I was able to become acquainted—are clever with words. And even the soldiers are quite bright, sometimes even to some embarrassment of the top brass. I recall a time in another unit—a surface-to-air missile unit in Khabarovsk Kray—when Private Kilichbay Kholmuradov, a soldier from Tajikistan who was not awed by the shine of the large stars on the shoulderboards of the top brass, declared:

"I'm getting discharged soon, but I urge you very strongly to show some concern for a soldier's personal life. This is a hard place to live, and an even harder place to work—we're constantly on duty, after all...."

The soldier was right, he was smart one. It took us an hour and a half to get from the airfield to the hill occupied by the garrison with a rather incomprehensible nickname, "Vyuchka"; for an hour and a half we were jostled from side to side in a GAZ truck on a road that was more like a tunnel through snow packed firm beneath the spring sun. We passed a water truck carrying hot water (that's so the water won't freeze by the time the tanker reaches its destination)—though of course at a fork in a the road, since there is no way to pass otherwise. The local islanders named the water truck "Polaris."

There are 62 children in the garrison, including eight schoolchildren. They are driven to school—1.5-2 hours one way. Let me mention that there are tree stumps as far as the eye could see around the launch sites. As it turns out, there used to be a huge camp here long ago, one of those established for logging.

But of course, the officers talked least of all on this subject—they dwelled more on their work.

"You know," said Lieutenant Colonel A. Lidovskiy, confirming the restlessness that one senses in large headquarters, "we fly against those scouts 15-20 times a month. The activity never lets up. Even during negotiations and summit talks. Nothing makes a difference."

By the way, the Americans also said the same things to me, though not here, on "Vyuchka," but on Kamchatka, where I was sitting in the duty flight's hut talking to the pilots about this and that. The problems are the same: the lack of amenities, the precise schedules just like in Russia proper, and the housing.

The unit stationed here flies two-seater MiG-31s, which were tested some time ago by Hero of the Soviet Union A. Fedotov, and aboard one of which he died together with navigator V. Zaytsev exactly 5 years ago. The Mikoyan pilots are known in the regiment, and they remember Fedotov as well.

Captain G. Mefodyev is an aircraft commander.

"A komkor [aircraft commander]! Mefodyev corrected me to the sound of general laughter, and he added: "All sorties are over the ocean. There is nothing here to pray to but the equipment. We have two gods—the proficiency of the crew plus the equipment."

"And the navigator's head!" Captain Titov added to what the commander said.

We made a bet with the pilots: If the lines following below make it into the newspaper, then.... By the way, the terms of the bet have no bearing on the topic of this report, but these never-to-be-forgotten lines, which are to enter the chronicle of aviation journalism, should read as follows: "Whining and leaping, the airplane rushed along the landing strip, and then lost itself in folds of the terrain." "He does carry on!" the general exclaimed.

At that moment a piercing bell returned everyone to seriousness. Mefodyev and Titov ran to their airplane and took off. For a rendezvous with another Orion. The year before last the regiment's pilots took off 214 times to escort the reconnaissance airplanes, while last year the number was 825. Such are the dynamics of work out here.

A word from the Commander-in-Chief:

"The Air Defense Forces are scattered throughout the entire country. To be honest, their needs are poorly provided for. Moreover around 20,000 families have no quarters at all. In the last 2 years we were given sizable supplementary allocations for the development of the social infrastructure. We surpassed last year's housing construction plan. However, the situation remains acute. Our objective is to solve the problem in the next five-year plan. We will build some quarters in the central part of Russia so that people would move there after being discharged into the reserves. We are also thinking about ways to compensate officers and warrant officers for housing expenses—after all, thousands of families live in private apartments."

The visiting journalist has it easy—he is fed and comforted, he comes one day and leaves the next, delighted and touched by what he has seen. Just the names alone stir the soul: Tyatya and Kudryavyy volcanoes, settlements with proud names such as Sokol [Eagle] and Burevestnik [Albatross], Avachinskaya Hill, Kasatka Bay, Cape Van-der-Lind....

The sole inconvenience is the time difference between here and the capital: Everyone is alert, while your eyelids droop. And these people remain alert on combat duty for 24 hours a day, in shifts, of course, honorably fulfilling the responsibilities imposed on them by the state, while wives of officers and warrant officers that have them maintain a simple household, raise little children and, if they are lucky, go to work as plotters, chefs and laundresses—there is little else to do.

The radar operators, those who are stationed on the islands, are especially cut off from the continent. Take for example Major B. Primak's company, which brings in a year's supply of food at a time. This is one of the hardest places to serve. In terms of both climate and support. The commander lives with his wife Yevdokiya Fedorovna, a private first class, in a TsUB (an all-metal general-purpose module), while the children are living in the Ukraine, with his mother-in-law. Irina Prokolovich, the wife of Senior Lieutenant V. Prokolovich and secretary of the company's party organization, is from Leningrad; she is an electronic engineer, and she works at the station as a baker. They live with four-year-old Olegzha in a mobile home. This year the Prokoloviches are to get a change—they were promised the Kiev Military District. Well, that seems just, but Irina is anxious: Is this really true?!

While soldiers unloaded our helicopter (the post exchange took this opportunity to send a few things), Captain Nikolay Frolov, referred to as the "legendary Frolov" on the Kuril Islands, and the commander of our MI-8, asks:

"Well, what do you think? How about flying to one more cape where life is about as depressing as it will ever get!"

We flew over a few island stations, and found the conditions, or more accurately the lack thereof, to be identical everywhere. Lieutenant Colonel A. Nazarov explained it to me like this:

"The situation has recently begun to change. It's hard, but we're hanging on. As far as discipline is concerned, I

don't think that collectives consisting of 18-year-old soldiers can exist without some conflict. However, the kinds of things that are now being written about in the newspapers—they come to us 2 or 3 weeks late, by the way—never happen here! The extreme nature of the situation makes its impression. The soldiers work side by side with their families: After all, both holidays and work days are all spent together, people work side by side, and there are fewer family squabbles. But I feel sorry, of course, for the children."

As we left the station we were given a send-off by its entire civilian population—Vika Shapranova, a real captain's daughter, and her brother Zhenka.... Good luck to you, my children!

Night ASW Operation Described

18010517 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Pasyakin entitled: "Duel at Sea": "Reporting From the Deck of a Large ASW Ship"]

[Text] The conditions of the "enemy" submarine's raid approximated a combat situation to the maximum extent possible. The commanders of the large ASW ship Vice-Admiral Kulakov and the patrol escort ship Zadornyy were only minimally informed about the "enemy". The vastness of the area was added to this, which made the job of the ASW ships more difficult and made the submariners' situation easier. The hydrology of the sea, which complicated acoustics, was also on the side of the latter.

...There was semidarkness in the spacious sonar room. In the center of the room there was a position with built-in screens and an illuminated annunciator panel, which provides the required information. Depicting the underwater situation, the scanning beam sweeps across an orange illuminated rectangular screen at various intervals like a series of breakers. The electronic beam passed across the annunciator panel hundreds of times. After seeing a blip on the screen, the on-duty sonar operator became alert and strained his ears.

"Echo-bearing... distance..." he reported to the ship's primary control station.

The commander ordered the crew of the ASW ship to assume combat alert condition 1 and to identify the contact.

For the ships crew this command was equivalent to the firing of a starting pistol for runners. Time was reckoned in seconds.

"I think we have detected a submarine," Senior Lieutenant I. Devyatov, the sonar operators' group commander reported to the primary control station.

Interference and several targets appeared simultaneously on the sonar screen. Two of the targets "fled" in opposite directions. Where was the real submarine? We attempted to locate it against a background of heavy interference. And valuable time was slipping away.

The Zadornyy rushed to assist the Vice Admiral Kulakov. But the handing off of the contact did not take place. The submarine departed under a layer of discontinuity and became "invisible" to the ship's sonar operators. However, the duel was not finished. Now, the final word rested with the ship's helicopter pilots.

Ships' capabilities have increased significantly with the advent of shipborne aviation, and their operational tactics have changed. Helicopters conduct reconnaissance of the area, give out weather information and

target designations, participate in the search for submarines, and perform transportation functions... And in this case the "long reach" of the helicopters came very opportunely. An alert helicopter was airborne twenty minutes after the detection of the submarine. The aircrew commander was none other than the detachment commander Major V. Kuchеров—a military pilot 1st class and the senior and most experienced aviator on the ship. And Captain S. Sirchenko, the navigator, was a match for him. Their crew bore the title of excellent for good reason.

The advantages of the rotary wing machine are obvious. Speed, maneuverability, and the capability to peer through a layer of discontinuity by using a dipping sonar and to deploy an antisubmarine barrier of sonobuoys on the probable navigation routes of an "enemy" submarine...

The helicopter hovered over the sea. Using sonar gear at the required depth, the navigator-sonar operator listened to the underwater "ether". Nothing. The helicopter flew to another spot. It hovered again without result. It was as if the submarine had vanished. And by this time dusk had come, making spatial orientation more difficult for the helicopter pilots. However, the level of their training fully permits them to work at night.

Senior Lieutenant L. Giletin's crew received the mission to deploy the antisubmarine barrier. This is a difficult task. Darkness (it was a moonless night) complicated the helicopter crewmembers' work. Skill, equanimity, and confidence in their own abilities were required to complete the task.

The navigator reported to the commander when the helicopter was at the appointed distance from the ship. Giletin turned the rotary wing machine onto the course for deploying the buoys and strictly maintained that course. Captain A. Lagomina dropped the buoys in compliance with the prescribed intervals. Lieutenant A. Nikitin checked the condition of the buoys. After landing in the water and receiving the control signal, the buoys were in the alert duty operations mode. The antisubmarine barrier was deployed. The minutes of waiting dragged on.

And then a light bulb flashed under a number on the instrument... The electronic surveillance system emitted a target indication signal. Upon checking it was discovered that there were not any surface targets within range of the sonobuoy. This meant that it was an underwater target.

After completing the proper calibrations, the navigator listened to the underwater "ether" by using equipment on the activated buoy. In this instance it is not enough to be just a navigator, one must also be a skilled sonar operator.

"I think we have detected a submarine," the navigator reported to the commander.

The helicopter flew toward the activated buoy. After identifying the contact, the doubts vanished—there was an "enemy" submarine in the area. All the necessary information was transmitted to the ship. The helicopter crewmembers coordinated their actions with the ship's ASW team. While the Vice Admiral Kulakov was speeding toward the area and preparing to employ weapons, the helicopter crewmembers maintained contact with the

submarine and transmitted the necessary information to the large ASW ship. This is the real advantage of the ship's "long reach". Neither the large areas of the search, nor the sea's hydrology which is complicated for ASW ships, nor the layer of discontinuity under which the submarine attempted to hide saved the "enemy".

Long past midnight, the subordinates of Captain 3rd class Ye. Sokolov, the commander of Combat Unit-8 (BCh-8), provided a victorious conclusion to the difficult duel. They hit the target with a sniper torpedo attack.

Training Program Plans 'Significant Reduction' of Training

18010397 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, 1988 pp 29-30

[Article by Colonel General A. Ryakhov, Deputy Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR: "The Principle—Stage-by-Stage. The Responsibility—Personal"]

[Text] The quest for more effective ways to train the populace in civil defense, begun under perestroika, has continued in the past training year. Its diverse forms and methods were prompted by an experiment in independent study of CD subjects by white and blue collar workers and kolkhoz employees carried out in republics, krais, and oblasts.

This question is creatively answered at the Donetsk Machine-Building Plant imeni Leninist Komsomol of the Ukraine, at the Mozhaysk Printing combine of the Moscow oblast, and at the POs [production associations] "Standart" and "Baltiyskaya Manufaktura" (Tallin).

Selflessness and high professional skills were demonstrated by non-militarized formations participating in the removal of snow drifts in the Crimean and Odessa oblasts, the removal of the consequences of floods in the Azerbaijan SSR, the Krasnodar Kray, and the Chita oblast, of a hurricane in the Turkmen SSR, and of railway accidents, including ones involving potent toxic and explosive materials (cities of Yaroslavl and Arzamas).

Overall one could say that the training plans were accomplished. However the rates of perestroika in training of the populace are slowed by shortcomings, in a number of areas of a chronic, stagnant nature. A significant part of the leadership has still not drawn conclusions from the lessons of Chernobyl. For example, there have been no changes in the Buryat ASSR and the Chita oblast. As before, the basic reason that many civil defense courses in the Altay Kray failed to accomplish the plan was class absences. In the Voronezh Oblast, the result of the irresponsible attitude of some officials to their duties and their sense of impunity was that the experiment in independent study of the subject was allowed to drift, and essentially failed.

One cannot but be concerned by the fact that a number of ministries and departments are cutting back the civil defense training of managers and specialists of the domestic economy, and that civil defense departments are being eliminated in academic institutions for skill enhancement. Unfortunately, it is typical that the leadership and administrative organs recognize the need for perestroika, but nevertheless have not been able to clearly define its main directions and have not marked out a specific program of action as applied to local conditions.

So what will comprise the core of the activity of all civil defense levels in the coming training year?

First of all, the introduction of a new system of study. On its basis, the level of readiness of the administrative organs, formations, and all the populace for successful execution of protective measures in emergency conditions of peace and war should be truly enhanced. Toward this end, the training organizers are obliged to clarify precisely the requirements for the quality and level of training at the new stage. Each resident will study the methods of defense against natural calamities, accidents, disasters, as well as modern means of attack, but of course in a differentiated manner. Here we should observe a stage-by-stage principle of accumulating knowledge and skills, allowing for local conditions, public activity, age, state of health, and education.

Civil defense chiefs of all levels have been granted the right partially on their own to determine the subject matter of the training and procedures for conducting the classes—the training measures should be organically combined with the planned tasks—and to promote their execution. Training forms are envisaged that will ensure that blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees are torn away from their work as little as possible: independent study of civil defense subjects (self-tuition), and for certain categories of the leadership, taking of examinations without attending lectures.

It is important that each training organizer feel a personal responsibility for the state of civil defense training in the work area assigned to him, and each citizen, for his personal training. We assign an important role in this to party and public organizations seeking to raise the effectiveness of civil defense propaganda.

The proposed principle of stage-by-stage accumulation of knowledge makes it possible to reduce from 35 to 15 hours the volume of training of the leadership directly at the installation, since subjects that duplicate training in the courses are eliminated. This same principle makes it possible to abandon the 20-hour program of training of formations, leaving only special training in a volume of 15 hours. Here 9 hours are assigned for practicing the subjects, and 6 hours for special subject matter, as determined by the relevant civil defense chief of the installation or the territorial civil defense organ. Commanders in the training groups will work together with subordinates under the leadership of the civil defense chiefs of staffs and services (senior specialists). They themselves will handle individual subjects related to the use of equipment, aggregates, and mechanisms in the conduct of rescue and other urgent tasks.

The newly created formations are an object of special concern to civil defense chiefs and staffs. Potential accidents, disasters, and natural calamities characteristic of a given region, safety measures in the conduct of

practical work, methods of rendering self- and mutual first aid in the event of a burn or exposure to potent toxic materials, all this should be allowed for in the organization of their study.

As before, the training of formations should end with a TSU [Tactical Special Exercise] (duration up to 8 hours), which is done during complex exercises and sessions at installations.

Beginning in 1989, training of blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees not belonging to formations will be carried out every year, in a volume of 12 hours. This will include both independent study of civil defense questions, regular training sessions under the leadership of one's immediate supervisors, and periodic planned classes in training groups, conducted by the leaders of the corresponding structural subunits, engineer-technical workers, or other specially designated persons.

In order to provide help to blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees studying a civil defense subject independently, consultation points will be created at installations, equipped with the necessary materials, literature, and study and visual aids in accordance with the subject matter. The procedures of their operation will be determined by the civil defense chief of the installation, and officials of the installation staff, the most prepared commanders of the structural subunits, and activists will be called upon to be consultants. The workers of the staff or civil defense courses of the rayon (city) will hold one or two-day assemblies with the leaders of the classes and the consultants. During the classes and training sessions themselves, they will work through the practical measures provided for by the civil defense plans of the installation, during which special attention will be paid to actions following possible accidents and natural calamities.

As we see, a significant reduction in the training time is a characteristic feature of the new training system. This is first of all a natural result of the introduction, in particular, of the principle of stage-by-stage accumulation of knowledge, and a more clearcut definition of its volume and the skills necessary for each category of trainees, depending on the civil defense obligations imposed upon them. Secondly, under conditions of perestroika, when the State Enterprise (Association) Statute is in effect, it is more expedient to make the organization of training more flexible, closer to life and conditions, i.e. to grant the right to the relevant leaders of labor collectives to themselves determine the subject matter of the classes, the forms and methods of their conduct (independent study or in organized groups), and themselves establish the time for the study of programs (working or non-working time). This will make it possible to pull blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees away from productive work as little as possible, something that is especially important for collectives operating under new conditions of management.

At the same time, a reduction in the volume of training should not be construed as a weakening of requirements regarding the level of knowledge and skills. On the contrary, it presupposes a multiplication of efforts, an increase in the responsibility of the leaders and the trainees themselves for the organization and results of training, for the use of all opportunities and reserves to enhance its effectiveness.

For the training of the populace not occupied in production and service spheres, reliance is put on independent study of training and methodological aids, civil defense booklets, and civil defense radio and television broadcasts and films. Specific information on direct participation of the populace in civil defense measures at one's place of residence (actions following warning signals, locations of shelters, issue points for individual protective gear, evacuation assembly areas etc.) can be learned at consultation points in the quarters and utilities organs, in recreation and reading rooms, classrooms, and civil defense protective structures. It is recommended that employees of quarters and utilities organs, officers and sergeants in the reserve, veterans of war and labor and other activists who have undergone the necessary training be called upon as consultants. In a rural locale, the organization of such classes and consultations is a job for the rural (village) soviets, with enlistment of trained civil defense activists.

The training of young students will be organized according to present programs. Most important in the training of VUZ students is to instill in them the skills of practical actions as future commanders of formations and chiefs of civil defense services in the elimination of the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities. The students of secondary and special academic institutions are trained for performance of civil defense measures according to their type of specialty, allowing for the specifics of production, and students of general schools and professional-technical academies, for able application of protective methods in extreme conditions, and the rendering of self- and mutual first aid.

The procedure for preparation and conduct of complex exercises at major installations of the domestic economy, and of complex training sessions at medium and small ones, has not changed. In the general schools and secondary professional-technical academies, they are conducted annually on civil defense Day. But also during the exercises and training sessions, they should first of all practice the measures to protect people and material property from the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities. When the training questions (stage) of exercises are planned, they should be tied to the execution of domestic economic plans, and in the summarizing of results it is mandatory to calculate their economic impact.

A special role in the enhancement of the level of training of the leadership and command personnel will be assigned to civil defense courses. Beginning in 1989,

their work will be organized in accordance with the requirements of the introduced "Regulations on Civil Defense Courses". In the new training year, it will be necessary to clarify upcoming plans (for 3-5 years) on the makeup of courses, with allowance for changes that have occurred in the administrative-territorial and branch organs of management, the levels of the domestic economy, and in the structure of the formations. This will make it possible to bring the number of courses and the manning level of the instructor staff (masters of production training) in strict accord with the established number of students and the volume and regularity of their training.

Much still remains to be done also in the restructuring of the training and methodological work. As before, the problem is to convert republic, kray, and oblast civil defense courses into genuine training and methods centers. In order to intensify the training process and raise the interest of the students, beginning in 1989 the courses will shift to a differentiated makeup of training groups (allowance for civil defense training, time in the occupied position, etc.). Most important in repeat study—more deeply to study the most important questions of civil defense organization, and to acquaint oneself with the latest attainments of its theory and practice. By decision of the chiefs of courses, the time periods of study by these groups may be reduced. For more prepared students, provision has been made for taking the test without attending classes.

The effectiveness of course work directly depends on quality work by the instructor staff. The civil defense chiefs and staffs running the courses should raise their standards in the selection and training of instructors and masters of production training.

Successful training of the populace is impossible without effective civil defense propaganda. At the current stage, the most important thing in its content is explaining to USSR citizens the essence of measures taken by the CPSU and the Soviet government to restructure civil defense, its orientation toward execution of protective measures under peacetime conditions. It is also necessary convincingly to explain to the populace how important it is for each independently to study civil defense questions, to be ready for able and confident actions in emergency conditions that may arise. For this it is necessary more broadly to utilize round-table discussions, question-and-answer meetings, debates and contests, meetings with civil defense veterans and participants in the elimination of the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities.

Experience confirms that where constant attention is paid to improving training facilities, classes are conducted in a more organized manner, and their return is higher. There is no end of work here. One of the trends is the transition from creating and using traditional training-method and visual aids of a general illustrative type to those that reveal the special actions of the civil defense forces and the populace as applied to local conditions, that help to assimilate the techniques and methods of conducting rescue and other urgent tasks in the event that emergency situations arise that are characteristic of the specific installation and the particular region.

The transition to the new system of training is one of the stages of civil defense restructuring. This is intended to raise it to a qualitatively new level of readiness. And the orientation toward those who have already taken a step forward will help us to achieve successes more quickly.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1989

MRL-1 Weather Radar Station

18010491 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in
Russian No 3, Mar 89 pp 12-13

[Article by Reserve Colonel V. Knyazkov: "The MRL-1 Weather Radar Station"]

[Text] Each commander is obliged to take weather conditions into account while planning combat operations. That is why there is an entire meteorological service in the Armed Forces which has a mass of instruments and equipment, including weather radar stations, at its disposal.

We can judge their capabilities and operating principles by examining the MRL-1 mobile weather radar station. Its "functional responsibilities" are quite diverse. Using the MRL-1, one can detect the seat of origin of thunderstorms and precipitation, can calculate not only their horizontal and vertical extent, but also their direction, displacement speed, determine the upper and lower limits of cloud cover, and forecast their development trends: Will a hurricane arise or will a cloudburst dump "mushroom" rain [rain during sunshine].

In short, This is a distinctive all-round weather craftsman. It is dual-range, that is, it works on channels I or II, the wave lengths of which are 8 and 30 millimeters, respectively. The MRL-1's transmitter generates super-high frequency [SHF] pulses which pass through an antenna-wave guide system. They are very "short": their length in channel I is 0.45 mks (sic) [microseconds]. Let us point out that the station's antenna is a transmitting—receiving dish with a 3 meter diameter. Electromagnetic energy is radiated into space in the form of a narrow beam. As soon as this invisible gigantic "needle" comes into contact with weather formations, electro-magnetic energy reflection occurs. The reflected pulses "scatter" in various directions, including in the opposite direction, that is, back toward the station and are received by the very same antenna and wave guide track and enter into the receiver. Here the pulses are "processed", "separated" from interference, amplified, demodulated, etc. Finally, they are depicted as blips on radar scopes which remind me of television picture tubes.

Thus electromagnetic pulses, those invisible information carriers, become visible. Operators "read" the light blips as we read ordinary alphanumeric text, and comparing them with scale lines and grids, assess the "work" completed by the pulses: at what distance from the station did they encounter a barrier, at what altitude, in what direction did it occur, what type of blow on the barrier was it—"soft" or "hard". The weather formation's coordinates are determined in this manner: range, azimuth, angle of sight, and also its density, etc.

Let us cite several other technical characteristics of the station. The operating modes are as follows: 0-360 degree field of coverage and vertical scanning, or antenna oscillation in the vertical plane within a range of

minus 1 to plus 105 degrees. Detection range of intensive storms and downpours on channel II is quite high—300 kilometers. The upper boundaries of cloud cover can be determined at ranges of 10-12 kilometers. Pulse power to generator output through channel II of the transmitter is not less than 210 kilowatts. Antenna revolutions are 6 revolutions per minute in a horizontal plane (through azimuth) in both circular and programmed scan modes. Antenna scan rate (on line of sight) is 1 period each 33 seconds plus or minus 3 seconds. Six men must be assigned to service the station if it is being operated around the clock. A norm of not more than two hours has also been established for converting the station from the traveling to the operating position. The same time period has been established for packing it up.

The station consists of the following: an equipment cabin, a trailer intended for transporting the antenna and the oscillating mechanism, an electrical power supply system, and the remote equipment.

The most "saturated" portion is the equipment cabin. Judge for yourselves. The antenna-wave guide system is located here, the channel I and II transmitters, the built-in tolerance monitoring equipment, the channel I and II receivers, the storage device, the reflected signal power measurement meter, the noise coefficient meter, the indicator devices, the photo-recording equipment, the control system, the antenna's electric drive system, air conditioning and heating, and the power source.

An electric generator (diesel) and a transformer provide electrical power to the MRL-1.

The remote equipment includes a meteorologist's panel and distribution column. And it is called remote because it is located at the air traffic control tower at a distance of not more than 1 kilometer from the equipment cabin.

The station's radar scopes are essentially "windows" into the surrounding world. Radar images of areas of cloud cover, thunderstorms, and heavy rain are received on them and with their help meteorologists determine the coordinates and sizes of weather targets. There are three such devices: a scanning scope (IKO), a range—altitude scope (IDV), and a dual—beam amplitude scope (IDA). A little bit about the function of each [follows].

A weather target is depicted on the screen of the IKO cathode ray tube on a horizontal plane in "azimuth—range" coordinates, the same target is depicted on the IDV, but on a vertical plane in "range—altitude" coordinates at any azimuth. As for the IDA, this device can in many ways be called multi-functional: Using it, the meteorologist visually observes signals, determines their range, evaluates amplitude and time correlations, measures the average power of reflected signals, and finally, tunes the device.

The station operates in three modes: "Tuning," "Local," and "Remote." The first mode is intended for tuning and adjusting equipment. Servicing personnel carry out all necessary operations, manipulating tumblers, switches, and levers located on the face plates of the appropriate units. The second mode is the station's primary operating mode. In this case, operators control the equipment directly from the control panel located in the equipment cabin. In the third ("Remote [mode]"), the station's operation is controlled from the remote [control] panel. Servicing personnel cannot be in the equipment cabin during this time.

Several words about locating the station at a site. Its primary requirement is that all local objects situated around the equipment cabin must be lower than the antenna in all azimuths. If terrain relief does not permit this, then you need to grab shovels, build a small elevation, and place the equipment cabin on it. If the amount of excavation work is sufficiently great, engineering equipment is used, for example, an ordinary bulldozer.

As a whole, the MRL-1 possesses a number of excellent tactical-technical specifications and is a reliable instrument for the tactical weather service.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo DOSAAF SSSR, "Voyennyye znaniya", 1989

Light Industry Unresponsive to AF Concerns on Flight Uniforms

18010481 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Article with the byline Air Force Combat Training Office under the rubric: "In Response to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Article": "A Response for the Ministry of Light Industry".]

[Text] On 21 October 1987, we published two letters from our readers concerning the same subject. The letters were entitled: "Whose Bright Idea Was This?"; and "For the Time Being We Envy the Mechanization Experts". The authors criticized the design and quality of aircrew and maintenance uniform items (LTO).

The editorial office received an answer to these letters from Major General of Aviation A. Gopko, which admitted that the claims of the authors were "...basically well-founded". He reported that the quality of individual LTO items, the life expectancy of the items, and the supply quotas do not completely meet the needs of flight and maintenance personnel in the Air Forces of the USSR Armed Forces. A number of institutions controlled by the Air Force Main Staff are involved in studying and generalizing the operational testing and development of new LTO items.

Major General Gopko stated in his response; as a result of the scientific research which has been conducted by these organizations, the principal deficiencies in LTO items have been determined, suggestions have been made concerning the elimination of these defects, and a program for improving LTO items has been elaborated and has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The lack of fabrics in serial production with the required physical, mechanical, hygienic, and aesthetic properties is an impediment to the realization of these suggestions. The best of the specimens produced by industry wear out rapidly, are flammable, and look unsightly after one to two years of use. Major General of Aviation A. Gopko imparted,—"Thus, although new LTO items have been developed and are being tested in the Air Force, during the 12th five-year plan flight and maintenance personnel in the Air Forces of the USSR Armed Forces should expect neither a decrease in the life expectancy of the LTO items nor the inclusion of additional LTO items in the supply quotas".

The fact that this is indeed the case is confirmed by the letters, which continue to come in to our editorial office from aviators. One of them—from Guards Major O. Belokopytov, flight commander and military pilot first class, entitled: "It is Practical. It is Attractive. It is Safe..." was published on 12 January this year.

As Major General of Aviation N. Vykhail reported to our editorial staff, the question which the author raised regarding improving the quality of flight gear is well-founded. Major General Vykhail stated in his response, the defects enumerated in the letter have to do with the quality of fabrics being used for the manufacture of flight gear, with the design and performance characteristics of the flying personnel's special equipment, and the supply quotas.

A program has been developed improve LTO in the Air Force. However, the realization of this program has encountered a number of difficulties. So, the Air Force command element has repeatedly appealed to the USSR Ministry of Light Industry and the USSR Gosplan concerning the question of using fire-resistant fabrics in the manufacture of flight gear. These agencies informed the Air Force that "...because of the small quantity, it is inexpedient to engage in the development and manufacture of special fabrics for the Air Force. It does not seem possible to pick out fabrics from the entire assortment which are in serial production and which completely satisfy the requirements of the Air Force.

Having taken this attitude into account, a number of steps are being carried out by the Air Force to improve the performance characteristics of flight gear. Materials treated with the preparation "Foboteks", which increases their stability at high altitude, are being used as the outer layer of lightweight and winter flight suits. A removable fur jacket liner has also been developed and

26 May 1989

38 REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

camouflaged fabrics will be more widely used. The production of uniform items with improved design and performance characteristics for the aircrews and maintenance crews are projected.

Such is the current state of affairs. All that remains is for us to ask the USSR Ministry of Light Industry: is it possible that only the Air Force needs the special fabrics, which are being discussed?

'Restructuring' DOSAAF to Fit Lithuania*18010605 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian**15 Mar 89 p 2*

[Interview with Ginutis Taurinskas: "'Time to Return Trust'"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

[Question] Ginutis Pransishkovich, the situation is obviously not a simple one in the region. Some almost go as far as to advocate secession of Lithuania from the Soviet Union, and other just as unusual views are being voiced. What is the explanation for all of this?

[Taurinskas] Perestroika, glasnost and democratization have stirred the people, and released not only a tumultuous flow of ideas but also a mass of emotions. The sociopolitical situation in the Soviet Baltic republics is developing especially dynamically. Many representatives of science, engineering and the arts and some other categories of laborers and young students have begun uniting into various informal associations in support of perestroika. It was in this way that the Peoples and International fronts in Estonia, the Peoples Front and Interdvizheniye in Latvia, and Sayudis and Unity in Lithuania were born. Moreover it is no secret that the former unite chiefly the indigenous population while the latter unite representatives of other nationalities. There are also "green" groups fighting for ecology, and other small formations. Most of them, which began with good intentions, are ending in destruction. Half-baked decisions about the state language fanned the fire as well.

What discussion can there be of a struggle for perestroika among people who stand outside the headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, which is in the center of Riga, with posters reading "Invaders, get out of Latvia!". This is our Soviet Army they are talking about, about the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers who laid down their heads for the liberation of the Baltic republics from the fascist scum.

[Question] I heard that some informal groups are demanding creation of national armies.

[Taurinskas] Such voices are being raised. Imagine—an Estonian army, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Kazakh.... Is this just some kind of nonsense? No! Clear nationalistic aspirations of certain circles are behind this. Something definitely motivated Sayudis to declare in its program that service in the Soviet Army is immoral. Yes, our country's peace initiatives are supported by all honest people of the earth, but military confrontation in Europe, and in the whole world as well, is still an objective reality. And pacifism is out of place today.

[Question] Is it true that the demonstrations by nationalistic elements are being repulsed?

[Taurinskas] Of course, and chiefly with actions. An enormous amount of work was done in the republic after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The conception of economic independence was created. Steps were taken to improve the ecological situation. Great changes also occurred in the spiritual sphere. However, let me say frankly that the successes could have been greater, had there not been mistakes and inertia in the activities of a number of party committees, including the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, in the first stage of perestroika. Some comrades were unable to sense that the situation was changing, and missed their chance. Others turned out to be incapable of party work under the new conditions. All of this was openly discussed at the last plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, in which all of the events were analyzed.

For example, the appearance of Sayudis was met favorably at first — as a sign of the people's growing activity. But gradually people holding extreme positions assumed the upper hand in its activities. This movement is far from homogeneous in its composition, after all. As was emphasized at the plenum by Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary A. Brazauskas, Sayudis in July 1988 is not the same as Sayudis in February 1989. The words "socialism," "party" and "perestroika" have disappeared from the lexicon of its officials. Only the irresponsibility of some of our leaders could explain the fact that the republic's mass media began publicizing ideas which were frequently alien to us, including on television. Things went so far that Sayudis leader V. Landsbergis proclaimed a "Declaration of Independence" throughout all Latvia on television.

Everything good that the Lithuanian Communist Party has done is being smeared with black paint by the leaders of Sayudis. They are persistently striving to compromise the revolutionaries, the underground, the partisans, the active builders of socialist Lithuania. And who is it that they consider to be the "saviors of the motherland"? Among them we find the father of the leader of Sayudis, Landsbergis the Elder. But it was he, together with his accomplices, who signed the 23 June 1941 declaration appealing to "Adolf Hitler, the savior of European culture," in which they promised "all-out assistance to the German army in its historical campaign in the fight against Bolshevism." Such is the family legacy.

All participants of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum demanded decisive measures to curtail the political activities of extremists. And now the situation is being rectified.

[Question] Will the present situation probably require new approaches at all levels of the activities of DOSAAF organizations?

[Taurinskas] Invariably. We have been aware of this need for a long time, and we are doing whatever is within our power. But it is very sad that perestroyka was a minimum of a year late in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. Tell me, is it right that reorganization of the work of our society's headquarters—its Central Committee—began half a year following the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress? Decisions defining the activities of the society for five years into the future were prepared by people who are no longer working. It was said at the congress, both from the podium and in the lobbies, that all of the activities of DOSAAF require perestroyka, but room could not be found in the final documents for fundamental proposals. I think that the blame for this is borne not only by former leaders of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee but also by former officials of the CPSU Central Committee who allowed this. They all left their jobs, but the problems remained, and now we have to hurry and solve them.

[Question] For example?

[Taurinskas] Let's begin with the name of our society. I am certain that its name must be changed immediately. First of all its acronym sounds odd, especially in many national languages. Second, we have long outgrown the tasks which were set before DOSAAF in the time of its organization.

[Question] SOVETSKAYA PATRIOT readers have proposed the most diverse names, but....

[Taurinskas] They should have been listened to. Let's think about it. We provide direct assistance to the army, aviation and the navy in that we train specialists for them. But this is a maximum of a fourth of all of the work. Preparation of specialists for the national economy, management of technical and military applied forms of sports in the country, public defense work and military patriotic propaganda are not directly related to assistance to the armed forces. And every Soviet citizen assists them indirectly, no matter where he works and no matter what organization he might be a member of. Some feed the army, others clothe it, and still others arm it....

And third, our organization bears too much of a military atmosphere. Why for example is model building or car racing called a military applied form of sports? Swimming, skiing, martial arts, karate, and even marksmanship and the pentathlon are referred to simply as sports throughout the whole world. Then why does propaganda employ the word military, and not just simply patriotic? Were it to do so, it would be more contemporary and acceptable today, especially to the young, toward whom it should be directed primarily.

[Question] The debate on uniting DOSAAF committees and STKs [amateur technical circles] has been going on for many years, and this issue has been discussed on several occasions at plenums of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. What do you think about this?

[Taurinskas] We are not only thinking about this. Wherever possible, we have already united them. Common sense suggests that beginning with the city level and going up to the primary organization, these two subdivisions must be brought together under the same roof—the STK! Yes, yes, not a committee, but an STK! And all of the work should be restructured correspondingly.

Where there are no STKs, no work of any kind is being done. And not only individuals but even entire organizations are refusing to exist only on paper, just to pay the dues. For example the Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee, the Republic Library and the Vilnius State University have eliminated their primary DOSAAF organizations. We of course are troubled by this. But speaking frankly, the Kaunas Polytechnical Institute for example, which has a huge STK known throughout the entire country, has no intention of leaving DOSAAF!

It is written in decisions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress that we are obligated to create technical circles and sections in each organization containing a hundred or more persons. Under today's conditions this requirement is absurd!

[Question] Nonetheless, this figure is taken from that well known CPSU Central Committee decree.

[Taurinskas] Here is what I have to say about that: When such decrees are prepared, all specific figures are coordinated beforehand with the executors. The leadership of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee was obligated to explain how they were unrealistic, and to substantiate this with pencil in hand. Of course, it is much easier to answer: "Yes, Sir!". And what are we supposed to do? Compose fake reports of execution? Besides stamped membership cards, we cannot give out anything to people in many organizations. We can't because we don't have anything!

[Question] I would repeal the stamps, the cards and even the membership dues when we go over to a club structure. But I would mandatorily leave club dues, which should be much more substantial, and the STK membership card. And instead of dues, I would establish a public bank account, such as the Children's Fund or the Cultural Fund, to which individual citizens and organizations could transfer their savings and assets. I think that many will show their generosity.

[Taurinskas] Membership dues make up 3-5 percent of our budget. The benefit is not that great, but the damage done to the authority of the society would be considerable, especially if we do not propose anything substantial in their place. The public will begin to think that DOSAAF is an indigent organization supported by the people through dues and lotteries.

[Question] Perhaps it is also time to modernize the lottery. Consider what they have in the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports—"Sprint", "Sportloto", "Sportprognoz"! There's always a crowd at the stalls.

[Taurinskas] We of course shouldn't wait for half a year for results either. You could lose your membership card, in that much time. In general, it is my opinion that in order to increase the welfare of our society, we must sharply intensify its cost-accounting activity, including in forms not traditional to us. All the more so because all of the conditions for this are present today.

[Question] Please tell us about this in greater detail.

[Taurinskas] Besides the Prienai Experimental Plant, the Shalchininkay Combine and a number of other production organizations of ours, we are essentially utilizing new methods of earning money. Thus passenger transport cooperatives have been created in seven of our training organizations. Any driver so desiring can contribute 55 rubles to our account and receive the right to convey passengers. Two percent of this sum is transferred to financial organs, while the rest is pure income.

For example the cooperative of the Siauliai STK numbers 100 persons. The net profit is 50,000. The Vilnius and Kaunas driving schools each bring in 20,000-30,000 profit.

We have created craft shops in a number of organizations. Thus the Birzai ATSK [not further identified] has contracted with one of the factories to sew mittens out of its wastes. Last year it earned 100,000. And maintaining the ATSK costs 40,000. There are plans for making a transition to full cost accounting and self-financing in 3 or 4 years after purchasing gliders and airplanes from us.

A shop producing BRO-11 gliders is operating in the Panevezys ATSK. The republic hang-glider club, which resolved the raw material problem with our assistance, is starting to manufacture 24 hang-gliders a year, and it also wants to switch to cost accounting.

We already have experience in situations where the club council takes the sports organization completely into its hands, and signs a leasing contract with it. That is what happened with the Siauliai city STK, the Kaunas service dog breeding club, the Birzai ATSK and the Klaipeda STK. We receive double the profit in financial respects. For example the service dog breeding club used to give us 7,000-8,000 income annually, while now it gives us 15,000.

[Question] I do not see any rifle sports clubs on your list of sports organizations that have gone over to cost accounting.

[Taurinskas] I think that cost accounting would be impossible in this case. If we do, we would destroy rifle sports. For self-reliance to be possible, all shooting

galleries will have to be hired out from morning until evening. And what about the sportsmen themselves? What about their competitions? What about trips by teams to other regions? All of this the club will be forced to sharply reduce. We cannot do such a thing. I think that they would need to take responsibility for two or three air gun shooting ranges as a way to bring in money. Then the rifle sports clubs would be able to make ends meet.

[Question] I was told that you have already made contacts with foreign firms....

[Taurinskas] Our production combine signed a contract with Italy's AGV for joint production of a thousand and a half athletic helmets a year. Half of them will be sold in the foreign market, while the other half will be sold internally. We will get 60 percent of the profit, and the Italians will get 40.

We will be signing a contract quite soon with a Japanese firm to make small inexpensive training airplanes. We will make the fuselage, and the Japanese will produce the engines. This will be a great help to our pilots and sportsmen. Our Yak-52, you see, costs 1,500; that won't do! In addition the Japanese have agreed to purchase our LAK-16 children's gliders and catamarans, and in return we will receive computers and other electronic equipment.

We are also engaged presently in such noncurrency exchange with Hungary. They have purchased LAK-12 gliders from us, and we have purchased four air balloons, and recently an aeronavigation society was created under the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee. We exchanged one other glider for 15 scarce modern parachutes for the republic team.

[Question] You've become a real businessman....

[Taurinskas] Not yet. This is only the beginning. Here are some thoughts that give me no rest. All workers of our defense society must understand that life in the country is changing.

Many, especially financial experts and economists in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, still feel that perestroika is going on somewhere out there, far, far away, but actually it is right at our doorstep.

I am not about to judge how things are going in other regions, but in our republic social organizations, even large ones such as the Komsomol and the trade union, things are not going so sweetly, inasmuch as their financial independence depends in many ways on dues. Fearing the loss of their members, they sway this way and that, toying with the people. And we who have a considerable material base are living comfortably, and looking at the future with optimism. And by solving the sports problem, we are solving other important problems facing the defense society.

[Question] By more than appeals and lectures....

[Taurinskas] Quite right. Last year we conducted over 40 aviation sports holidays. We have operating aeroclubs. We travel to the kolkhozes, the plants and the training organizations, where our sportsmen put on demonstrations. We conducted four air rallies in the republic in order to publicize DOSAAF activities and the pilot-officer specialty. In the kolkhozes, at the plants and in the training institutions we speak to the young: Please, go ahead, this is the real thing, touch it, sit down in the cockpit, take hold of the stick.... This is real propaganda.

And when the sports complex at Kaunas—the Nyamunskoye Ring—goes into operation, we will invite all nations. It is to be used for various all-union and international competitions. Including Formula-1 auto races.

[Question] Is it true that you are also having some difficulties in the work of your training organizations in regard to preparing young people for military service?

[Taurinskas] Of course. Some people are even demanding that we teach in Lithuanian. We calmly explained that Russian is the language spoken in the Soviet Armed Forces, and if we do not learn it, it will be extremely difficult for us, and it will cost us even more. And when we teach young people one of the military occupations, we mandatorily explain, both to the young boys and the parents, that we are doing this in their interests. Otherwise the government would have to double the term of service.

At the same time our training organizations have displayed initiative and attempted to establish ties with soldiers who had studied in our schools. Thus recently one of our workers, Colonel (Retired) V. Ragauskas, visited one of the units stationed near Moscow. We procured some certificates and gifts, and relatives brought letters and small parcels. You could imagine how much joy there was on both sides.

[Question] As I understand it, you are in favor of new forms of work, even ones that are not traditional to DOSAAF. I am certain that after this trip, both the young men and their close ones had many kind things to say about DOSAAF. And not only to you, but also to neighbors and friends. This is the way we create public opinion that even Sayudis is unable to sway.

[Taurinskas] All we need is to have our hands completely untied by giving the republics more rights, including financial. Let the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee do no more than guide and coordinate our work, and let us create our own forms and methods of work. After all, the conditions and traditions of the Baltic republics differ from Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and Russia. If so, then why should everyone be treated the same?

There should be one goal—patriotic education of young people, their attraction to technical sports, and their preparation for service in the armed forces and for highly productive labor. And the paths are different. Under these conditions we will be able to reach our objectives both better and faster.

Role, Problems of 'Vystrel' Courses in Training
18010449 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Mar 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant General L. Generalov, chief of the "Vystrel" courses, by Colonel G. Miranovich, under the rubric "Combat Readiness: Qualitative Parameters": "School for Commanders"]

[Text] Classes at the Higher Small-Arms School imeni RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army], established at V.I. Lenin's behest, began 70 years ago, on 18 March 1919. This date is considered the birthday of the Vystrel Higher Officer Courses imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov.

The contribution made by that educational institution to the training of military cadres for the tactical level is well known. Those who have completed the "field academy," as the courses are known in the forces, include prominent Soviet military leaders, party figures and statesmen, and representatives of fraternal armies. Many scientific military works by various generations of Vystrel graduates have received recognition and been widely read.

Our correspondent interviews Lieutenant General L. Generalov, chief of the courses, on the everyday life of the educational institution, its history and its place in the accomplishment of the urgent tasks posed by the restructuring in military organizational development.

[Miranovich] We know that Vystrel was given the name Higher Small-Arms School of the RKKA in 1920. This was in the spirit of the times: brief, forceful and underscoring the "small-arms" nature of the school. Anyone familiar with the Vystrel educational facility today would probably agree that this is a large and modern scientific-technical complex. It has practically everything one might find at a military academy, let us say. Because of this it might seem somewhat surprising, Comrade Lieutenant General, to hear me ask whether the name of the courses is not outmoded. After all, history shows that it has been called different things at different times....

[Generalov] Indeed it has had different names. The Model Training Battalion established in 1826 in Tsarskoye Selo could be considered the progenitor of the courses. It was set up to introduce into the forces, as stated in the order on the Guards Corps, "total uniformity in all things pertaining to front-line service and the uniform." The battalion was converted into the Officers' Small-Arms School in 1882. Documents show that it was "the only scientific research institute in the Russian Army dealing with the small-arms training of the infantry."

It has had different names also in the Soviet era: Higher Small-Arms School, Higher Tactical Small-Arms [School] It became the Vystrel courses in October of 1924.

It is not a matter of the name, however. Here is an excerpt from an order issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the procedure for enrollment in the courses: "The aforementioned courses are to be filled with individuals from the Red Army assigned to command regiments, who have combat experience but require additional scientific military knowledge." This defines the essence of Vystrel also today. Our students have behind them service in areas with various geographical and climatic conditions and experience in combat operations. And we link the name of the courses precisely not to their "small-arms" nature, as you put it, but to the dynamic nature of the training process. Within a short time our students receive adequately solid training conforming not just to their immediate assignment but designed also for the future. We train the group of UN military observers for stationing in one of the most explosive regions of the planet in just 2 months, for example. And that is not the record. We conducted an assembly of journalists and writers, also with a fairly extensive program, at the end of last year, and managed it within a single month....

[Miranovich] That is indeed like a shot (vystrel).... But let us not talk about the writers and journalists for now: the field academy is highly esteemed in the forces. How do you succeed, given the intensity of the training process, in doing a good job with the fairly complex programs?

[Generalov] With respect to the prestige of Vystrel, as far as I know from my service in the forces, it has always been high. Furthermore, our museum contains a lot of evidence confirming this. This is what Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiy, who took the training course as commander of a rifle regiment in 1926, had to say about Vystrel: "Its role in the training of middle- and senior-level commanders has been and continues to be enormous." Many other well-known people who have taken the courses at various times also retain fond memories of them.

Incidentally, there have also been some good writeups by journalists. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to express my gratitude to those who have told the truth about the courses, and therefore, about the army. This has been a rarity lately....

[Miranovich] Let us return to the matter of combining intensiveness and quality in the training process.

[Generalov] Remember: "fill the courses with individuals... with combat experience but requiring additional scientific military knowledge." This principle has been and still is strictly adhered to. Our students have something to share with one another and also with the instructors. This is taken into account for manning the permanent staff of the courses. Officers in the forces with sufficient experience in working with people and in organizing the training and upbringing of personnel are selected for the main positions. As a rule, officers from

the regimental, division and army levels are appointed as instructors. Major General Vladimir Fedorovich Blazhkun, for example, came to us to head the artillery series from the position of deputy commander of district rocket troops and artillery. He had risen through all of the levels of command prior to this.

Vystrel thus absorbs the experience of the forces in order to enrich it and return it to them. And this is done in a purposeful manner, I would even say with rigid practical focus. That is our main "secret."

I have already stated that we train a group of UN observers in 2 months. At the same time the students in this group have to master a fairly vast program within minimal time periods, which includes the study of the region's history, the duties of military observers, the radio traffic procedure, and so forth. Clearly this can only be accomplished by focusing exclusively on the specific features of the students' forthcoming job.

[Miranovich] You will agree, however, that this is just a particular function in the life of the courses. Vystrel's main purpose is to train commanders....

[Generalov] It is indeed just a particular function. It is a serious test for us to turn out such a group, however. After all, our officer corps and even our nation as a whole are judged according to the competence of these specialists.

With respect to the primary purpose of the courses as a school for commanders, I completely agree with you. Furthermore, I feel that in view of this we need to talk today about restoring the status of Vystrel.

I refer primarily to a renewal of the traditional Vystrel training, consisting of the advanced training of commanders for the regimental and battalion levels. Experience has shown that an officer ordinarily becomes a battalion commander 6-8 years after graduating from a school. He spends a certain part of that time in positions inadequately linked to the organization and conduct of training. In the first place, the courses would give him the opportunity to complete his knowledge and skills, and in the second place they would provide him with advanced work techniques. The need to restore this kind of training is dictated also by the fact that an emphasis on the small subunits is needed in the military training.

[Miranovich] Well, getting back to the nature of the courses, brought up at the beginning of our interview, we could say that Vystrel today is a multi-level, higher military educational institution faced with acute new problems, could we not?

[Generalov] The main problem pertains precisely to the restoration of Vystrel's status. Today we train officers for the Ground Forces in 19 specialties, with training periods of 10, 5, 3 and 2 months. This dissipates the effort and prevents us from focusing on the training of officers

for the main tactical levels—as regimental and battalion commanders. I believe that certain groups—instructors and students in graduate programs at military academies and officers for the training center sections, for example (and there are more than ten such groups)—should be reduced in order to enlarge the group of regimental and battalion commanders. Furthermore, they should be prepared in a purposeful manner, according to comprehensive programs and with a standard training period of 5 months, let us say. This would make it possible to give the training process a more cyclical pattern—two graduations a year—and to load the training facilities more evenly. I am convinced that it will be difficult to expect the rapid restoration of tactics as the art of conducting combat in the Ground Forces without increasing the tactical focus of the courses.

Naturally, a restructuring is necessary also in the selection of candidates for the training. Unfortunately, the courses take practically no part in this at the present time. And the selection of candidates is not always made conscientiously everywhere in the forces. Only irresponsibility on the part of certain cadre workers can explain the fact, for example, that this year, when the reduction of the Armed Forces is beginning, we have been sent seven officers over the age of 40 years for training in the regimental commander program. They include individuals who are to be discharged into the reserve in a year....

Incidentally, something similar exists in the appointment of instructors. The personnel agencies frequently send us as instructors people with inadequate professional preparation, some even unsuited for teaching work. It is sometimes not a simple matter to get rid of such a person, particularly if he is young. And this kind of problem-instructor then suffers himself and tortures others. We try to arrange our work in such a way that training time is not spent repeating obvious facts, so that the student does not receive ready decisions but learns how to think on his own. How do we achieve this, however, if the instructor himself is not accustomed to thinking and making decisions? I have seen more than once how students are afraid to make bold and original decisions because they have to be assessed, the best option sought and debated. What kind of debate can there be, however, when the student himself is under the power of routine?

The problem of selecting instructors is being exacerbated also by the reduction of the Armed Forces. We take a very cautious approach to everyone who has served out the required period of time—we have more than 60 of them—and is ready for discharge. We try to decide in such a way that the cause does not suffer.

We ourselves have recently been handling the selection of replenishments for the permanent staff. We look for worthy individuals, review their personal histories and

invite them in for interviews. Among other things, this has enabled us to replenish the Vystrel teaching staff with officers tempered in combat in Afghanistan. We now have 19 of them.

We have also asked the command element of the Ground Forces about the courses taking part also in the selection of candidates for training.

Other problems have also been intensified by the orientation toward quality parameters in the training of the troops. Among other things, the official structure of the courses needs major restructuring. Incidentally, it has not been changed for at least 25 years or so. There is a great deal to be done with respect to modernizing the training facilities.

In short, the "field academy" is being restructured on the march.

New Rules for Acceptance into Military Schools
18010467 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Mar 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview of Col Gen V. Arapov, first deputy chief, Main Cadres Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense: "Rules of Acceptance into Military Academies, Schools and Institutes"]

[Text] New rules have been approved for acceptance into USSR Ministry of Defense military educational institutions. At the request of the editors, Col Gen V. Arapov, first deputy chief, Main Cadres Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, comments on these rules.

[Question] The rules of acceptance that have existed up to now were approved not so long ago, a little more than 4 years ago. What made it necessary to change them?

[Arapov] It was caused most of all by the shift of Soviet defense organizational development to new qualitative parameters. At the present level of development of military affairs, it is rather difficult to train an officer professionally if the person does not possess certain character traits, qualities of will, and clearly expressed moral purposes. The new rules are aimed at achieving a better selection of precisely such candidates.

There is a second aspect. Some of the provisions of the rescinded Rules were experimental in nature. Time demonstrated that some justified themselves, and some turned out to be ineffective, and had to be renounced. The experience of restructuring military education has been taken into account. I emphasize, however, that the main provisions of the selection system remained as before—the VUZes are manned on the basis of professional selection.

From the rules of acceptance:

Officers are accepted into military educational institutions that prepare officer cadres with higher military education, who are on active military service in the USSR Armed Forces, have higher military-specialized or higher civilian education, and are serving primarily in those Armed Services or branches of arms (services), to which the military educational institutions relate.

NOTE: A term of service in officers' duties is established only for candidates entering the command faculties of military academies. It must be no less than five years. The maximum age of officers beginning study depends on the position occupied.

Officers and warrant officers who are on active military service in the USSR Armed Forces; compulsory and extended service personnel; military construction personnel; civilian youth; military reservists who have served their compulsory military service; graduates of the Suvorov Military School, the Nakhimov Naval School, the Moscow Military Musical School, and specialized boarding schools with extensive Russian language study and intensified military-physical training, who have completed secondary education, are accepted into military educational institutions preparing officer cadres with higher military-specialized education.

Warrant officers are accepted at the end of two years of service in positions of warrant officers, or officers' positions; extended service personnel are accepted after two years of extended service; compulsory service personnel and military construction personnel are accepted regardless of their military specialty and time in service. All of these categories of military personnel, as well as military reservists from among those compulsory service personnel discharged into the reserves, are accepted up to no later than 23 years of age; civilian youth are accepted at ages 17 to 21. Compulsory service military personnel, and youths from among komsomol activists, or who have been in the work force, who are CPSU members, CPSU candidate members, or komsomol members, at the recommendations of Soviet Army and Navy political organs, or CPSU raykoms (gorkoms) and komsomol raykoms (gorkoms) respectively, are accepted into higher military-political schools and the Military Institute political officer training faculty.

Compulsory service military personnel, military reservists from among compulsory service personnel discharged into the reserves, and civilian youth from among komsomol activists, and public minded individuals who are CPSU members or candidate members, or komsomol members, on the recommendations of garrison (formation) military prosecutors, are accepted into the military law faculty of the Military Institute (with the exception of groups for training of officers of military tribunals and the legal service of the USSR Ministry of Defense).

Compulsory service military personnel and civilian youths who have honorary sports titles, or a skill category no lower than two in one of the types of sports, and warrant officers and extended service personnel who are in no lower than the first skill category, are accepted into the Military Institute for Physical Culture.

The age of those entering school is as of 1 September of the year they enter the VUZ.

Persons with the same qualifications as for preparation of officer cadres with higher military specialized education (other than officers and warrant officers) are accepted into secondary military schools.

[Question] Vitaliy Fedorovich, you stated that the new Rules would improve the quality of the selection. Through what mechanisms? What must candidates know who are now preparing to enter military VUZes?

[Arapov] First of all I will note that the system of traveling examining boards has been abolished. Now all military personnel will go to study directly in the VUZes. But each one who becomes a student or cadet will undergo two stages of selection. The first, preliminary, stage will be carried out by professional selection commissions of the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, formations, and armed services, where the VUZ instructors will also go. This selection will be rather strict. As an example I will discuss in more detail the procedure for selecting academy candidates from among officers.

Each candidate will be subjected to testing on general military regulations, and drill and physical training, and will write a composition. In addition, there will be a discussion on general tactics or tactics of an armed service or branch of arms, and on the working principles, combat capabilities, and operation of the main types of weapons and equipment.

Candidates thus selected will be sent to VUZes, where they will undergo a final professional selection.

Approximately the same procedure for selection for study entails for compulsory service personnel. Initially candidates will be sent to 25 day training assemblies, held from 5-30 July. During the assemblies they will undergo medical examination, and testing on battle drill, physical training, and regulations, and will write from dictation in Russian. A discussion will be held with them on general educational subjects submitted to for the entrance exams.

As concerns the selection of candidates from civilian youth, it will be held by rayon (city) draft boards before 15 May. Candidates entering higher military aviation schools for pilots and navigators, airborne and naval schools, before being sent to VUZes will take a second medical examination by the medical (flight-medical) commissions of the republic, kray or oblast military commissariat.

[Question] Here two questions arise as a result of readers' letters. What will happen to those youth who would like to enter military educational institutions, but who have reached draft age? And second, military commissariats often refuse to make up documents for entry to a VUZ for which there is no allocation. What do the new rules say on this score?

[Arapov] Yes, these provisions have been taken into account by the Rules. Persons such as these must be examined by the draft boards as candidates for entry into VUZes, regardless of whether an allocation exists in the given military commissariat.

From the Rules of Acceptance:

Officers desiring to enter military educational institutions submit a request through command channels to the military unit commander before 1 January of the year of entry; warrant officers and compulsory and extended service personnel before 1 April of the year of entry; persons from among civilian youth and military reservists submit a request to the rayon (city) military commissariat at their place of residence before 1 May of the year of entry.

The report of a military person indicates: military rank, last name, first name, middle name, position occupied, year and month of birth, education (general and military), and name of military educational institution (faculty, specialty) that the individual desires to enter. To the request are attached: copies of documents on education, party recommendation (for CPSU members and candidate members) or komsomol recommendation (for komsomol members), three authenticated photographs (without head cover, 4.5 x 6 centimeters), (for compulsory service military personnel—recommendation, autobiography, and service card). Originals of education documents are presented to the VUZ reception commissions upon arrival.

Statements of civilian youth indicate: last name, first name and middle name, year and month of birth, address of place of residence, and name of military educational institution (faculty) that he desires to enter. To this statement are attached: an autobiography, recommendations from place of work or study in the form of the Rules of Acceptance, party recommendation (for CPSU members and candidate members) or komsomol recommendation, copy of the document on secondary education (students in secondary schools present a certificate about their ongoing success), three photographs (without head cover, 4.5 x 6 centimeters).

Passport, military service card, or draft registration certificate, and the original document on secondary education, are given to the acceptance commission of the military educational institution upon arrival.

[Question] So, a candidate has collected the documents and successfully passed the preliminary professional selection. What awaits him right in the academy or school?

[Arapov] First, there has been a change in the procedure for evaluating knowledge of general educational (military) subjects and disciplines. Depending on the specific nature of the VUZ, the entrance exams are divided into profile (competitive) exams, which are evaluated according to a four grade system ("five," "four," "three," "two") and non-profile, which are evaluated according to a two grade system: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. Further, for officers entering military academies, there is an exam on Marxism-Leninism.

The benefits for certain categories of persons entering VUZes have been reexamined. Heroes of the Soviet Union and heroes of socialist labor are enrolled without testing general educational knowledge, if all the other requirements of professional selection are met. Graduates of the Suvorov military schools, and the Nakhimov Naval School are enrolled in military schools and institutes (except for the Military Institute). This rule also extends to graduates of special boarding schools sent to military schools by military commissariats. Graduates of the Military Musical School are enrolled in the Military Conductor's Faculty at the Moscow State Conservatory. Youths who have completed secondary schools with a gold or silver medal, or technical schools or SPTU [agricultural trade and technical schools] with a diploma with distinction, are enrolled in military aviation-technical schools without taking exams.

Students who have completed the first or subsequent courses at civilian VUZes in specialties that correspond to the profile of the given military educational institution may be enrolled, after being interviewed, in the first year of military schools and institutes, without testing of their knowledge in general educational subjects.

In all other cases, candidates who have completed educational institutions with a gold or silver medal, or with a diploma with distinction, take one exam in the profile discipline, determined by the chief of the VUZ. If they receive a mark of "five," they are excused from further exams; if they receive a mark of "four" or "three," they take exams in the other disciplines as well.

The next benefit is non-competitive enrollment according to the results of professional selection. This extends to commanders of companies, batteries, battalions, artillery battalions, and the equivalent, and deputies of this category of officers, who have taken first places in competition in field, air or naval training of Soviet Army and Navy officer personnel. This benefit also extends to candidates entering military schools from among persons of the indigenous nationalities, those who arrive at the VUZes by direction of republic acceptance commissions, as well as orphan youths or those left without the guardianship of parents.

All other candidates will be enrolled in the remaining places on a competitive basis. Competitions among candidates from among civilian youth are carried out separately from those of military personnel. Here a number of individuals will enjoy preferential right of enrollment in VUZes: persons awarded orders and medals of the USSR (For Valor, Ushakov, For Combat Services, Nakhimov); military personnel who displayed a high state of morale and aggressiveness in protecting the USSR and in fulfilling their international duty; as well as military personnel who have the qualification of first class or master, if they are entering VUZes that prepare officer cadres in a related specialty. Candidates from among civilian youth who have been engaged in practical work for no less than one year, and compulsory service military personnel who have served no less than a year, may enjoy this right.

From the Rules of Acceptance:

Evaluation of general educational (military-professional) training is carried out according to the following disciplines:

—in the majority of military educational institutions preparing officer cadres with higher military education, and in engineering faculties of military academies, for groups staffed by officers with higher military-specialized education: in higher mathematics, Marxism-Leninism, foreign language, tactical (tactical-specialized) training, and military-technical (military-specialized) training;

—in the majority of engineering faculties of military academies and higher military engineering schools for officers with secondary education—in mathematics, physics and CPSU history, in the amount of the program of secondary military schools, and in military-technical (military-specialized) training;

—in higher command and command-engineering schools, schools for pilots and navigators, naval schools, and the majority of other higher military schools, and the Military Engineering Institute: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), physics, history of the USSR;

—in higher military-political schools: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, geography, history of the USSR. Persons entering the Lvov Higher Military-Political School take an oral examination in Russian language and literature instead of the exam on mathematics.

In higher military chemical defense schools, rear services schools, and the Ulyanov Higher Military-Technical School: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), chemistry, history of the USSR; in the Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance School, instead of chemistry an oral exam on mathematics is taken;

—in secondary military schools: on Russian language and literature (written) and mathematics.

Candidates entering the Military Institute are tested in Russian language and literature (written and oral), foreign language, and geography (persons entering the legal faculty take an exam on USSR history instead of geography); those entering the Military Institute of Physical Culture take an exam in Russian language and literature (written), USSR history, biology, physical culture and sport (practical); those entering the Military Conductors' Faculty at the Moscow State Conservatory take an exam in Russian language and literature (written), harmony and scales, USSR history, instrument of the military orchestra, and conducting (practical).

The acceptance commissions of military educational institutions conduct the work of professional selection:

—with officers from 1 through 20 August;

—with warrant officers, compulsory and extended service personnel, and civilian youth from 10 through 30 July.

Republic acceptance commissions will be at work from 5 through 25 July.

[Question] Vitaliy Fedorovich, I would like here also to touch on this question. Many school children and pupils in SPTUs share doubts: they have dreamed about becoming officers, but wavered in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces. Is it not entirely possible the school will close and the years of study will turn out to be wasted?

[Arapov] These fears are needless. It goes without saying that some schools will be closed. But this does not mean that the destinies of many students may be cancelled altogether. Only those who understood that they made a mistake in the choice of a profession, or who realized that they can not fully master the course of instruction, will leave the military schools. Each instance of such a dismissal, I stress this in particular, will be decided on an individual basis. Those students who have not changed their dream, and who are striving to realize it, will receive military education, and will be sent to carry out officer's duty in the forces.

New 'Language' to Facilitate Technology Assimilation

18010557 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 89 p 2

[Interview with laboratory director V. Surnin by Col N. Kalmykov, correspondent: "Millions of Rubles in Savings"]

[Text] "Millions of rubles in savings may be achieved by switching to a new method of technology assimilation." Such is the belief of V. Surnin, director of the laboratory of technical information and didactics of one of defense industry's scientific-production associations.

[Kalmykov] Vladimir Ilich, I would like to begin the interview with a letter from Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) Mikhail Kovlenko, who served over 20 years in the radiotechnical troops. Here is what he writes: "When I began serving, practically all operators could confidently perform the functions of servicing and maintenance specialists as well. They could independently tune a system, and seek out and correct a complex fault. Moreover in contrast to today's operators, most of them had not graduated from training subunits. But when I encountered such a thing toward the end of my career, it was an exception. A soldier could only manage to learn to manipulate controls and perform elementary operations tolerably well. The 'guts' of the equipment became something unknown to him. And that's no surprise: The complexity of the equipment has grown several times over, while the methods of its assimilation have remained the same.

"What am I getting at? That each year the gap between the accomplishments of scientific and technical progress and utilization of these accomplishments grows larger and larger. The possibility is not excluded that in the near future technical devices will appear which can be serviced and maintained only by robots or engineers of the highest qualifications. But you can't assign an engineer to each machine, and you can't accumulate that many robots. Then what is the solution? How do we prepare specialists for high-demand occupations?"

Letters with such content are now being encountered with increasing frequency in the editor's mail. Does this mean that a problem does in fact exist here?

[Surnin] The problem not only exists, but also it can no longer be called a new one: This is not the first year it has been troubling many minds in all countries. Mankind has come face to face with the fact that it is not prepared to fully utilize the possibilities afforded to it by scientific and technical progress, namely due to the low occupational qualifications of service personnel. And the results of this are evident to all: accidents at technical facilities, and thousands and tens of thousands of technical devices of all types—from production lines to machine tools and combines—standing idle due to breakdowns. The most dependable link in the man-machine system is man. The result is tens and hundreds of millions of rubles cast to the winds. Reports have now appeared in the literature indicating that the outlays of labor and assets on technical maintenance and repair of various kinds of machines in the course of their operating life exceed the outlays on their manufacture several times over. Where are things going to go from here?

The main reason for this is that the system for assimilating technical knowledge—the reader is a full 100 percent right in this case—has fallen hopelessly behind progress; for practical purposes it has not undergone any changes. Today it is something cumbersome and ineffective. Why? Because words, text and diagrams remain the principal means of reflecting technical information in

this system. But what does it mean to textually reflect, let us say, physical processes occurring in a modern electronic device, and to show the mutual influence and interdependence of all of the highly complex electric connections they contain? How much text, figures and graphs would be required for this? How much time would a person need to learn all of this if modern devices now come with numerous technical descriptions and instructions, and sacks of drawings and diagrams attaining dimensions of several square meters?

This is why there is such an urgent need for creating a new system of reflecting and presenting technical information and for its assimilation by users, based on a fundamentally new method. Here as well specialists involved in this problem are unanimous: The present textual method is simply useless; the most promising way of reflecting information is that of descriptive resources and special symbols—"mental images," which are easily decoded in the individual's consciousness, and perceived as stable signals representing fully defined, specific concepts. Andries van Dam [transliteration], one of the leading Western specialists in the field of creating knowledge by computer graphics, feels that one static "picture" could replace a thousand words.

[Kalmykov] Excuse me, Vladimir Ilich, but it seems to me that that same van Dam also believes something else. Namely that despite numerous attempts, we have still been unable to create a sufficiently effective language making it possible to present a diversity of technical information in the form of pictures.

[Surnin] This is not quite so. We can assert right now that the language has been created. I am referring to the fragment-pictographic method (the F-P method) of displaying technical information, developed in our laboratory. Last year, by the way, it was registered with the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Interbranch Information, and thus its practical use has been made mandatory. Though of course only in our defense industry; it has not yet acquired the force of a state standard.

[Kalmykov] What is the essence of this method?

[Surnin] To be brief, the method is a system of rules for the formalized use of descriptive resources, and special symbols to present the most varied technical information by means of cumulative, mnemonic and associative means. This is done with the assistance of F-P language. When we developed the method we based ourselves on the idea that man thinks primarily in images, and second that he perceives over 80 percent of information through his visual organs. This means that if we were to present some information graphically in outline form as simplified and stylized images, pictograms and mnemonic symbols, this would significantly simplify and facilitate the process of its perception.

[Kalmykov] Has this method been practically tested, and what has it revealed?

[Surnin] It has been tested several times, including in military organizations. All responses are positive. Moreover documents drawn up on the basis of the F-P method are already available for a number of industrial models of complex equipment. And these are the results: Use of the method reduces the volume of technical documents by a factor of three, the time it takes to assimilate the technology decreases significantly, by five times in some cases, the number of mistakes made by technical personnel drops, and it is simpler to find faults. I would like to communicate additionally to specialists involved in discrete mathematics and graph theory that use of the method to develop technical devices permits assessment of the structure of control systems in regard to the possibilities for emergency and dead-end situations. And one other thing: F-P language is universal, and it is compatible with all forms of equipment.

[Kalmykov] But first the equipment must be assimilated. How much time would it take a person to do so if his knowledge of the technology is extremely limited?

[Surnin] The technology is sufficiently simple. Experience shows that its assimilation requires not more than 50 hours, and irrespective of the language in which the student speaks at that.

[Kalmykov] Does this mean that if a secondary school student learns this language in pre-draft training instruction or in an extracurricular program, when he is called up into the army and is given a job as a radio mechanic for example, he would be able to assimilate the complex apparatus?

[Surnin] He would, and at a minimum of two times faster than his comrades. And much better. On the condition, of course, that he trains with documents written on the basis of the F-P method. And this is true of not just radio mechanics alone. It is true of everyone, irrespective of the particular profile of the individual's specialty—mechanics, electronics and so on.

[Kalmykov] However, all we can assert right now is the one fact that a new method facilitating assimilation of technology exists.

[Surnin] Excuse me, but let me emphasize—the assimilation of complex technology. Using this method to teach someone how to use a telephone would be like hunting rabbits with an elephant gun.

[Kalmykov] All right then, complex technology. But what comes next? How do we put it to practical use, how do we make its use widespread?

[Surnin] That's the most difficult thing. If we were to consider the big picture, we would need to develop technical documents based on the F-P method and F-P technology on a country-wide scale. This would mean writing a state standard as well. But of course, it would be unimaginable to accomplish all of this in a single

swipe. We need time. Obviously the transition would have to be carried out continually, like links on a chain—from the developers of the technology, to the enterprise, and then to the sector. This is precisely the way things are already being done in defense industry.

Organizing the mass study of F-P language is a problem of no less complexity. We don't even have the training literature for this yet, after all, except for our own developments, which were written, by the way, in the form of a layman's manual. No publishing houses are interested in it yet. It is, after all, a completely new thing,

and the caution of the publishers is entirely natural: Who needs this, and why, would the books sell? Such that we ourselves are forced to supply interested organizations with the necessary literature, printed out on duplicating machines. But could we possibly satisfy everyone in this fashion? The demand for the literature is increasing. Many who are acquainted with the new method are becoming convinced that its use will ultimately mean a significant savings of resources. But of course, we could achieve the maximum economic impact only on the condition that the method is laid at the basis of the entire system of vocational-technical education.

Reasons for Early Losses in WWII Discussed

18010541 Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 2, Feb 89 pp 60-63

[Round-table discussion recorded by Capt 3d Rank I. Khristoforov: "Heroism or Tragedy? Historians Take a Close Look at the Initial Period of the War"]

[Text] It has been known for a long time that people display a heightened interest in history at major turning points of a country's destiny. In the depths of history we seek parallels to our times, and try to look at certain events in a new way. Considering this, the editor's office plans to conduct, in the "SOVETSKIY VOIN Discussion Club," a number of round-table discussions, interviews and other discussions on the most acute problems, and publish articles by prominent historians, social scientists and publicists. We will be happy if articles carried by this journal help to fill in a number of "blank spots" on the vast map of history. The club will be led by doctor of historical sciences, professor, Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Fedorovich Minayev, assistant chief for scientific work of the department of CPSU history, Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

We begin our meetings of the discussion club with a round-table discussion on problems concerning the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

The participants of the round-table discussion include: doctor of historical sciences, professor, Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Fedorovich Minayev; candidate of historical sciences, docent, Great Patriotic War participant, senior instructor at the department of CPSU history and party-political work of the Military Institute, Colonel (Retired) Aleksey Petrovich Bulychev; Candidate of Historical Sciences Boris Vadimovich Sokolov.

[Minayev] The initial period was doubtlessly one of the most complex in the Great Patriotic War. No other period is associated with such conflicting conclusions. We hardly need support the point of view of those scientists who feel that time to be one of universal pell-mell retreat and tragedy. We will not forget that ours was a withdrawal in combat, that history has documented the Smolensk and Kiev engagements and the famous tactical successes in the Yelninsk operation and in the tank engagement in the vicinity of Przemyśl. It was precisely in the stubborn fighting of the initial period that the Germans suffered tangible losses for the first time since the beginning of World War II.

Not only have many interpretations of the nature of combat activities in the initial period come into being recently, but also the "framework" of this period has become movable. Therefore I would like to begin the discussion by accurately defining exactly when this stage of the war, which began on 22 June 1941, ended.

[Bulychev] In my opinion the initial period of the war ended in the summer of 1942. The front became stabilized. A lull set in. Both of the opposing sides made preparations for new combat activities.

[Minayev] I would reduce the time frame a little. Back to the end of the Battle of Moscow, which historians set at 20 April 1942.

[Sokolov] Some researchers reduce the chronological boundaries of the initial period literally to the first weeks of the frontier engagements, while others extend them to the summer of 1942. There is also the point of view that this period extends all the way to the Battle of Stalingrad. In my opinion the initial period should be reckoned until the time when the fascist German army attempted to implement its Barbarossa plan, to attain victory in the course of its blitzkrieg, and Soviet troops countered this and conclusively foiled the plan for a "lightning war" by their victory at Moscow. The conclusion of the Battle of Moscow is the end point of the initial, mobile period. A continuous static front established itself from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea.

[Bulychev] I also agree with this time frame.

[Minayev] While the chronology of the period is more or less clear, a number of problems arise as to its description. When you get right down to it, despite the victory at Moscow, the initial period remains for the most part a time of retreat and losses. Yes, there were certain tactical victories, but strategically our retreat on such a broad front appeared tragic. What in your point of view were the causes of our failures in the first months of the war?

[Bulychev] The first cause was economic. Industry had not been mobilized. The second cause was absence of combat experience. The Finnish campaign was neither here nor there. The forces that participated in it were rather negligible. The next cause was fascist Germany's superiority over us in numerical strength, artillery and mortars.

[Sokolov] I see the causes somewhat differently. Let me simply name them, rather than arranging them by degree of importance. There was the element of surprise. There is hardly any need to offer evidence of that. There was the unfortunate troop grouping: It was too close to the border, and it was oriented too much on offensive fighting. By the way, even if a grouping is organized for offensive fighting, this does not signify that it is "aggressive," as is often trumpeted in the West. After all, no one could even imagine attacking the mobilized Wehrmacht with an unmobilized army, and one caught unawares at that as well.

One of the important reasons for the retreat was flaws in the development of our armed forces. There were the mass purges, especially among officers, and the over-centralized leadership, which restricted the independence of commanders of all ranks beyond any measure. As G. K. Zhukov recalls, there were times when an isolated bump was taken on Stalin's personal orders.

Losses in aviation suffered during the first days also had their effect on the misfortunes of the initial period. When we committed tank formations to combat, we left them without air cover, which the fascists immediately capitalized on, even though the strength of their ground troops was not superior to ours.

Another of the major causes was the army's unpreparedness for defensive war. We were prepared to attack, to break through "to enemy territory," with "little blood." But the army never was taught how to defend—how to stubbornly fight a long, bloody defense.

[Minayev] I would like to add this: We doubtlessly cannot discard the economic factor. Mobilization of industry for war, and of the entire national economy as well, did not proceed until the war was already in progress. Hitler's Germany had a clear time advantage in this aspect. It would be sufficient to point out that as of the beginning of the war we were able to produce 1.5 times more tanks than Germany, but by as early as the first months of the withdrawal we lost 1,360 plants in the western part of the country, and many arsenals and military depots that had been advanced to the border on orders from Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik.

[Bulychev] Let's get back to the issue of the correlation of forces. Boris Vadimovich feels that Germany did not have a superiority in manpower. But consider the figures: As of 22 June 1941 the fascists had a grouping twice as large as ours—5.5 million against our 2.68 million. Plus the advantage in artillery and mortars—47,200 guns against the Red Army's 37,500.

[Sokolov] Let's look at the correlation of forces in a different way. It is true that as of the beginning of the war there were 2.6 million troops in the western districts. But over 7 million persons volunteered or were called up for the front in the very first weeks and months of the Great Patriotic War. Moreover units from the internal districts, from the Transcaucasus and from the Far East were transferred to the West.

[Bulychev] The Far East gave us very little. A strong grouping was left there to oppose the Kwantung Army. Forty divisions.

[Sokolov] Yes, more than a million persons remained. Even with regard for this, out of the 5.4 million regular personnel of the prewar army, not less than 4 million were committed to the Soviet-German front in the first few months. Thus over 11 million persons fought against Hitler's invaders in 1941 in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[Bulychev] This figure is rather artificial.

[Sokolov] But the fact is that it is not. It was calculated from official documents.

[Bulychev] I can't believe that those 7 million conscripts you mentioned reached the front simultaneously.

[Sokolov] They couldn't have reached it simultaneously. But they did go to the front. And we have no right to not consider them in the correlation of forces.

But let's go on to the strength of the fascist troops. At this point I would like to subject the figures that have established themselves in our historical works to serious doubt.

Let me begin by saying that if the estimate of the strength of the invading army on 22 June 1941 of 5.5 million persons is true, then why it decreased by more than 1.5 million by as early as 1 December—to 3,916,000 persons (this is the figure cited in the book "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. A Short History])—remains a mystery. After all, according to information in the diary of former chief of German general staff F. Halder, as of 26 November 1941 the losses of the German armed forces attained 156,500 killed, 31,000 missing in action and 556,000 wounded. It must be considered that most casualties had already been returned to the ranks by this time. If we also include the losses of German allies, which were relatively low in this period (the role of satellites was smaller than in 1942, and they were used more in the secondary, relatively tranquil sectors of the front), we find that as of 1 December 1941 the strength of the invading army may have decreased (due to the number killed, imprisoned and casualties not returned to action) by around 400,000-500,000, but never 1.5 million. Then, if the figure of 3,916,000 is correct, we find that Hitler's troops and those of his allies in the East could not have numbered over 4.5 million persons. This is also consistent with the data cited by Halder, who writes that prior to the invasion of the USSR, the German troop grouping numbered 3.2 million persons, and when troops of the satellites and the naval and air forces are accounted for, the strength of the invading army could not have exceeded 4.5 million persons.

The enemy's forces were apparently exaggerated in our postwar historiography for Stalin's benefit, in order to at least somehow justify the tragedy of the summer and fall of 1941.

[Bulychev] I don't think so. More likely the figures need to be checked. You mentioned the Wehrmacht's losses. But ours need to be considered as well. Otherwise it looks as if an army of 11 million was unable to restrain the onslaught of 4.5 million.

[Sokolov] That has nothing to do with what I was talking about. But as far as our losses are concerned, there are many contradictions here as well.

In 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces lost 3.9 million persons as POWs. Of them, only 1.1 million survived the winter of 1941-1942. The Germans starved POWs, killed them in death camps, and did not consider them to be people. With regard for the losses in November, and a certain number of casualties that had not yet been returned to the ranks, the strength of our troops at the front between 22 June to 1 December 1941 should have been approximately 5.5-6 million, and not at all the 3,394,000 persons asserted in our official historiography.

Thus as of the end of 1941 our troops had a time-and-a-half numerical superiority over the enemy, and they possessed the same number of tanks as the enemy (1,954 and 1,940), being inferior only in artillery (22,000 and 26,800) and aviation (2,238 and 2,830). The assertions of some historians that we were standing "on the brink of destruction" seem exaggerated in light of these data.

[Bulychev] You cited a POW figure of 3.9 million. But according to the same German sources 2 million of our servicemen were imprisoned in the first year of the war.

It seems to me that you base your research on publicistic materials and encyclopedic references, and not original source documents. I am therefore rather doubtful of your figures. All the more so because you have not carried out detailed research in archives. And our official sources contain so many figures on the war that frequently they contradict each other. Obvious confusion is created. And so it is that you stubbornly base yourself on one figure cited in IZVESTIYA for prisoners of war in the first year of the war. But there are other figures as well.

[Sokolov] I insist on a figure of 3.9 million. In 1941. More of our soldiers were captured in 1942 as well. Until approximately November. POW losses in subsequent years were minimal, and sporadic as a rule. For example one could cite the encirclement of our troops in Eastern Hungary near Balaton.

[Bulychev] The figures were doctored....

[Minayev] This debate could go on endlessly. And both sides would insist that they are right. But I least of all would want us to claim absolute truth in this discussion. Let's be blunt: We do not have accurate data yet. We need special research. Meticulous, scrupulous, both in our archives and with captured documents, of which we have a sufficient quantity, according to information from the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And these documents have been almost untouched by researchers.

[Bulychev] And with all of the differing figures, we're just not talking the same language....

[Minayev] Analyzing the initial period, we cannot ignore the figure of Stalin. The assessment of his role in the war has moved in recent years from sharply positive to

sharply negative. This swing from one extreme to the other means that now practically all of the failures of the war, and especially of the initial period, are ascribed to Stalin. Was his role really that negative in the first months of the Great Patriotic War?

[Bulychev] You're right. Stalin is portrayed today only in the darkest colors. This is especially true of the initial period of the war. Recently most historians and publicists have been stubbornly promoting the point of view that in June-July 1941 Stalin was suffering from mental and physical exhaustion. If he was in such a state, how could he, I ask, conduct a meeting of the Politburo at 4 o'clock in the morning on 22 June 1941? How could he have been able to create the Supreme High Command General Headquarters by as early as 23 June? All we have to go on is the directive dated 29 June. Thus we find that this one-sided position in relation to Stalin belittles the role of the party in mobilizing the country to repel the enemy.

[Sokolov] Only oral testimony has reached us concerning the suggestion that Stalin had suffered from exhaustion. There are no documents confirming this. And testimony concerning his exhaustion was given basically in the period of the "thaw" of the 1950s.

[Bulychev] The most objective description of this period (and consequently to some extent of Stalin's role in it) is given in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev's report "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues." The premises and assessments it contains are a dependable reference point for development of historical science, and for truthful and clear analysis of the past associated with the Great Patriotic War. "When the enormous misfortune entered our common home," noted Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, "the Soviet people did not flinch, they bent neither to the blows of the first misfortunes and defeats, nor under the burden of the millions of deaths, torments and sufferings. They firmly believed in the impending victory from the first day of the war." This conclusion is based on many facts. Even on the fact that we marched into battle in the name of Stalin, meaning that he led our actions not only as a military official but also an ideological one. Moreover we won in many ways owing to Stalin as a military leader.

[Sokolov] Stalin a military leader? We won the war not owing to his decisions as a military leader, but more likely the reverse.

[Bulychev] That's argumentative.

[Sokolov] I have the facts to confirm this: What sort of great military leader could this be, if we won the war with losses of 4:1 in relation to the enemy's losses? This is a Pyrrhic victory. And what sort of military leader could this be, if all of the system he created (including during the war) presupposed not even the slightest initiative from the lowest levels?

[Bulychev] Young man, did you participate in the war?

[Minayev] That's not the point. Let's approach this subject objectively. Overall, in my opinion Stalin was not a great military leader. But we cannot diminish his role as a military and political leader. As a leader he knew whom to rely on in solving the most complex strategic problems of warfare.

[Bulychev] Let me return to Boris Vadimovich's mention of the absence of initiative. This could be declared only by a person who does not know what war is. I fought from Kiev to Berlin and Prague. As a tank driver-mechanic. There were times where we would not have been able to carry out an operations order had it not been for initiative, inventiveness and cunning, if you will. And we would not have been able to survive in combat. I feel that initiative was not suppressed at the lowest levels. It all depends on the preparedness and traits of character of the specific commander. Take a look at the press reports of our times: One officer acts on the training field as an innovator, while another acts stereotypically. And so it is in war. And to end the discussion of Stalin's role in the war, let me say this: The writing on the turret of my tank read "For the Motherland, for Stalin!". We went into combat and died with this name, and we gained victory with this name.

[Minayev] You, Aleksey Petrovich, were a tankman in the war. You know the T-34 from first-hand experience. You fought head-to-head with fascist tanks. I would like to ask you not as a historian but as a person with considerable frontline experience: Was our equipment superior in quality to the enemy's equipment? One of the causes of the failures of the initial period of the war, after all, involved just armament alone: the small quantity of new, modern equipment, and the shortage of ammunition.

[Bulychev] Our tanks had a large number of advantages. First of all, the tenacious armor. Shells bounced off it like rubber balls, while German armor was pierced like glass. Moreover the T-34 used diesel fuel, while their "savage" tank ran on gasoline. The fascist burned like a torch. When it came to the ammunition load, we carried 101 shells, while the Germans carried less. The running gear of our tanks was better. Meaning that we had the advantage in maneuverability. And as far as the tanks sent by the Allies are concerned, in our army they were handed down to cavalry units and used only as auxiliary forces in secondary sectors.

The question may arise as to why we were unable to put anything up against the Germans in the first months of the war if we possessed such modern armored equipment. Especially when we consider that Soviet troops had a numerical superiority in tanks (9,100 against the 4,300 of the fascists). Apparently the problem was that our fleet of vehicles consisted mostly of obsolete models, and there were only 1,475 units of new vehicles—KV's and T-34s—in the units.

[Sokolov] Permit me to disagree with the idea that the number of modern models of tanks we possessed was low. Even those 1,475 vehicles you mentioned could have destroyed the entire fleet of fascist equipment penetrating the front. Especially when we consider the vulnerability of its frontal armor.

The reason for the purely "tank" failures lies in something else. And namely in the fact that the Germans had an overwhelming superiority in aviation. As of the beginning of the collision we did of course have more airplanes (7,230 as compared to 4,980), but they were noticeably inferior in quality. The fascists had 3,300 new, modern types of airplanes in the troops, while we had 1,500.

[Minayev] According to the latest data on our aviation, only 17 percent of the air units of the border districts had been supplied with modern equipment by the time the war began.

[Sokolov] Moreover almost all of our aviation was destroyed at the airfields. The army was deprived of air support. The task of the Luftwaffe became easier: It could now attack our tank units unhindered. This, as an example, decided the outcome of the major tank engagement in the vicinity of Brody. Incidentally, in 1944 the Germans penetrated the front in the Ardennes just when the weather would not permit flying (the Allies had an overwhelming advantage in aviation). And when on the eighth day of the combat activities the skies cleared, American and English airplanes reduced to naught the successes gained by the Germans basically due to blows by tank units.

But why in the subsequent periods of the war we lost more armored equipment than the enemy is a special question. Apparently the roots of this problem lie in poor special training of tankmen. You would perhaps disagree with me on this, Aleksey Petrovich?

[Bulychev] It is hard for me to judge from personal experience. There were large tank losses at the end of the war—this was a direct consequence of the fact that the Wehrmacht began receiving antitank grenade launchers. As an example which possibly confirms to some extent your notion that tankmen training quality was inadequate, I can present an example from memoirs.

In the book "Marshal Rybalko," the second edition of which was published in Kiev, its author, Lieutenant General (retired) S. I. Melnikov, cites the following episode. In September 1942 Stalin held a meeting on the issue of manning the Bryansk Front's 5th Tank Army. The inadequacy of the skills of driver-mechanics was an acute issue. When Stalin asked what the viability of our tanks was, Lieutenant General P. L. Romanenko answered: "Our tanks live from one to three attacks, and then they are put out of commission." None of those invited to Stalin's meeting had any information on the enemy. Then he himself replied: "The enemy's tanks go

into the attack for a minimum of five times, and a maximum of 15 times. Then they perish." The following was named among the most important reasons for the ineffective use of our armored equipment: insufficient training of driver-mechanics. In accordance with an order from the peoples commissar of defense, driver training lasted not more than 10 engine hours, though good training required not less than 25 hours. Such economization of fuel during training affected our losses.

That is a fact.

[Sokolov] The poor special training of tank driver-mechanics is only half the problem. Consider how much we lost because 40,000 officers and generals were exterminated. What could be the quality of the work of a division commander in combat conditions if, for example, he was but a battalion commander just a few months previously? Or here is a fully concrete fact: At the beginning of the war a major was appointed commander of the Western Front's air forces, and a month later he was promoted to major general. Was there much that he could do given the inadequacy of his experience and training?

[Bulychev] I would like to dispute the figure you cited for the extent of the purge. These "40,000 purged" have been dragged threadbare through the papers. Let's look at accurate facts. The word itself "purged" is not equivalent to the concept "executed by firing squad." Thus out of those 40,000, 11,000 were returned to the army and navy as of January 1938. In addition the discharge orders of a little over 2,000 were repealed. Moreover many of them were expelled from the army for banal things—drunkenness and immoral acts.

[Sokolov] But it is directly stated in the "History of the Great Patriotic War" that all 40,000 were purged.

[Minayev] If you look at the exact wording, you find that they were "eliminated" from the armed forces.

[Bulychev] The purging of even a single person is an outrage. But we must see the entire picture objectively. In the least, we should exclude from these 40,000 the 2,000 that were discharged in those years for drunkenness and moral degeneracy. Some of the purged, by the way, were returned to the front.

[Sokolov] Somehow I never came across such facts. More likely the reverse is true; the purges even continued into the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Meretskov was arrested on the second day of the war. And how can there be any justification for the execution of the large group of talented military chiefs in fall 1941, when such a danger was facing the country?

[Bulychev] The removal of many of our generals and officers had to have an effect on the level of combat training. But we should not belittle the training of those commanders and political workers who were in the

ranks. They are the ones who led their subordinates in combat against a very strong enemy in a difficult moment. Not a single chunk of our ground was given away free. Moreover we were attacked by an army that had conquered rather highly developed European states in just a few days: Denmark in 1 day, Holland in 5, Belgium in 19, Poland in 35, France in 44, Norway in 63. How the "lightning war" against the USSR ended, we are aware. Its result includes the contribution made by those Soviet soldiers who absorbed the most powerful blow of the Germans in the most difficult first months of the war.

[Minayev] There was more than enough of everything in the summer and fall of forty-one: heroism and cowardice, great deeds and treachery. We lost an enormous amount of territory and major industrial and agricultural regions, and we were deprived of considerable manpower. The losses were great, but in the fierce fighting of the withdrawal we not only acquired important experience but also did not lose our faith in victory. Don't forget that the Wehrmacht also suffered losses, especially among regular officers who had fought through many European countries. We can boldly say that by the Battle of Moscow, the quality of the fascist army had become lower than in the first days of the invasion.

Of course, the Red Army's withdrawal in the 1941 campaign was a tragic test. But the fall of our state which Hitler counted on did not occur. The Soviet system demonstrated its viability. Soviet troops attained important strategic success in the Battle of Moscow. The defense of the Brest fortress, Przemyśl, Odessa, Sevastopol and other cities and towns of the country entered the chronicle of the war as a heroic chapter. In that difficult year of 1941, the foundation of the victory, which predetermined the course of world histories for many decades to come, was laid.

COPYRIGHT: "Sovetskiy voyn", 1989

Soviet Program to Design ICBM Reviewed
18010550 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 89 First Edition pp 3-4

[Article by Lieutenant General (Ret) G. Tyulin: "The 'Seven': Years, Accomplishments, People"]

[Text] The author of these memoirs had a direct hand in the creation and testing of the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, which was designated the R-7 (the "Seven").

Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin is a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, a doctor of technical sciences and a professor; in different years he was the director of a missile scientific research institute, a deputy minister, and chairman of the State Commission for Testing and Launching of Space Missile Systems.

He is a Hero of Socialist Labor, a Lenin Prize laureate and an RSFSR honored scientist and technician.

A Forced Measure

How did it all begin? When the memory stirs up the past, many things surface. At one time it was all thought to be just a succession of events, perhaps even random somehow, with no single thread tying them together. Time brought them together.

The war was nearing its logical conclusion. Fascism was doomed. Western agents conducted a secret conspiracy with German officials of extremely high rank. The victory of May 1945, which brought rejoicing to the planet, made some apprehensive, and even frightened. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to serve as a "deterrent." "Use of the atom bomb was not so much the last act of war of the Second World War as the first great operation in the psychological cold war with the USSR, which had already begun," wrote the famous English physicist M. Blackett. H. Truman, who assumed the post of U.S. President in 1945, viewed the atom bomb as America's chief means of pressure upon the Soviet Union. "The Russians will soon be put in their place, and then America will assume leadership of the world movement along the path it must take," the President declared to members of his cabinet. Churchill's militant speech had already been given in Fulton, and the malevolent secret plans of new military adventures code-named "Pincher," "Broider" and "Dropshot" were already being prepared. The situation required decisive and immediate responsive measures. But all of this came later on.

It was 1944, the second-to-last year of the war. At that time I was Chief of Staff of the 3d Army's Rocket Launcher (Katyusha) Unit Operations Group, which was within the composition of artillery of the 2d Baltic Front. I now cannot recall exactly what day it was, but it began with a telephone call and an order: Appear immediately before General A. I. Nesterenko, Deputy Commander of Frontal Artillery for rocket launcher units. The conversation was very short: "Lieutenant Colonel Tyulin, you are to leave for Moscow immediately for an interview with General Gaydukov, member of the Red Army Military Council for Artillery." Nesterenko was unable to explain the purpose of the interview. All he could say was that he was giving me a few days to transfer my affairs. I am sure it would not be hard to understand the state of a person who had served in the operating army from fall 1941 to summer 1944, and who was now forced to leave for the rear at a time when victory was so close. Nesterenko understood this, and switching to familiar address, he added:

"Your consent is not required. Transfer your affairs to your assistant. I'm sure that all of this is more serious than it might seem."

In Moscow I was assigned to a scientific and technical division headed by Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers A. I. Semenov. We were to thoroughly study models of German field rocket artillery, large quantities of which were available at the captured ammunition depots, and to prepare proposals on developing future rocket weapon systems.

Busying ourselves with Fau-1 cruise missiles, despite limited information, we realized rather quickly that there was nothing of special interest in the design of this "miracle weapon": The gunpowder charges were not an innovation at all; the Fau-2 long-range ballistic missiles were of incomparably greater interest. Information about them was meager. The Wehrmacht believed this weapon to be Germany's hope, and it imposed the highest classification on everything having to do with its production.

Once the division chief summoned me and asked:

"Well, how are things going, have you figured anything out?"

"Given the limited information that we do have, I would say yes," I replied.

"And what is your conclusion?"

"That we know practically nothing about the Fau-2 missile except that it exists and it flies."

"There are plans for a trip to Germany. I think we'll be able to figure things out more quickly locally. In early May our group will fly to Germany under the command of General Sokolov; you are to fly with Deputy Peoples Commissar for Ammunition Sinegubov. Go get ready."

Our first acquaintance with the fascist missile center at Peenemunde, on the island of Usedom, did not inspire hope for any great success for our mission. The test beds, the laboratory buildings, the shops of the experimental plant and the launching equipment for the Fau were depressing to look at. The bombing of Hitler's missile citadel, for which the English had prepared so long and carefully, had attained its goal. The full-scale production plants in the vicinity of Nordhausen created the same impression. The center's directors General W. Dornberger and designer Wernher von Braun, and together with them the engineering elite of the "missile production operation," had gathered up all of the basic documents and moved to the south of Germany, where they offered their services to the Allies.

Besides our group, other specialists sent by various departments came to Germany as well. L. M. Gaydukov, who arrived soon after, told me that there was a great deal of work to do, that we were not to count on returning soon, and therefore, I was ordered to unite the effort and create a single group. Later on it came to be

called the Soviet Technical Commission. It fell upon me to find a place for it to call "home," and to make preparations to greet all who were going to fill our ranks.

We were to establish which enterprises and companies cooperated in creating the missile weapon, and to recreate the system of mutual ties. The picture turned out to be rather complex: A vast system of cooperating companies took part in the programs to build the designed missiles. These companies were located in the vicinity of Greater Berlin (the country's capital and its suburbs), in Thuringen, in the cities and districts of West Germany, and in Czechoslovakia (Prague, Brno).

Soon the first telegram bearing a list of names arrived from Moscow, and what came to be called "Tyulin's enterprise" appeared in the Obershynevayde [transliteration] District, on Bismarckstrasse. This was a frequent meeting place of engineers and designers B. Ye. Chertok, A. M. Isayev, Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, M. S. Ryazanskiy, Ye. Ya. Boguslavskiy, V. P. Barmin, N. A. Pilyugin and many others. V. P. Glushko and V. I. Kuznetsov visited as well. S. P. Korolev arrived somewhat later (in September).

Gathering the Forces

In those days the name of engineer S. P. Korolev was known to a rather limited circle of people. He worked during the Great Patriotic War in one of the quantity-production aircraft plants producing warplanes. Korolev also worked on other problems, about which he spoke very little in those years. He also said just as little, by the way, about what his fate had been in the prewar period.

Our first meeting occurred back in 1937, and it was a chance meeting to some degree. I was then a student at Moscow University, and Sergey Pavlovich was working in the Missile Scientific Research Institute, with which the aerodynamic laboratory of Moscow State University collaborated by contract.

Korolev, who outwardly appeared reticent and quiet, had some sort of unrepeatable knack of communication with people that allowed him to open up their hearts. His uniform suited him, and his bearing was relaxed but honorable. He was able to deal well with technical problems. Our second meeting brought us together for a long time, until his last days. Special-purpose SS detachments carried out Reichsfuhrer Himmler's orders to destroy everything that might reveal the secret of the Fau. They acted decisively, they destroyed everything they could, but a few things survived; the Americans managed to capture finished missiles and drawings. What fell into our hands was only part of the archives, from which von Braun had removed all of the principal technical documents.

Not all of the scientists of Peenemunde fled to the West, but those who remained basically possessed middle qualifications, and they could not provide us sufficiently complete information about the missiles and the production operation as a whole.

Korolev delved into the essentials with his typical meticulousness. Once I asked him:

"Sergey Pavlovich, what do you think about all of this?"

He took some time before answering.

"The main thing that is important to understand right now is that solving the scientific and practical problems associated with missile technology would be unimaginable without a solid experimental and production base."

"But what about people?" This question had to be of some concern.

"People?" Korolev echoed. "They're out there. There might have been more of them, if only...."

He suddenly fell silent and changed the subject. Much later I learned that the dark period of the purges, prison, Kolyma and Magadan had made him cautious; he avoided opinions on controversial issues, as if afraid that it could happen all over again.

"We had made considerable progress back in the late 1930s," he said, recalling work in the Missile Scientific Research Institute, "though at that time we were concerned more with powder charges."

We often returned to this subject. Korolev would present his views, and give "von Braun's team" and "German scope" their due, but even then he believed that the design of the A-4 (the Fau-2)—the most sophisticated missile of that time—could not be used as a model for future development.

To Korolev, who predicted the possibility of creating such missiles even before the war, everything he saw was not surprising. He wrote back in 1935, in an article titled "The Missile in War," that it "could develop high speed and fly higher than all known types of aircraft." And today there are some extremely interesting documents dated 1936 stored in the archives: "Object No 212. Tactical and Technical Requirements on a Long-Range Cruise Missile with a Liquid-Fuel Rocket Engine." It was there that he noted that "a cruise missile is designed to be fired from the ground against remote area targets."

Korolev dreamed of his own special design office, a "unity of effort"; his maturity as an engineer and his talent as a designer would have permitted him to do this, but there were limitations on what he was allowed to do at that time.

Major A. I. Sokolov flew into Berlin in late October 1945. He reported that an invitation had been received from the English, who were making ready to carry out test launchings of an Fau-2 in the vicinity of Cuxhaven, in their occupation zone, on the shore of the North Sea. Many wanted to witness the launching of a ballistic missile. But the Allies agreed to admit only five persons. These were A. I. Sokolov, V. P. Glushko, Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, S. P. Korolev and the author of this article.

Upon our return to our "enterprise," Korolev proposed repeating what the English had done, but using our own resources (the English employed Germans at the launch site). The idea was supported by many of our comrades. By this time we had everything we needed for a test launching. Soon after, an order came from the Soviet Technical Commission announcing creation of a launching group.

L. A. Voskresenskiy was appointed chief of the flight test group (later on he became Korolev's assistant for testing). We sought permission from Moscow. We were refused on the grounds that it would be better to carry out such work in the Soviet Union. It cannot be said that we were disheartened by this decision. We expected it to some degree, and therefore the task arose of immediately creating a special train that would contain everything—from cars bearing the missiles, the ground equipment, the gyroscope testing laboratories, the radio apparatus and the shops, to quarters and living space.

Project R-2

A critical analysis of the new missile, later called the R-2, was carried out in the second half of 1946 at the suggestion of Korolev and Glushko. On the test bed the engine was revealed to possess reserve power, and the possibilities for significantly boosting it were demonstrated. The principal parameter of the new craft was that its range twice exceeded that of the Fau-2. Besides Glushko, the active participants of the work included N. A. Pilyugin—independent control, M. S. Ryazanskiy—radio engineering equipment. It was at this time that a fraternity of chief designers began to form. Besides those named above, it also included V. I. Kuznetsov—command instruments, and V. P. Barmin—ground equipment.

Getting ahead of myself somewhat, it would be pertinent to recall that the proposal for the R-2 was successfully defended by Korolev in April 1947 in the Scientific and Technical Council of the institute, in which he headed Division No 3 which later became a special design office. USSR Armament Minister D. F. Ustinov took part in the council's work.

A year passed. A commission came from Moscow in May 1946 to see what we had managed to accomplish. It included D. F. Ustinov, Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev, and the directors of a number of ministries.

On acquainting itself with the state of affairs the commission noted that much more had been done than had been expected, and it made a number of organizational decisions. Among them was a decision to form a special-purpose brigade out of veteran officers to extract all of the operational information from the Fau-2. Major General of Artillery A. F. Tveretskiy was appointed commander of the special-purpose brigade (I had served as his chief of staff in the Northwestern Front).

On 9 August 1946 S. P. Korolev was appointed chief designer of a special design office which was given the job of developing long-range missiles. Several design collectives headed by Glushko, Ryazanskiy, Pilyugin, Kuznetsov and Barmin took part in this work.

It was natural to appoint Korolev as chief designer: He was the greatest engineer in the area of missile technology, he possessed considerable knowledge and a deep understanding of the problems, and he was a willful, energetic person who knew how to unite and organize people.

And so, the people who were to solve a most complex range of scientific, technical, design, operational and production problems convened at the missile proving ground at Kapustin Yar. It would be hard to list the names of all who took part in construction of the first missile proving ground and in the testing of the first long-range missile, not as yet intercontinental. These were extremely erudite, self-sacrificing people who were competent in technical respects, and in their overwhelming majority, communists. They included the first Chief of the proving ground V. I. Voznyuk, L. A. Voskresenskiy, B. Ye. Chertok, Ya. I. Tregub, N. N. Smiritskiy, Yu. A. Mozhzhorin and Ye. Ya. Boguslavskiy.

A proving ground as such did not exist. Our special trains stood on a rail spur laid from Baskunchak. They were called the first and the second (they were referred to as "expeditions"). They consisted of rail cars containing drafting "rooms" and a computer office (containing computer technology that would seem antediluvian by today's standards).

Kapustin Yar

This was a difficult time of organizing and developing the proving ground. The first construction units arrived in late July and early August 1947. Bare, lifeless steppes, dry, dust-gray wormwood, camel's thorn, scanty islands of spurge. There was essentially no water. Dry winds chased billowing dust and tumbleweed about. Sand, rock, concrete and bricks for construction, water for drinking, food—everything had to be carried in.

The deadline for preparing and conducting the first launching was extremely close. But this deadline was set by the party Central Committee and the government, which is why the idea of postponement never came into

our heads. The work was organized, as they say now, like at the front. And most of those who were sent to these Volga Steppes were former frontliners.

The first launching was carried out at 0947 hours on 18 October 1947. It could not be said to have been entirely successful, but it could not be called unsuccessful either. The missile left the launching pad, but it deviated significantly from its prescribed trajectory. "But at least it flew," we consoled ourselves. We dug down to the cause: We found that the gyroscopes "strayed" and the error accumulated in response to vibrations. We corrected the problem and continued the testing. Eleven launchings were carried out in all. The last two were on 12 November.

The opinion that our successes in missile and space technology are not really "ours," that Korolev was aided to a significant degree by Wernher von Braun's developments and by his Fau-2, has circulated on several occasions in the Western press. What is being said between the lines is obvious. But it would be pertinent to recall one little-known page of history.

Stalin knew about Hitler's secret weapon. In his correspondence with Churchill, who was alarmed by the bombardment of London by fascist missiles, this weapon was mentioned several times. After the first launchings in Kapustin Yar, Korolev was invited to the Kremlin for an interview. He reported the work done, and described the concept of the R-2 missile.

Stalin said that the Germans had been able to achieve certain successes in designing long-range missiles. Korolev agreed with him, but he did not remain silent about the weaknesses of the Fau. He was certain that the group of our leading designers would be capable of creating a more dependable missile capable of greater range. Stalin listened restrainedly. "First we need to complete the work on the R-1," was his decision.

In the meantime Korolev had already found new design concepts that would significantly upgrade the quality of long-range ballistic missiles. I am referring to a system of new design and layout, with a jettisonable fuel tank and a nose section that separates at the end of the powered segment of the trajectory. But....

The first launchings....

A dull explosion, a mist over the steppe, and oppressive silence after the roar and thunderclaps....

Outwardly calm, but tense within, everyone was silent. The fragments had to be collected, the cause had to be sought, and thought had to be given to how to avoid such a thing in the future. Korolev led the critiques. Usually the SP (that's what we called him) rejected the first explanations right away. The second he listened to patiently, but he frowned and shook his head.

No, he was not stubborn in his own decisions. He knew how to listen to people. He was typified by unusual persistence and boundless energy. Korolev formulated his design conceptions in 1947. Ten years passed from this moment until the successful flight of the first intercontinental missile. No, not simply 10—just 10. It would be more just and more accurate to phrase it that way.

I can remember that time. The missiles were tested day and night, summer and winter. It is hard to convey the enormous exertion of physical and moral forces that was required of each participant of the testing.

I often wonder what was the main thing, what kept everything going. Enthusiasm? Military seasoning? Perhaps both. But not this alone. As fate would have it, there were many talented engineers, people with a flexible mind and golden hands, among the "first." There was so much that we had to do on our own, after all.

Shadow over the Planet

In August 1949, on another proving ground, an atomic explosion was accomplished in the presence of representatives from the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces and members of the government. The report of it caught the attention of the ruling circles of the USA. Feverish attempts to create a "superbomb" that could "deter the Russians" began. On 31 January 1950 Truman signed an order for the production of a hydrogen bomb. It stated: "Accelerate work on all weapons, including hydrogen weapons." A thermonuclear device called Mike was exploded on 1 November 1952. An enormous vortex, exceeding by many times that which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, caused joy among Pentagon strategists. And although Mike was not yet a bomb—it could not be raised aloft by an airplane, new threats, blackmail and noisy publicity concerning "America's unlimited might" resounded with new strength.

A dark shadow settled over the planet. A new term appeared in the lexicon of Pentagon generals—"sausage." This is the name that was given to the thermonuclear bomb, which was to "compel the Russians to think and tuck in their tails." But once again disenchantment awaited the proponents of "atomic diplomacy." On 8 August 1953 the Soviet government reported to the USSR Supreme Soviet that the USA no longer had a monopoly over the production of the hydrogen bomb. Here is what PRAVDA said on 20 August: "Last week a hydrogen bomb was exploded in the Soviet Union for testing purposes. The explosion was of considerable force owing to a thermonuclear reaction in the bomb."

Years will pass, and they will come to be called "the three K's"—Korolev, Kurchatov, Keldysh. A remarkable and talented engineer, a highly talented physicist and a mathematician of enormous range who led the creation of the theory of superlong-range missile flight

(and later on the theory of space flight), they were acquainted with each other since long ago. For many long years Sergey Pavlovich, Igor Vasilyevich and Mstislav Vsevolodovich were bonded by firm creative friendship. They spent a great deal of time together thinking about how to put a thermonuclear charge together with a launch vehicle. And this also was a forced responding measure. A forced one!

The chronicle of the events of those years, were we to present it in its entirety, would be very voluminous. Here are but a few dates.

1948, September. Kapustin Yar proving ground. Flight tests on the R-1 missile. Three phases, with the last occurring in winter (late 1950).

1950, April. A special design office for development of long-range missiles is organized in the scientific research institute out of departments subordinated to Korolev (with Department No 3 being the main one).

1950, October. Kapustin Yar proving ground. Flight tests on the R-2 missile begin.

1952, October. Kapustin Yar proving ground. Launchings of experimental missiles to work out the new systems of the future R-5 missile. Flight tests on this craft begin in March 1953.

1954, May. Proposals to begin work on intercontinental strategic (including naval) missiles are submitted to the government. Work on the initial plans for the R-7 begin in July. It was in this year that development of the proposal for building the future cosmodrome at Baykonur was started.

Deep scientific research projects were carried on in parallel—for example ones such as "Investigation of Variants of a Long-Range Rocket Employing Propellant Based on High-Boiling Oxidizer" (1952), design and flight testing of operational-tactical missiles, missiles for the navy, geophysical missiles....

The first models of ballistic missiles were viewed by their creators not as finished works but as one stage in the creation of future designs, ones capable of higher payloads and longer range. "We need to cross the enormous range barrier," said Korolev, "and we will...."

A long road was traveled during the postwar years. There were many successes, and there were bitter failures. Substantiated, precise calculations were needed in order to analyze the mishaps; the characteristics of processes that deviated at some moment from what had been anticipated had to be recorded. I remember Korolev summoning the chief engineer after one of the explosions and asking him to provide all of the necessary data right away.

"How soon?" the engineer asked.

"Tomorrow, by 1200 hours," the chief's voice was firm.

"That would be impossible," was the reply. "It would take that much time just to get home and back."

Korolev exploded.

Sergey Pavlovich was hard-boiled, hot-tempered, intolerant of red tape, but easily appeased, and kind. By the way, out of the very many people I had the fortune to meet and work with in those years, I don't think there's anyone whom I would call cruel and evil. And not just because I might feel uncomfortable in doing so. That's the truth.

A Step Toward Space

The history of the creation of the first intercontinental ballistic missile is complex and dramatic. First there were the conceptual design, the experimental model, the mock-ups, and the captive and field tests. Then there were quantity production, the trouble-shooting, the steps toward perfection....

In order to create a dependable missile shield, we had to solve a number of serious problems in design, production, production organization, new materials, many complex and precision instruments, and diverse ground equipment. But the dream of conquering space was already alive.

Creation of intercontinental missiles was associated with construction of cosmodromes with complex launching structures, and with creation of a special command and measuring complex located within the USSR and on the World Ocean to control spacecraft in flight and to receive and process information from them.

And all of this was done.

The search for unusual technical concepts and the extremely tight schedules required enormous effort from the designers of the new missile. Had it not been for the rich experience accumulated by S. P. Korolev and his collaborators, and had it not been for the experience of other design collectives and the creators of individual machine units and missile systems, the task of creating the first intercontinental ballistic missile would hardly have been completed so quickly.

Then came August 1957.

The preparations, fueling the rocket, checking the systems at the launch position, the meeting of the state commission, and the reports from the technical director.

Years passed, and missiles of improved design joined the inventory. Missile units capable of operating this equipment perfectly and performing their combat duty vigilantly and reliably were formed.

The English scientist K. Gatland [transliteration] admits: "The R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-66 Sapwood according to the NATO classification) created in the Soviet Union had a high take-off weight and was extremely promising as a launch vehicle. The USA's first intercontinental ballistic missile, the M-65 Atlas, was of smaller size and lower take-off weight, and it was less effective as a launch vehicle than the R-7 missile."

The first intercontinental missile was launched to maximum range on 21 August 1957. Academician M. V.

Keldysh had this to say about it later on: "...Both the design of this missile was new, and the engines were based on a new design; many innovations were introduced into the control system and into the system of ground equipment. But Sergey Pavlovich did not stop his work after these accomplishments...."

Space launch vehicles created out of our first intercontinental missile opened mankind's road to the stars, to the shoreless ocean of the Universe.

Tenets of, Debate on U.S. 'Strategy of Competition'

18010440 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General Yu. Lebedev and Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Podberezkin: "What Lies Behind the 'Strategies of Competition' Concept?"]

[Text] The "strategies of competition" concept, which appeared on the scene of American political life not long ago, has recently drawn the attention of specialists and the public. (We would mention parenthetically that it is translated also as "competing strategies" and "strategies of rivalry," which does not essentially change the matter.) President George Bush called precisely this concept "as American as apple pie," no doubt with the fact in mind that it corresponds entirely to the spirit of all U.S. policy. There are grounds for assuming that the "strategies of competition" are not only to the liking of ruling U.S. circles, but also reflect the specific features of American military policy.

"Strategy," according to experts with the Heritage Foundation who prepared the new administration's regular report on long-range priorities and policy means, "is defined as a plan for developing and using national resources for achieving foreign and defense policy objectives. A good strategy is, therefore, one whereby the funds allocated are utilized wisely and effectively." The Heritage Foundation experts believe that the new concept is an example of this kind of good strategy, which attaches paramount importance to making the most effective possible use of resources allocated for military purposes.

Some people might object to what we have said on the grounds that every state tries to adhere to these principles. True, but the question is one of how to spend available resources, for what purposes, in the current situation, fundamentally new in many ways.

The authors of the American concept do not hide the fact that its purpose is the thoroughly adjusted coordination and agreement of the main tenets of U.S. policy in three areas: use of the U.S. armed forces (questions of military art); organization and financing of research and development (R. and D.) in the interest of the armed forces; and finally, the organization of procurements of weapons and military equipment. Let us discuss them in detail.

With respect to the use of the U.S. armed forces, the "strategies of competition" concept has the objective of introducing new weapon systems as rapidly as possible for purposes of enhancing the employment of military force as a foreign policy tool. In reality it means the development of new forms and methods of warfare, which is ultimately producing changes in the entire U.S. military doctrine. A statement by former American President R. Reagan is extremely noteworthy in this

respect: "Our military leaders, like those of our enemies, are presently rethinking military doctrines and the structures of their armed forces, which is a consequence of these (technological changes) and other applications of technologies for military purposes." He went on to say: "As this trend of military rivalry continues, it will probably increasingly focus on the use of nonnuclear weapons, which, by combining Stealth technology with super-high accuracy at great range (of the weapons—Yu.L. and A.P.), will once again open up possibilities for inflicting strategic nuclear strikes." These thoughts were defined even more concretely in recommendations of the Heritage Foundation, which assign an important place to possibilities for using air-and sea-based cruise missiles without nuclear warheads as strategic weapon systems.

In accordance with the "strategies of competition" concept, which regards taking advantage of the enemy's weaknesses and one's own advantages as their main task, changes in U.S. military art are already being reflected in some ways in U.S. military art. Among other things, it is believed that the vulnerability of the rear deployment areas constitutes a weakness in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. The new strategy therefore recommends employing strikes against second echelons and reserves deep in the territories of the Warsaw Pact states. In accordance with this, the "strategies of competition" call for the creation and deployment of highly accurate long-range missiles armed with nonnuclear warheads by the United States and its allies.

And so, an evolution of military-political thinking is occurring in the USA and NATO in the area of preparing for offensive combat operations calling for deep strikes against the territories of the Warsaw Pact nations. This aspect should be taken into account in connection with the talks on the reduction of armed forces in Europe, at which questions pertaining to the use of new types of weapons for offensive purposes will occupy a place of considerable importance.

A second highly important area is the selection of priority areas for scientific and technological confrontation and reliance on making maximum use of those technological advantages which—and the USA is confident of this—the United States and its allies possess over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization. This has to do with using the achievements of scientific and technological progress—information processing, control, optics and so forth—for military purposes, creating a situation in which the USA is always making a "qualitative leap" in the most important areas of the scientific and technological revolution and leaving Soviet weapon systems behind. Priority is beginning to be given to the development of volley-fire, jet-propelled weapon systems, cruise and ballistic missiles armed with nonnuclear warheads, the latest systems for combat command and control, communications, reconnaissance, radioelectronic warfare and so forth.

Many of these types of weapons have already been developed, and the U.S. armed forces have even begun receiving some of them. It is planned to create and deploy even more systems, however, primarily in Europe. The Grumman corporation, for example, is developing the Joint Scanning and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS) for scanning an area of hundreds of miles from the air and transmitting data on targets to be attacked to ground stations and aircraft. Northrop is testing the Tacit Rainbow, an unmanned aircraft designed for homing in on and destroying enemy radar equipment. The Air Force and Navy are preparing to begin producing aircraft with Stealth technology (as well as a new generation of longer-range cruise missiles, incidentally), and so forth.

There is yet another aspect to the "strategies of competition": the selection of this or that weapon system or military technology takes into account not just their own combat effectiveness, but also the extent to which these systems will depreciate the Soviet Union's outlays on defense. It is also asserted that in the '70s and to some extent at the beginning of the '80s, Soviet outlays for certain categories of weapons and military equipment were greater than those of the United States. The well-known report "Differentiated Restraint" states that in recent years the USSR has constantly outstripped the USA in the stockpiling of weapons and military equipment. And so, they propose undertaking not merely a similar buildup of corresponding weapons, but the acquisition of qualitatively new weapon systems which would be many times more effective. "We must take advantage," the report states, "of technological achievements more rapidly than the Soviets..., thereby making Soviet weapons obsolete."

Let us leave assessment of the reality of the USSR's "outstripping" to the conscience of the authors of such reports. The main thing for us is that one of the main principles in the "strategies of competition" calls for neutralizing Soviet defense efforts by deploying qualitatively new weapon systems for less than the Soviet Union will be forced to spend. Western analysts love to cite the example that the military's acquisition of the B-2 Stealth strategic bomber will depreciate the USSR's outlays on its air defense system, which they put at 200 billion dollars. Former Defense Secretary C. Weinberger stated "We must come up with programs the response to which will cost the USSR far more than our outlays." In other words, either the USSR will be forced to spend considerably more resources to ensure its security than the USA or else it will have to accept the achievement of military-technological and ultimately, strategic military superiority by the United States.

Finally, a third area of application for the "strategies of competition" consists of coordinating efforts in the military area with other aspects of the administration's political course: coordinating research and development plans with procurements among the departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; putting relations with

Congress into order, particularly in the area of the military budget; and correlating the U.S. position in the weapon reduction talks with military development programs.

There are obviously substantial problems in each of these areas. It will certainly not be an easy matter, the American experts believe, to overcome the discord among the U.S. military departments, each of which tries to get approval for a "long list of only its programs."

The situation with respect to the allocation of funds in Congress is perhaps even more difficult. In the situation of the budget deficit it frequently objects to additional funding for the Pentagon. Ahead lies the difficult process of reducing a number of secondary programs to make money available for more promising ones, the number of which is rapidly growing as use of the latest technologies accelerates.

But these are internal problems, so to speak. The intention of "combining" "a technological leap" in the arms race with the Soviet-American talks on disarmament, in our opinion, poses a particular danger. As a result of this, in accordance with the "strategies of competition," they are attempting to eliminate from the agenda for the talks such issues as the Strategic Defense Initiative and all military space activities in general, including the development of antisatellite weapons; limitation of sea- and air-based cruise missiles and new generations of aircraft with Stealth technology, including the heavy B-2 bombers; ASW defense systems, and a broad range of nonnuclear offensive weapons. The USA turns out also not to be interested in making its military doctrine exclusively defensive and eliminating capabilities for conducting aggressive, offensive actions. In other words, the "strategies of competition" nullify in many ways the positive results achieved with great effort in the talks and can lead to a new round of an arms race of quality.

Norwegian Military Committee Chairman on Purpose of Visit

*18010450 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Mar 89 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with K.M. Fredheim, chairman of the Storting's Military Committee, by Col V. Streltsov and Capt 1st Rank A. Zlydnev under the rubric "Interview on a Current Subject": "We Are For Strengthening Trust"]

[Text] The schedule for the visit to Leningrad by the Norwegian members of parliament in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet was so packed that it was difficult to count on an interview with K.M. Fredheim, chairman of the Storting's Military Committee. Nonetheless, we did manage to meet with Mr. K.M. Fredheim prior to the guests' departure for Murmansk. He agreed to an interview with KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are the objectives of your delegation's visit to the Soviet Union? What have you seen, and what remains to be done?

[Fredheim] The idea stemmed from our work on a long-range, 5-year Norwegian defense program being discussed in our committee. The main purpose of the trip to the Soviet Union arose out of an interest in your restructuring. This includes the restructuring in relations between the East and West, in which a rapprochement has taken shape of late. We asked the Soviet embassy to arrange for a meeting in the USSR Supreme Soviet and with local military officials in order to see whether a new level of contacts was possible. We were primarily interested in three things. First was the possibility of conducting arms talks on both the political and military levels, particularly since the visit coincides with the talks in Vienna. In the second place, we wanted very much to hear your own assessment of the progression of and prospects for the restructuring. In the third place, we wanted to know how your decision unilaterally to reduce your armed forces would work—not just in general, but specifically in the northern regions of the USSR. I can briefly comment on all three objectives.

With respect to positive prospects for the talks in Vienna, following the talks in Moscow I had the impression that they are realistic, that they actually exist. This is due to a significant degree to the fact that the Soviet Union is demonstrating a willingness to respond flexibly to various issues of international relations and to take a constructive position. The main impression we had following the talks in Moscow and Leningrad is that the restructuring process is irreversible and is promising in all respects.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You represent the Norwegian Storting's Military Committee. The readers of our newspaper would be interested in learning for what purposes it was established and what its specific functions are.

[Fredheim] Our parliament consists of professional committees (education, foreign political, railway transport, military and so forth). The Storting's Military Committee deals with matters pertaining to national defense. The military budget and long-range programs are under its control. And if any sort of hitch occur in the Ministry of Defense, we are authorized to hear a report from the defense minister and have parliamentary authority to make demands of him.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces began a few days ago in Vienna. What has been the reaction in your nation to this event, and what do you expect from them?

[Fredheim] We pin great hopes on the talks in Vienna both on the general European level and from the standpoint of our state. Our popular masses are following the talks with interest. Opinions to the effect that these talks are a real opportunity to restrain the senseless arms race are to be found in many of Norway's leading newspapers and on radio and television.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We know that there has long been a specific Soviet program designed to reduce the level of military confrontation in the northern part of Europe. There has been no specific response to it on the part of NATO. Why do you think this is?

[Fredheim] From the standpoint of our government, it can be said about this problem that Norway's armed forces are not large enough to create a problem for our neighbor, the Soviet Union. The Norwegian point of view is that individual regions should be singled out for disarmament (in central, northern and southern Europe). We feel that it is expedient to consider everything as a whole—that is, on a general European scale. The Norwegians take this stance, since they are not proponents of the so-called "sausage" theory whereby the ends are enlarged by applying pressure to the middle. In other words, if arms are greatly reduced in the middle, this should not result in a concentration of military power on the flanks. We are against this theory.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The idea of establishing a nonnuclear zone in the northern part of Europe has become widespread in that region. What is the Norwegian government's present position on this matter?

[Fredheim] The North Atlantic bloc has nuclear weapons. There are none in Norway. The Norwegian government and most of the Storting deputies are basically in favor of establishing a nonnuclear zone in northern Europe. This problem has to be considered in a general European context, however.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Mr. Chairman, relations between our nations have not always been bright. Do you not think that a good tradition is emerging today in contacts at the level of parliaments and delegations dealing with defense matters of our states?

[Fredheim] How could it be otherwise? It is a good beginning. If we meet frequently and discuss the problems troubling us, I believe that it will be easier to trust one another.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Mr. Fredheim, permit me to ask one last, unofficial, so to speak, question. How does your family view the Soviet Union and the changes occurring here?

[Fredheim] My children, like my wife and myself, feel that there is much that makes good sense in Mikhail Gorbachev's policy. If the leaders of other states proceed with equal intelligence and far-sightedness, I believe that we can live in peace and tranquility.

Gromov's Experiences in Afghanistan Considered
18010515 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 1, Feb 89 pp 76-80

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Roshchupkin and Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik under "Essays, Publicist's Materials" rubric: "They Remember Khowst and Kabul...: Lines in the Portrait of Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General V. Gromov"]

[Text] Kabul-Termez-Moscow—That is it. The last column of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan has gone across the border bridge at Termez. Now it is the contingent of the former....

For Lieutenant General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, one of the most complex and critical tasks given to him by his fate in the military was the leadership of our forces in Afghanistan. And now their withdrawal is over. Over snow-covered mountain roads, where our soldiers had to look out for avalanches and glaze ice, obstructions and rock slides, ambushes and mines. Where any thoughtless step or wrong decision by a commander can be fatal. What he proposed to himself on New Year's Eve did come about: the efficient withdrawal of forces.

By the way, is it only now, at the time of the withdrawal, the final point in the long road from the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, that the heavy burden of the commander's responsibility caused him for days on end to be like a tense string reacting keenly to any change in the situation?

He gives a parting glance back to the highway, on which the troops were returning to our border. Perhaps he remembered Operation "Magistral" [highway] that was concluded a year ago? That was the code name under which they carried out combat operations with the Afghan forces to break through the blockade at Khowst. Because of its geographic position, the district of Khowst, which juts into Pakistani territory, was the target of constant attacks by major opposition forces. For several years, their armed formations kept a vicelike hold on the district.

On Lieutenant General Gromov's map, the district was marked as one of the main fields of battle with antigovernment forces. According to reconnaissance data, more than 100 detachments led by "field commanders" of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) were concentrated there.

The largest formation under the command of Jelaludin numbered about 5,000 men and was armed to the teeth with up-to-date weapons of American, British and Pakistani construction, including the "Stinger" and "Blowpipe" portable antiaircraft missile systems. Jelaludin's detachments dug in around the road from Gardez to

Khowst. The population of Khowst and the grouping of Afghan forces found themselves in a blockade. They could be helped only from the air.

The commander was given daily reports on the situation in Khowst. Adhering to the humane principles of the policy of national reconciliation, the Afghan Government with the help of its representatives sought to open the way through peaceful means. It was a matter of life or death for thousands of people: it was necessary to supply bread, medicine and necessities to the starving population of the district.

Negotiations were held over the course of 20 days with Jelaludin's representatives and elders of the dzhadran tribe living in the district. But while the negotiations were going on, counterrevolutionary leaders took advantage of the respite to regroup their forces and to mine the road and approaches to it. They drove the people from their homes and forced them to flee to the mountains or across the border. The main forces of the rebels were concentrated near the strategically important Sate-Kandao Pass. In the reports of Western radio stations, with which Lieutenant General Gromov regularly familiarized himself, the pass was called nothing less than the "impregnable citadel of the mujahedin" (fighters for the faith).

The reports of scouts verified that this was not just empty bragging. Rebels under the leadership of foreign military advisers established several zones of defensive fortifications built in accordance with the latest NATO engineering technology. Western specialists organized strong air defense with reliance on the prevailing heights. There they set up air defense systems, mountain-version antiaircraft guns and large-caliber machine guns.

It was clear to Gromov that to storm the key line on the road from Khowst to Sate-Kandao Pass involved possible heavy losses. And it was not so simple to crush the multi-stage fire system. The officers of all staff sections under the commander spent more than one sleepless night carefully working out an operational plan. They coordinated its details with the Afghan general staff. They took measures to prevent a leak of information.

The commander continuously received reports from the field of battle and more and more new data appeared on his map. Symbols appeared on it in the form of parachutes meaning airborne assault forces. A flurry of open canopies had hardly begun to revolve at high altitude in the sky, when long machine gun tracer trajectories rushed at them from the pass. It seemed that the burst of machine gun fire left no one alive in the airborne assault force.

An intense expectation froze in the Gromov's tired eyes. The rebels, having opened fire from all kinds of weapons, involuntarily revealed the position of all of their weapon emplacements. Soviet and Afghan aircraft delivered an

aimed bombing attack against them and then powerful artillery assaults were carried out. The strong fire system at the pass was knocked out almost without losses.

But what about the airborne landing force? No, no members of the airborne assault force suffered that time. It was merely dummies under the parachute canopies—the airborne landing operation was not real.

"What distinguishes Gromov from other military commanders? The gift of foresight, firmness and stability in the combat situation. In any situation, even the most complex, he is always self-restrained, disciplined and equal in his relations with everyone. The commander very much respects industriousness, professionalism and knowledge of military affairs in people, especially officers. But not being timid himself, he considers that the main thing for a commander of any rank is to be exemplary and fearless in combat." (from a conversation with a Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces).

During those same January days, the ubiquitous staff armored personnel carrier of the commander and his pair of helicopters hurried to where the success of the operation was being determined. Gromov's slender youthful figure was frequently seen at gun positions, at outpost emplacements and blockades located along the road to Khowst. Battles and unblocking actions fully revealed the courage, tactical mastery and initiative of many soldiers and commanders—Colonels I. Parkhomenko, Yu. Storov, V. Yevnevich, Lieutenant Colonel of the Guard V. Vostrotin, Lieutenant Colonel G. Belousov, Major of the Guard N. Petrov and many others.

The voice of the commander warms when he tells of the young officers of the guard unit, where Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Vostrotin serves and of Guards Senior Lieutenants S. Tkachev and Yu. Gagarin.

On the night of 8 January 1988, an avalanche of rocket and mortar fire came down on Hill 3234, where airborne assault troopers were dug in. Under its cover, closely-spaced lines of rebel riflemen made up of so-called detachments of suicide volunteers and Pakistani commandos attacked the hill. They walked, without bending over, in their black overalls similar to an SS uniform with the sleeves rolled up in the manner of Hitler's bullies. And they bawled, just as did the soldiers of the Wehrmacht in their time: "Surrender, Russian, Moscow is kaput!" But, just as their grandfathers in the Great Patriotic War, the guards did not waver.

After establishing a perimeter defense, the airborne assault forces rebuffed twelve attacks. A fierce battle raged for 7 hours and the enemy lost more than 100 men. Officers Tkachev and Gagarin were in the most dangerous sectors. Following them, all 39 airborne assault troopers fought courageously and fearlessly. The

wounded did not leave the field of battle and continued to fire as long as their arms could hold their assault rifles. This is the great example of commanders!

Operation "Magistral" was one of many developed and carried out in Afghanistan under the command of B.V. Gromov.... One can hear dynamism, aspirations and hope for the further development of success in the very name of this operation. Indeed, the rout of the counter-revolutionary forces in the Gardez-Khowst region can hardly be overestimated in military terms. It is no accident that precisely after Operation "Magistral" an application was sent to Moscow to award the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to B.V. Gromov.

But the unblocking of the road to Khowst also had tremendous political and economic importance. It ruined the far-reaching plan of the armed opposition to separate the Khowst district and to proclaim a so-called "government of free Afghanistan" in its territory. It destroyed the myth of the so-called "impregnability" of this region, which the counterrevolution and Western "voices" had been spreading intensively. After the unblocking of the most important state highway, the people could fully sense the concern of the authorities in Kabul about the provision of food and fuel, whose delivery was organized by Soviet troops. The authority of the opposition ringleaders that had plunged the district into chaos and destruction was upset in the consciousness of people.

The combat and political experience of the communist and leader Gromov grew from year to year. Boris Vsevolodovich performed his internationalist duty on Afghan soil three times. In his duties as chief of staff and division commander from February 1980 through August 1982, he proved himself to be a courageous and well-trained officer. From March 1985 through April 1986, he led a special group of officers that gave comprehensive help to our units as well as to the Afghan Army in preparing and organizing the resistance against the counterrevolution.

And starting in June 1987, General Gromov was commander of our contingent in Afghanistan. His command and organizational qualities were revealed especially clearly at this post. The commander's service record included the performance of combat operations to rout basic formations of rebels in strategically important regions—in the provinces of Lagman, Vardak, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan and around Kabul. In the opinion of higher-echelon commanders, the merits of Boris Vsevolodovich in stabilizing the situation in the country and in coordinating close cooperation with the leadership of the Afghan Army are unquestionable.

What a fate! I simply admire this man. Here is an example worthy of emulation by the boys now growing up and by soldiers and officers. The young people will mature through the example of people like Gromov. (from the letter of L. Bychkovaya in the city of Zheleznogorsk).

The road of life and the officer's service. Where and what are its beginning and sources? Boris Gromov is a son of his time, a time seared by war. He did not see his father. Private Vsevolod Alekseyevich was killed in 1943 in battle in the bluffs of the Dnieper. The memory of his father and the example of his older brother Aleksey left a great mark in his life. They led the son of a frontline soldier to the dream of being a member of the military. At the age of 12, he became a pupil at a Suvorov Military School and he later was graduated from the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni S.M. Kirov. He entered the Military Academy of the General Staff from Afghanistan. And he finished it, by the way, with a gold medal.

In his more than 20 years of service in the forces, Boris Vsevolodovich met many commanders who left a mark on his heart. Can you really forget your first battalion commander—frontline soldier Lieutenant Colonel N. Yeroshenko! Nikolay Vasilyevich taught Lieutenant Gromov and other young officers what is necessary for combat and to be close to the soldier and to understand his mood, joys and concerns. And to this day, Gromov has maintained contact with his first battalion commander.

But life was also hard and pitiless with Gromov. His wife, Natalya Nikolayevna died tragically in an airplane crash. He was left with two sons. The oldest, Maksim, is in eighth grade and the youngest, Andrey, is in second grade. They can now once again feel the love and concern of their father and his sparing masculine tenderness. And a father's support, which is so needed by sons.

All of those with whom Boris Vsevolodovich went through combat in Afghanistan personally felt the concern and support of the commander. This is the work style and way of life of the delegate to the 19th Party Conference and Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General B. Gromov. And he worked in close contact with the political section and party organization of the staff of the limited contingent. There were rarely any party meetings of the directorate officers, sessions of the party commission, or meetings of personnel in units without fiery and direct declarations by the commander.

"In working with people, Boris Vsevolodovich does not permit any defects and demands the same of others," we were told by Major General A. Zakharov, Chief of the Political Section of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. "He, a candidate people's deputy of the USSR, is distinguished by high party qualities: honesty, responsibility and high-mindedness."

And it is as though he was able to pass on this baton, these qualities to his pupils, with whom he went through the first and most difficult period of the Afghan epic. They are Heroes of the Soviet Union Colonel Ye. Vysotskiy and Lieutenant Colonel R. Aushev, the bearers of combat awards officers B. Ogorodnik and V.

Dolich, and many others. He began with them and time proved that they—young battalion and company commanders—turned out to be worthy of their mentor.

Boris Vsevolodovich considers this stage in the development of the officer to be very important.

"What are the typical mistakes of some commanders at the company and battalion echelon?" Gromov asks. "They frequently make decisions without an adequate idea of the strengths and weapons of the enemy and of his refined tactics for actions in the mountains. Some seem to forget that their subordinates have to carry out a combat mission and subject themselves to fire. It is necessary not only to take such officers strictly to account but also to teach them, to teach them utilizing our truly priceless golden stock of combat experience."

...The scorching summer of 1980. An alarming situation had developed in the north of the country. Mortar fire, attacks against villages and the tent garrisons of our subunits and Afghan forces.... Armed formations of the opposition concentrated themselves in the almost inaccessible mountain region of Amir Dara near Farah. Their sallies became more and more impudent.

The combined motorized infantry unit where Colonel Gromov was chief of staff received the order along with Afghan units to wipe out a den of counterrevolutionaries. And so it happened that Gromov not only had to author a plan for combat operations but also to carry it out and lead people into combat.

Our subunits secretly entered the designated region. This, at least, is what Gromov thought. But in reality? The rebels were already waiting for them. How and where did they find out? Of course they had reconnaissance and the chief of staff knew this. Nevertheless.... The rebels mined the only road and blocked it with obstacles.

They cleared the way with clearing vehicles and when necessary they used crowbars and shovels. Gromov immediately faced many questions. Why did the enemy detachments one by one leave well-prepared positions and not enter into battle? From where should their strike be expected? Where should the command and observation point be located?

As things went along, Gromov abandoned the initial plan and decided to position staff vehicles in the immediate vicinity of the combat deployment. And he very quickly regretted this bitterly. It was for good reason that the rebels left their positions. Was he really unable to foresee their insidious plans?

As soon as the staff vehicles reached a level sector where they planned to set up the command and observation point, mines and "RS's" [rocket projectiles] began to explode. The firing became more accurate by the minute. The groups of rebels came ever closer. Colonel Gromov

made a difficult decision and called for the fire of regimental artillery against the command and observation point. Firing at themselves.... This battle subsequently forced him to rethink and reexamine many things....

But what was the result? Gromov's subordinates were able to resist, to resist and be victorious. This is when the first combat award appeared on the chest of Colonel Gromov—the Order of the Red Star. It is the most memorable for him, for that was when he called for fire against himself....

But our story about Gromov as a military leader would be far from complete if we did not speak about him as a political leader. There are many examples in the chronicles of the international mission of our army in Afghanistan in which problems in the stabilization of the situation were resolved without the use of force under the leadership of the commander.

And, talking about force, this was the force of the word and the force of the arguments and party conviction of the commander. Many facts speak of the correctness of his political decisions, when regions with a large population took the side of the government and sought reconciliation. Following the example of the commander, the leaders of combined units and units paid considerable attention to work with the local population and actively took part in the realization of the policy of national reconciliation. This line was also followed consistently during the days of the force withdrawal.

This is all. Still another difficult and crucial period in the life of a soldier and communist has remained behind. But will there be less party responsibility in the future? Hardly. For he always puts the performance of his party, service and, finally, general human duty as an internationalist soldier above everything else.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1989.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301 (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771).

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

14 JUNE 89